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Janny de Jong, James Leigh, Ine Megens, Marek Neuman, Senka Neuman Stanivuković and 
Margriet van der Waal 
Against the backdrop of unprecedented ecological changes and ensuing challenges to global solidarity, the 
digitalisation, transnationalisation and automatisation of the political and the everyday spheres, and the 
increasing power of deterritorialized operating systems (such as global financial institutions) in determining 
political and social realities, it becomes more and more difficult to locate Europe. Contemporary Europe is 
fluid, deterritorialized, and constantly emerging; as such, it brings into question the analytical strength of 
categories such as “national,” “regional,” or “global.” Europe nowadays is given meaning and is practised 
not only in political and media discourses, nor artistic output such as literature, film and installations, but 
also in infrastructures (roads and bridges), protocols, and security algorithms. It can be located in various 
places: not only in the institutions and policies of Brussels, but in the practices of migrants, on Facebook 
discussion boards, or in travelling exhibitions. Accordingly, we asked the participants of the 
annual  Intensive Programme (IP) of the Erasmus Mundus Master Programme Euroculture: Society, Politics and 
Culture in a Global Context  to locate Europe by examining how it may be given (multiple) meanings through 
actors’ practices and experiences, and where (meaning the spaces and their material conditions) these practices 
and experiences are being realized. 
The IP of 2018 was developed by the Euroculture programme at the University of Groningen and jointly 
coordinated with colleagues at Krakow’s Jagiellonian University.  The IP featured a broad and exciting 
programme of lectures, presentations and an excursion related to the main theme. Practice and space were 
used as analytical categories through which to explore Europe in a new and exciting way. Europe is 
multifaceted; it is not only “something,” but it is also “somewhere;” it is not only an “idea,” but is also an 
“act;” it is not only “imaginary,” but is also “material.” To understand Europe’s multifaceted nature, we 
asked students to explore in their research papers, which they had to present and discuss  in a workshop 
format, where Europe is rather than what Europe is.  
We encouraged students to explore the individual and collective practices and processes through which 
European spaces are given meaning and governed as a social and political imaginary. We were also interested 
in research which analyzes how feelings, experiences and emotions define relations between people and 
their (material) environments. For example, how might we encounter and experience Europe through senses 
of belonging, love and attachment, or fear? Our approach to space necessitated our students to become 
aware of how we “produce space” – make meaning of it – in our own interactions with it, and in the kinds 
of (research) questions we might pose about it.  
The main theme – Where is Europe? – was divided into three possible means to approaching space. The 
first potential approach to space considers it to be an environment that we can grasp with our senses, in 
which agents (human and non-human actors) find themselves, and where they can perform specific actions. 
This involves seeing spaces as places where individuals and groups engage with the material, visible, and 
measurable environment (either natural or human-made) that surrounds them. What we have in mind here, 
thus, is for instance how we make sense of our environment through different spatial categories that we 
assign and recognize in space: households, public spaces, neighbourhoods, nature, parks, cities, regions, 
nations, borders, etc.  
A second possible approach sees space in line with the ideological intentions imposed upon it. Here, one 
might consider and investigate how spaces are given meaning and turned into particular places through the 
work of planners, policymakers, researchers, politicians and other similar actors. The “work” these various 
actors carry out in order to “produce” particular spaces foresees a specific use of said spaces which is 
determined and regulated by the conventions, the beliefs, and by the language said actors use to speak about 
them. In this context, one can think of the impact/effect of maps, plans, regulations, laws, information on 
pictures, etc., which produce specific statements regarding spaces, and create certain bodies of knowledge 
about them. 
A third possible approach to space is to consider the actual meaningful practices that humans enact in 
their spatial environments: the “placemaking” processes. How are our direct experiences of the spatial 
materiality in which we operate mediated by broader socio-economic and political discourses and 
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expectations? How do we live our daily lives in the spaces that we occupy, and how do we make sense of 
these spatial experiences? How do we talk about these spaces and how do we represent them? 
Of course, we do not in any way suggest that these three approaches to space should be seen as separate, 
or exhaustive categories. On the contrary, all three analytical levels are intertwined. Rather, we offered this 
division in order to become aware that space does not just simply exist, but that different dimensions are 
involved in how any space – in this case, Europe in particular – is given meaning through socio-spatial 
practice.  
Students were asked to approach their research inquisitively and open-mindedly, as a practice of 
wondering, and to critically reflect upon the intellectual boundaries which are often set between different 
research fields, methodologies, and analytical dimensions. In other words,  we welcomed problem-driven 
research that is aware of, but not constrained by, disciplinary frontiers. We defined the following subject-
based (rather than analytical) subthemes, with each of these reflecting on the conceptual, methodological 
and empirical dimensions of the question guiding the 2018 Intensive Programme: Where is Europe?: 
1. Respacing Europe in the European Public Sphere: how Europe is given meaning through the 
emergence of the European public sphere as a place of dialogue and deliberation, but also confrontation 
and dissent.  
2. Replacing Europe in Everyday Life: how Europe is given meaning through the experiences and 
practices of Europeans in their daily lives.  
3. Reordering Europe through Political Practices/Institutions: how Europe is given meaning and 
governed as a political space through policy and political discourses and practices.  
In this volume, we have collected 8 of the best IP papers, divided over the three subthemes. 
1. Subtheme 1: Respacing Europe in the European Public Sphere 
Katharina Geiselmann analyses the importance and role of language in European memory politics by 
investigating discourse around the so-called “Holocaust law” in Poland. This law, making any mentioning 
of Poles being responsible or complicit in crimes committed during the  Nazi-era illegal, was meant as a tool 
of collective identity formation in Poland. Because of its vague language, Geiselmann argues that the law 
was never intended to be enforced, but was rather a tool to make a clear political statement. However, it 
was also an attempt to re-negotiate a common European memory in a manner more inclusive of the Eastern 
experience. Holocaust memory in the public sphere has the potential of bringing Europe closer together. 
Politicians and academics can, in other words, respace the European public sphere, and form an inclusive 
Pan-European memory. 
In her respective contribution, Linda Piersma explores how a variety of public and elite actors interact 
and together constitute a European public sphere, by analysing an online platform called “Debating 
Europe.” The platform is co-funded by the EU within its “Europe for Citizens Programme” and allegedly 
brings European leaders and citizens together to discuss issues of common concern. She argues, however, 
that the socio-political and online context of Debating Europe significantly shapes the discursive process. 
By doing so, it actually hampers the possibilities for genuine dialogue and fruitful interaction in an inclusive 
European space.  
2. Subtheme 2: Replacing Europe in Everyday Life 
Opening this section, Isabel Toman focuses on the impact of European, national and regional language 
policies on the sociolinguistic reality in the Basque country. Though the number of speakers of Basque has 
increased over the last two decades, all provinces do not experience this increase to the same extent. She 
finds the reason for these variances in the lack of legislative frameworks for minority language rights and 
the relatively free interpretation of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages by the 
respective national governments. Toman points towards a possible discrepancy between legislation and 
reality, as well as the importance of language hegemony and power concepts in shaping sociolinguistic space. 
Martina Adinolfi investigates the practice of squatting: the occupation of empty properties for housing 
needs and/or for the promotion of social activities. Because squatting generates direct-democratic forms of 
decision-making, together with autonomous and non-institutional modes of citizen participation and self-
managed consensus, it has noticeably influenced urban politics. Based upon her research of squatting in 
several European countries, Adinolfi argues that grasping the theoretical notion of space behind the place-
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making experience of squatting is crucial to understand how the European urban space can be re-shaped 
from below. 
3. Subtheme 3: Reordering Europe through Political Practices/Institutions 
Magdalena Kohl, in her contribution, takes yet a different perspective on towns and cities. She investigates 
how the German Association of Cities and Towns, the Deutscher Städtetag, made use of the refugee crisis 
in 2015 and 2016 to enhance its power and influence. Though it is not clear if this enhanced position of the 
urban versus the national and federal sphere will be a change for the long term, the paper shows that 
recalibration in favour of the urban scale is possible. 
Angela Medendorp takes a close look at cultural policy on a European level, by way of the European 
Border Breakers Awards (EBBAs), the EU prize for popular and contemporary music (2004-2018). To what 
extent do the EBBAs highlight cultural and linguistic diversity and what are the possible consequences for 
(the promotion of) European culture? The qualitative analysis sheds more light on the cultural agenda of 
the EU, the East-West (financial) power divide in Europe and the spread of English as the European lingua 
franca. The quantitative analysis of EBBA winners between 2004-2018 shows that nearly 80 per cent of the 
winners perform in English. Furthermore, winners hail predominantly from countries with strong 
economies. She argues that this leads to an image of European culture which lacks variety and contrasts 
with the aim of highlighting cultural and linguistic diversity within Europe.  
Juliane Olliger examines the challenge of maintaining and, if necessary, promoting European values, by 
investigating the value of solidarity during the recent migration crisis. Her findings show that enforcement 
of solidarity only worked partially. Supportive and undecided member states were responsive to the 
enforcement of political solidarity and increased their acceptance of relocations. However, critical countries 
were not responsive to political or legal-solidarity-enforcement and refused to accept relocated refugees. 
She argues that the EU needs to rethink its approaches to enforcing core values, such as solidarity, as it is 
necessary for the Union to function as a unity, particularly in times of crisis.  
In the final contribution to this selection of best student papers, Giorgina Spolverato analyses the 
judgment of the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) in the joined cases Aranyosi and Căldăraru. In its 
decision, the CJEU for the first time decided to interpret the European Arrest Warrant Framework Decision 
in a way so as to guarantee human rights’ protection of the “requested persons.” More specifically, the court 
had to balance two different principles recognized by the EU: on the one hand, the Protection from 
Inhuman and Degrading Treatment, as in the case at stake, deriving from inadequate detention conditions 
in the two states (Hungary and Romania respectively); on the other, the Principle of Mutual Trust and 
Recognition among EU Member States. Spolverato discusses the issue of whether the European Arrest 
Warrant Framework should be amended and the consequences this might have on the principle of mutual 
recognition. She further suggests some alternative solutions to enhance human rights’ protection in the 
cross-border fight against crime within EU territory.  
 
We would like to conclude by expressing our gratitude to everyone who made this 2018 edition of the IP a 
huge success. The event coincided with the celebration of the 20th anniversary of the Euroculture Master 
Programme. As usual, the organisation started more than a year before the actual event took place and 
entailed many lively and interesting discussions on the theme, the content of the research conference, 
meetings with alumni, an exhibition on previous IPs, the excursion, the  specific project that students would 
work on during the week,  the closing gala dinner and many other things. The Groningen team consisted 
of, in alphabetical order: Maria Ananchenkova, Janny de Jong, James Leigh, Ine Megens, Marek Neuman, 
Senka Neuman Stanivuković,  Margriet van der Waal and Marloes van der Weij. The team was helped 
tremendously by colleagues in Krakow: Duszan Augustyn, Karolina Czerska-Shaw, Juan Sarabia and Monika 
Nowak. We would also like to thank Angela Medendorp for her editing work on this IP student paper 
publication. Finally, a big thanks to the whole cohort of the Euroculture 2017-2019 group and Euroculture 
consortium staff who collectively contributed to making the 2018 edition of the IP a great event! 
  
The Importance of  Language in European Memory Politics: What 
the Discourse around the Polish ‘Holocaust Law’ Reveals 
Katharina Geiselmann 
1. Introduction 
Little did he know which consequences it would have, when Barack Obama used the term “Polish death 
camp” in 2012 on occasion of awarding the presidential Medal of Freedom to Polish war hero Jan Karski.1 
In fact, in February 2018 the Polish Lower House, Sejm, has finally passed an amendment to already existing 
legislation which would later be colloquially titled the Polish ‘Holocaust law’, officially being an amendment 
to the ‘Act on the Institute of National Remembrance’ (IPN).2 It was supposedly drafted to outlaw using 
this term, and made it a criminal offense to blame the Polish nation for any crimes committed during the 
Nazi occupation, being punishable with “a fine or the penalty of imprisonment of up to 3 years”.3 This law 
sparked a debate about the role of Poles during the Holocaust and the Polish governing Law and Justice 
party (PiS).4 In point of fact, “the new law was promulgated on the 73rd anniversary of the liberation of 
Auschwitz”, which certainly catalysed the debate.5 While responses to the new legislation are the focus of 
this paper, it should be noted that they are part of a much bigger debate and the law is only one example of 
the IPN’s work. For example, already in 2012 had the IPN launched a website titled “Truth about German 
camps”, which is accessible in 8 languages.6 
Holocaust remembrance became central to the European project after 1989. In fact,  German specialist 
in European Studies Aline Sierp, who has published widely on memory and identity issues, summarises that 
the Holocaust “seems not to have been of particular importance before the beginning of the 1990s”.7 
However, her study, using the databank EUR-lex, which includes all kinds of public documents issued by 
both the EU institutions and the member states, reveals that it “has occupied more space in European 
documents since 1990 than any other event in European history”.8 She also states that all resolutions passed 
since then by the European Parliament “refer to the importance of the Holocaust in defining the main goals 
of the European Union, pointing to its role as the new founding act of the EU”.9 Other scholars have also 
brought forward similar theses: For instance, the Holocaust is being considered the founding event of 
Europe by German historian Dan Diner.10 Similarly, the Holocaust is proposed to be a negative founding 
myth as part of a European memory by German political scientist Claus Leggewie.11 Tony Judt, British-
American historian, states that “the new Europe is […] being built upon historical sands at least as shifty in 
nature as those upon which the postwar edifice was mounted”, thus maybe pointing to the dangers of 
                                                 
1 Rick Noack, “Obama Once Referred to a ‘Polish Death Camp’. In Poland, That Could Soon Be Punishable by 3 Years in 
Prison,” Washington Post, 17 August 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/08/17/obama-once-
referred-to-a-polish-death-camp-in-poland-that-could-soon-be-punishable-by-3-years-in-
prison/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.07d19a23230e. 
2 Institute of National Remembrance, “The Act on the Institute of National Remembrance,”  
https://ipn.gov.pl/en/about-the-ipn/documents/327,The-Act-on-the-Institute-of-National-Remembrance.html. 
3 Ibid. 
4 This international backlash eventually led to the law being changed on 27 June 2018 in a special procedure, which made 
offensive statements civil instead of criminal offenses. 
5 Sławomir Sierakowski, “Jarosław Kaczyński’s Jewish Question,” Project Syndicate, 3 February 2018,  
https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/poland-holocaust-death-camps-law-by-slawomir-sierakowski-2018-02. 
6 Institute of National Remembrance, “German death camps and concentration camps in Nazi occupied Poland 1939-45.”, 
http://truthaboutcamps.eu. 
7 Aline Sierp, History, Memory, and Trans-European Identity: Unifying Divisions (Routledge, 2014), 124. 
8 Ibid., 124.  
9 Ibid., 124.  
10 Dan Diner, “Haider und der Schutzreflex Europas,” Die Welt, 26 February 2000,   
https://www.welt.de/print-welt/article504303/Haider-und-der-Schutzreflex-Europas.html. 
11 Claus Leggewie, “A Tour of the Battleground: The Seven Circles of Pan-European Memory,” Social Research 75, no. 1 (2008), 
219. 
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drawing identity and legitimacy from history.12 However, he explicitly states that the EU is built “out of the 
crematoria of Auschwitz”, and that it “remains forever mortgaged to that past”.13 Subsequently, it is 
important to understand how the past is used in contemporary politics. More specifically, there is a need to 
understand why PiS drafted this law and how the debate around it was framed by different actors. Leggewie 
points to a difference in memory politics in Western and Eastern Europe, since the West can look back on 
a success story after World War II, while the East lived through more suffering due to the Iron Curtain.14 
This hints at the issues that might arise when trying to form one pan-European memory. There are different 
experiences to be aware of, and different perspectives to be acknowledged. The question arises whether the 
law is purely part of PiS’s memory politics or can also be interpreted as its attempt to re-negotiate a European 
memory. Does the debate suggest that the European public sphere served as platform to successfully 
negotiate Holocaust narratives? Since this is a recent development, there are, to my knowledge, no studies 
dealing with the law.15 This gives me the opportunity to shed light on a new issue, but also puts me in a 
position in which I need to be careful how to interpret it. 
The main goals of this paper are twofold: Firstly, it investigates whether the debate can reveal to what 
extent the law is part of PiS’s memory politics. This will be measured by detecting a tool of memory politics, 
namely collective-identity-formation through Othering Germans and emphasizing the status of Poles as 
victims. Secondly, the paper analyses to what extent it could represent an attempt to re-negotiate a European 
memory. To investigate this aspect, the Polish case will be compared to other Central Eastern European 
(CEE) countries. The material for this analysis consists of selected statements by academics and by Polish, 
German, French, and EU-politicians. Thus, the debate can be analysed in the bilateral sphere and the EU-
sphere. While solely European politicians were included to focus on the debate inside of Europe, academics 
conducting research abroad were included because they have been vital to the debate around Polish 
Holocaust memory. Polish-American scholar Jan Gross, for example, has “created an enormous debate and 
controversy in Poland” on account of his book Neighbours.16 Implications of this on the possibility of the 
construction of a pan-European memory in the public sphere by different actors will also be discussed, in 
addition to exploring if this debate is evidence of the difficulty of integrating Eastern narratives into a 
common European memory. All in all, this paper shows how language analysis is a valuable tool in analysing 
memory politics and points to the limits and possibilities of a European public sphere to be a space in which 
Holocaust memory can be negotiated and thus a European memory - inclusive of different perspectives - 
formed. Conclusions will then be drawn about if this case points to a Europeanization of public spheres.  
2. Analysing the Debate Through a Multidisciplinary Approach 
This paper draws on various disciplines such as linguistics, politics, history, and memory studies and thus 
has a multidisciplinary approach. A linguistic analysis was found to be valuable because there have not been 
a lot of studies conducted about the role of language in memory politics, even though there is a link between 
the concept of collective memory and linguistic and narrative phenomena, as according to the Czech 
sociologist Mlynář “language constitutes the collective nature of memory”.17 Indeed, collective memory not 
only “emerges from language”, but is also “structured linguistically”.18 I will draw on Mlynář’s way of analysing 
so-called collective narratives from a political viewpoint: According to him, it is possible to observe both 
“what is narrated and what is not narrated”.19 Language will furthermore be seen as a cultural tool, which, 
together with an agent, functions in “distributed remembering”.20 Language is thus used to form collective 
memories, which “are semiotic sites—simultaneously discursive and spatial—of ongoing debate and 
contestation”.21 Confirming that the law is part of memory politics would be “a stark and overly simple 
                                                 
12 Tony Judt, “The Past is Another Country: Myth and Memory in Postwar Europe,” Daedalus 121, no. 4 (1992), 112. 
13 Tony Judt, “From the House of the Dead: On Modern European Memory,” New York Review of Books 52, no. 15 (2005), 12. 
14 Leggewie, “A Tour of the Battleground: The Seven Circles of Pan-European Memory,” 231. 
15 The law has been analysed after writing this paper by various scholars, e.g. by Marta Bucholc, “Commemorative Lawmaking: 
Memory Frames of the Democratic Backsliding in Poland After 2015,” Hague Journal on the Rule of Law (2018), 1-26. 
16 Janine P. Holc, “Working through Jan Gross's Neighbors,” Slavic Review 61, no. 3 (2002), 453. 
17 Jakub Mlynář, “Language and Collective Memory: Insights from Social Theory,” Slovak Journal of Political Science 14, no. 3 (2014), 
220. 
18 Ibid., 218. 
19 Ibid., 228. 
20 James V. Wertsch and Henry L. Roediger III, “Collective Memory: Conceptual Foundations and Theoretical Approaches,” 
Memory 16, no. 3 (2008), 320. 
21 Brigittine M. French, “The Semiotics of Collective Memories,” Annual Review of Anthropology 41 (2012), 343. 
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opposition, one that would lead to ‘an all-too antiseptic conception of ‘pure fact’”.22 However, the 
“simplifying, subjective approach” of collective memory is crucial in forming identities.23 I conclude that a 
simplified governmental narrative would be an argument for the law having been drafted in order to 
strengthen national identity, or at least the discourse in the debate would suggest so. There are “different 
temporal and spatial locations in which national identities are configured”, for example in the public 
sphere.24 Thus, looking at the temporal deixis in this paper should be helpful in determining to what extent 
the discourses focus on the past and are thus part of memory politics. Further, the person deixis, meaning 
how the speaker positions him- or herself in the context through, for example, personal pronouns, helps 
detecting Othering in the statements (often visible through us versus them-constructions), but also how the 
Polish government positions itself in Europe and the world. Othering is important in identity-construction 
as “national identities are imagined communities but also, and perhaps more important, they are formations 
constructed on the basis of difference and inequality”.25 Concluding, looking at the language of this debate 
will help analyse if the governmental narrative employs Othering and focusses on certain events in order to 
form a Polish collective identity in the public sphere. 
Memory politics is defined as the “struggle of different groups to give public articulation to, and hence 
gain recognition for, certain memories and the narratives”.26 Thus, the public sphere can be a platform for 
“the playing out of domestic memory and identity struggles”.27 American literature and cultures studies 
scholar Michael Rothberg,  also proposes collective memory to be multidirectional, and thus “as a subject 
to ongoing negotiation, cross-referencing, and borrowing”.28 In this way, Holocaust memory can be re-
negotiated in the public sphere. German political scientist Eva-Clarita Onken developed a framework to 
analyse memory politics in three spheres: the domestic, bilateral, and EU-sphere.29 However, due to the 
language barrier the focus in this paper will be on the two latter spheres. The assumption, that public spheres 
are Europeanizing, has been criticized. This paper will not be able to answer this question, but approaches 
the sphere structurally to assess if this debate rather points to a vertical Europeanization of public spheres, 
“where communicative links develop between the national and EU level”, or to a horizontal 
Europeanization, which “focuses on the communicative linkages between European countries”.30 
As mentioned above, the Holocaust has been said to be essential to a European memory, being seen as 
a definitional myth for the European project and its identity.31 At the same time, Polish sociologist Kucia 
points to the fact that while the vision of the Holocaust in Western Europe is rather homogenous, it is quite 
diverse and a national matter in Eastern Europe.32 It is thus important to analyse if Holocaust remembrance 
is framed as a national or transnational matter. Holocaust remembrance is, alongside its communist past 
and discourses about Germans and Germany one of the three strands of Polish collective memory.33 
Killingsworth et al. sum up the role which Poles perceive for themselves, namely as “the martyr and saviour, 
a country that had suffered for the greater good of Europe”.34 They also underline that in terms of the 
Second World War, it was “the Poles who suffered the most” and that this “weighs heaviest on and 
delineates Polish national memory”.35 Furthermore, the authors speak of a history in Poland in which 
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“historical debate was controlled, and largely appropriated for its own purposes, by the party-state”.36 
Interestingly, they specifically mention the “urgent need” felt by Polish MEPs to “rectify historical truths 
and to re-educate Western society”.37 It will be analysed if this is also the case for Polish politicians in this 
debate. In general, due to the Holocaust as definitional myth of the EU it is important to consider how 
Holocaust memory is constructed in the public sphere. Indeed, an inclusive European Holocaust memory 
should have great potential of bringing Europe closer together and could be seen as a result of a 
Europeanised public sphere. 
3. Methodology 
Keeping Onken’s framework in mind, discourses on two spheres were considered. Since responses on the 
EU-level have been scarce (which might be related to the ongoing legal proceedings against Poland), only 
two short comments about the topic made by EU-politicians Donald Tusk and Frans Timmermans were 
included. Donald Tusk is particularly interesting in this context as he is Polish but momentarily the President 
of the European Council. The investigation of the EU-sphere was thus limited, while the bilateral sphere 
was analysed more in depth, as I chose to include statements made by Polish politicians and officials (such 
as the Polish Foreign Minister and Ambassadors) and by two other European politicians (Emmanuel 
Macron and Sigmar Gabriel). Whilst these have been included partially on the basis that they were some of 
the few statements available on the topic, the German perspective is essentially functioning as contrast to 
the Polish viewpoint. Furthermore, academic responses were included, since academics have been crucial 
in the debates relating to Polish Holocaust memory. They  have been quite active in this debate, unarguably 
also because they themselves were targeted by the law’s clause on Holocaust research.38 The academics 
included were Jan Tomasz Gross, Jan Grabowski, Sławomir Sierakowski, Joan Sangster, Robert Frost and 
Andrzej Nowak. Thus, the statements used as source material have been selected through purposive, non-
probability sampling. Press releases and letters published in newspapers, alongside in one instance an 
interview, and a video which was transcribed by the author of this paper are included in the dataset. In total, 
it consisted of sixteen texts, by six Polish politicians, one German politician, one French politician, two EU-
politicians, and six scholars.  
The distinction between national politicians and EU-politicians was drawn by considering their primary 
political function (Gabriel as German Foreign Minister, Macron as French President, Tusk as President of 
the European Council, Timmermans as the Vice-President of the European Council) and thus if they 
primarily serve a national or transnational function. While this does not mean that they do not inhibit other 
functions or that they are not involved in both national and transnational politics in some way, it was 
expected that EU-politicians frame the issue at-hand more as a European issue considering their function, 
while national politicians might speak more from a national standpoint and focus more on bilateral relations.  
After conducting summative content analysis, a quantity of coding categories was adopted, showing the 
multidimensional approach needed for this paper. Firstly, nouns, verbs, adjectives and anything else 
referring to Poles or Poland and Germans or Germany were counted. Usually focussing on subject-verb-
object structures, this approach is a derivation of classical semantical analysis used in linguistics and allowed 
me to analyse the Othering of Germans and enforcement of a victimhood narrative in more detail. Bridging 
the connection between victimhood narratives and collective identity, identification markers such as 
pronouns were also detected. To locate the focus of the discourse and to what extent death camps have 
been part of the discourse, I also looked at any mentioning of death camps and the wording of the law. 
Mentioning of the EU, Europe, and any countries were likewise marked. I further analysed how the different 
groups framed the Polish-Jewish relationship and how the law was justified or contested. The way in which 
actors talked about the historical truth or interpreting history was also evaluated. Finally, as the law dealt 
with the responsibility for crimes, any mentioning of responsibility, perceived duty, and ascribing 
responsibility to the state vs. individuals were marked. 
By examining the focus and framing of arguments of the text, but also counting words, qualitative 
analysis was combined with quantitative analysis. Thus, I follow the German political scientist 
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Langenbacher, who also combines these two approaches in his research on memory regimes in Germany.39 
Although qualitative analysis constitutes the bigger part of this paper, the quantitative part was found to be 
useful to determine the groups’ foci. In fact, this approach allowed me to analyse the debate in different 
ways, even though my study is limited through the language barrier and scarceness of debate, which itself 
seems interesting when considering the debate as part of the European public sphere. 
4. Analysis  
4.1. Shifting the Focus to Create a Favourable Narrative     
While all groups perceived themselves as having a responsibility regarding Holocaust remembrance, Polish 
politicians tended to focus on the actions of the innocent state as opposed to individual collaborators. They 
spoke about their “duty to remind the world”.40 Academics rather saw an obligation to interfere in this 
debate. EU-politicians mentioned only that its task is to prevent events as the Holocaust in the future. The 
extent to which the responsibility lies with the Polish state or individuals has been discussed by all groups. 
However, it was framed in different ways. Polish politicians focussed mainly on the Polish state, which 
“defended the life, security, and freedom of all Polish citizens” and tried to shift any mentioning of 
complicity of Poles towards the innocence of the state.41 Generally, it was agreed, that the Polish state was 
not responsible itself. Gabriel, for example, stated that Germany is responsible alone, and “actions of 
individual collaborators do not alter that fact”.42 Academics talked about “certain strata of the Polish 
society” having collaborated.43 EU-politicians had the most balanced, but also distanced position, by stating 
that “all countries occupied by Nazi-Germany had heroes who fought the occupation but also, sadly, 
collaborators with the occupiers”.44 Thus, it becomes clear that while Polish politicians focussed on the 
innocence of the Polish state, painting a more black-and-white picture of where the responsibility lies within 
the nation, academics focussed on different segments of the society.  
4.2. Regulating the Interpretation of History Legally 
Speaking for the importance of the term is the fact that death camps have been mentioned in the discourse 
by all but the EU-politicians. Especially academics discussed the term extensively, with the term “Polish 
death camp” being used six times, and “Polish concentration camps” three times. Only Polish politicians 
employed terms making explicit the camps were run by Germans, such as “German death camps”.45While 
it was usually focussed on what the “Germans” did, Polish politicians also sometimes specified that it was 
“Nazi-Germany”, for example by using the term “Nazi-German concentration camps”.46 This is interesting 
as it can be expected that the linguistic nature of collective memory would suggest references to Germans, as 
Polish people experiencing the occupation were perceiving them as the Germans. At the same time, one can 
distance oneself from the past by specifying that it was the Third Reich, Hitler’s Germany, or Nazi-Germany. 
These expressions were scarcely used in the debate.47 Death camps thus indeed were part of the discourse, 
albeit all sides agreed that the term “Polish death camps” can be ambiguous and is not factually correct. The 
term was also used to justify the law, as there is a need to protect individual Poles, more specifically former 
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concentration camp prisoners, who must fight against the term. However, the law was justified also by 
framing it as part of “the existing regulation on Holocaust denial”.48 The need for this legislation was also 
emphasized by explaining that “educational and governmental efforts” were not sufficient.49 This stands in 
contrast to the statements made by academics, who referred to education and research being the only correct 
and “productive way to confront this ignorance”.50 For academics, the two main arguments against the law 
were that it could “stifle academic research” and is contrary to democratic principles.51  
Another reason mentioned was preserving the historical truth. The interpretation of history and 
establishing the truth of history have been integral parts of the discourses of Polish politicians and 
academics. Among Polish politicians, one term that has been used numerous times is “the distortion of 
truth”, which needs to be prevented. The falsification of history was also referred to, with Holocaust denial 
as example. Although some terms were also used by the academics, it can be noted the Polish politicians 
tended to talk more about “the” truth, suggesting there is one singular truth which needs to be spread. 
Academics focussed more on how history is interpreted, mentioning the “conception” of history.52 They 
also used the term “official histories” to demarcate the influence of the government on the official narrative 
and the existence of multiple historical narratives.53 Concluding, the law was framed as being complementary 
to existing Holocaust denial laws in Europe by Polish politicians. A main argument was also the preservation 
of historical truth, which cannot be achieved only through education and is endangered through the usage 
of terms such as “Polish death camps”. Mainly academics engaged in the debate by criticizing these two 
arguments, while the other groups steered clear of commenting on the arguments. 
4.3. Holocaust Remembrance: A National Matter? 
When looking at how often other countries or Europe was mentioned, it becomes clearer whether the 
debate and Holocaust remembrance was framed as a national or transnational issue. Other countries were 
mentioned by almost all groups, but to a greater extent by academics. Here it might also be useful to look 
at the temporal deixis. Polish politicians focused more on the past, for example on Poland alerting the allies 
and Western countries during the Holocaust.54 They also compared the loss of population of Poland and 
concluded that it had the highest loss “of any country”.55 Here they cleverly centre on the number of Polish 
victims, a category in which they include Polish Jews. This diverges from Holocaust remembrance in 
countries in Western Europe, where, usually, the biggest victim group is denoted as being the Jews, and not 
connected to their nationality or even put in the same category as non-Jewish victims. One Polish politician 
stated that anti-Semitism is a notion the whole world has to fight, and that the Holocaust should be a lesson 
for the world.56 Academics, in contrast, focused mostly on the present, and on countries such as the US, 
Germany, and the Ukraine. They specifically mentioned a possible impact on Polish bilateral relations and 
Poland’s reputation abroad.57 Polish politicians surprisingly also deviated from the national focus and 
mentioned various times that all of Europe was occupied by Germany.58 Academics talked about the 
“destruction of the European Jewry” and showed links to the EU as the European parliament is 
mentioned.59 Speaking of European Jewry clearly de-nationalizes the Jewish victim group and stands in 
contrast to the Polish politicians’ rhetoric. They also use the EU as an argument against the law, as it is a 
“dramatic departure from the democratic principles and standards which govern the laws of other members 
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of the European Union”.60 Similarly, Macron mentioned the “European Union’s fundamental principles”.61 
Gabriel likewise talked about “European Jews”, stressing that the Holocaust was a European event.62 They 
also mentioned reactions from European leaders.63 Timmermans stressed that the Holocaust is the “reality 
in which the European Union was created”.64  
Overall, the law was connected to other countries. The Holocaust was emphasized to be a transnational 
event and the connection to the EU was explicitly mentioned. At the same time, the issue was often framed 
to be an international issue, not a European issue, by stressing Polish relations with other countries. It was 
also emphasized that Poland suffered greatly in comparison to other countries, enforcing a victimhood 
narrative, however it is surprising that Polish politicians simultaneously framed the Holocaust and the 
connected suffering as European event, thus departing from the focus on the national victimhood narrative. 
4.4. Choosing Words to Emphasize What Was Done to “Us” by “Them” 
Concerning the nouns used for Poland, Polish politicians often distinguished between “Polish citizens” or 
“individuals” and the “Polish state and nation”.65 They also mentioned “Polish family” and “brothers, 
sisters, wives, husbands, sons, daughters”.66 Academics mentioned the current government more often, and 
even focused on its different organs (“Polish Sejm”, “ruling Law and Justice part”, “Polish foreign 
minister”).67 That Poland was the centre of the debate becomes obvious when looking at the quantity of 
verbs used for Poles. It seems that Polish politicians used verbs directed at Poles more often (for example 
“blame Poland” and “force us”).68 Academics and national politicians used modal verbs to a greater extent: 
Academics used “could have done”, “want to gag”, “needs to regain”, whilst national politicians used “will 
change”, “should be eradicated”, “can rest assured”, pointing to their evaluating and consultative role.69 In 
general, Polish politicians used more positive verbs such as “alerted” and “volunteered”.70 Academics 
employed more negative verbs such as “accuse”, “criminalizing”, “murdered”, “killed”, and “set on fire”, 
thus referring to crimes committed by Poles.71 It becomes clear that Polish politicians again focused more 
on positive actions of Poles and negative, exterior influences on Poland, again painting a picture of Poland 
as a victim. Academics in contrast seemed more critical of Poland and the action of Poles. Nouns used for 
Germans often centred on the crimes committed during the Holocaust. Gabriel talks about “crimes which 
Germans and Germany committed”, which seems like quite the sober expression compared to the 
expressions used by Polish politicians.72 His explicit mentioning of the state and individuals’ responsibility 
stands in contrast to the Polish politicians’ rhetoric of focussing on the innocent state. Polish politicians 
partially used the same terms, for example “Nazi terror”, and “German crimes”.73 The latter term seems to 
have been used interchangeably with the term “Nazi-German crimes”.74 Verbs used for Germans by all 
groups could be divided into neutral and negative words. Neutral verbs included “established” and “carry 
out”.75 Negative verbs such as “exterminated”, “eliminate”, “murdered” were used mostly by Polish 
politicians.76 For example, the following sentence exemplifies how a Polish Ambassador underlines what 
was done by Germans to Poles: “The Germans murdered indiscriminately, all in an effort to eliminate Polish 
national identity”.77 It also illustrates how Polish identity is explicitly linked to the Holocaust. They generally 
employed more negative verbs to refer to the actions of  Germans. However, they also used most verbs for 
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Germans quantitatively. Generally, they focused most on Germans and Germany, for example by employing 
many verbs with past reference for Germans, suggesting that they were othering Germans and Germany in 
their narrative as part of memory politics. Especially academics focused more on Poland by using more 
balanced verbs to describe their actions, trying to establish a more balanced narrative, but also expressing 
much more criticism towards Polish actors compared to the other groups. They also used more present 
tense, suggesting a focus on current actions, in contrast to Polish politicians. 
4.5. Vague Language – an Argument For or Against the Law? 
Finally, it is worth mentioning that language was even discussed in the discourse. Polish politicians expressed 
concern that some have “misinterpreted the wording of the legislation”.78 Academics, on the other hand, 
criticized the “ambiguous and imprecise wording” of the law.79 One Polish politician even mentioned 
language to be the reason why the law is necessary, as with “vague, nondescript language, the lines between 
perpetrators, bystanders and victim are being blurred”.80 This is one example of how the same issues were 
constructed as contradictory arguments by Polish politicians and academics. More examples will be 
mentioned in the following part of this paper. 
5. Discussion  
5.1. The Term “Polish Death Camps”:  Used to Justify the Law, Revealing the Politics Behind 
It 
Firstly, it is important to discuss the role the term “Polish death camps” played in the debate. There seemed 
to be a consensus that the term can be misleading, and academics even stressed that prohibiting this term is 
understandable. Here I would like to highlight the assumption that the term was used out of “ignorance 
rather than deliberate ill-will”.81 This ignorance might partly also be due to a linguistic issue. Semantically, 
“Polish death camps” can carry two meanings in English: death camps run by Poles, or death camps located 
in Poland. In Polish, these meanings might vary, rather being interpreted as the first. This hypothesis requires 
further testing. If positive, this would be an example of how complex memory politics in Europe may be 
due to the multilingual setting. However, because the term can denote both geographical location and who 
the camp was run by, it is also difficult for the law to be enforced. Anyone could argue that when using the 
term, they did not imply who was running the camps. This, and the fact that death camps were not 
specifically mentioned in the law, suggests that it was not necessarily made to be enforced, but rather as a 
political statement. As Jan Gross puts it, “if the law’s backers wanted to penalize [the] use of the phrase, 
they would have included it in the legislation”.82  
5.2. A Clash Between the Polish Government and Academics? 
It was interesting to see that both academics and Polish politicians used Holocaust denial laws for their 
argumentation. Polish politicians argued for the law to prevent Holocaust denial, while academics classified 
the law as contributing to Holocaust denial. Similarly, both groups used vague language as an argument. 
While Polish politicians stated that there is a need for the law because vague language makes it easy to 
confuse perpetrators with victims, EU-politicians criticized the vague language the law was written in. That 
Polish politicians and academics used Holocaust denial laws and vague language as arguments in opposite 
ways suggests that academics were more engaged in the debate than the other groups, and actually referred 
to arguments of the Polish government. This then means that specifically historians might have the biggest 
potential in forming a European memory in the public sphere.83 In this debate, it was mostly academics 
fighting for these balanced narratives by bringing forward arguments against the new legislation. Many of 
the academics involved in this debate, but also other debates dealing with Polish Holocaust memory, have 
Polish roots but conduct research abroad. For example, Jan Gross emigrated to the United States in 1969, 
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started his academic career there, and still teaches there.84 Similarly, Jan Grabowski emigrated to Canada 
where he obtained his PhD in 1994 and is now conducting research.85 These two examples perfectly show 
that due to the emigration of scholars during communism important research about Poland is being 
conducted outside of Poland. This means that it is not influenced by the government’s restrictions, but also 
that these scholars bring a non-European factor to the equation, questioning the assumption that European 
memory is being formed by solely European actors. Paradoxically, the ‘Holocaust law’ or any other 
legislation restricting research inside of Poland will thus only contribute to the formation of a debate, and 
thus maybe also memory, outside of Poland, and Europe. However, the question arises to what extent a 
Polish debate is being exported rather than being opened to international actors. For example, some data 
used for this study shows that partially, the former seems to be the case. Jan Grabowski, researching at the 
University of Ottawa, responded to the law, and as a reaction the Embassy of Poland in Ottawa issued a 
statement. Maybe what has to be analysed then is not only who shapes European memory, but also where 
it is shaped. 
5.3. Enforcing a National Narrative of Victimhood versus Framing the Holocaust as 
European Event 
The focus of Polish politicians on the innocence of the Polish state is proof of the attempt of establishing 
a victimhood narrative. That academics drew more distinctions, mentioning different actors of the state, 
shows they critically analyse the politics of Poland, and the different Polish actors involved. Polish politicians 
focused most on the state, stressing its innocence during the Holocaust. In addition, Poles were humanized 
by mentioning the families and different family members, but also victimized by referring to their suffering. 
The victimhood narrative was further enforced by Polish politicians by using verbs directed at Poles. In 
contrast, it is made sure to use many action verbs for Germans, to stress their role as perpetrators. While 
this is historically correct, it seems the extent to which Polish politicians focused on German actions is part 
of Othering. This is one strand of Polish collective memory, suggesting that this debate was also about 
shaping it, which is interesting considering the discourse analysed was in the bilateral and EU-sphere. Thus, 
it seems that even if the law was directed at the domestic audience primarily, it was important to Polish 
actors to enforce the Polish identity and role and have this recognized by others from the outside.  
In addition, the setting up of English campaign, websites, and videos also points to the wish to target 
the international audience. Whether this is due to a wish to have their suffering recognized is uncertain. 
Academics did not employ that many negative verbs for Germans, because the focus was on the actions of 
Poles as well and were more balanced by using negative verbs for both Poles and Germans. Particularly the 
verbs used for Poles show a contrast to the ones used by academics, because they include much more 
negative verbs, while Polish politicians used more positive ones. This is because Polish politicians focused 
on the positive actions of Poles in the past, while academics focused more on the negative ones. Ironically, 
by focusing on the past, the government wants to strengthen contemporary Polish identity, as “the law 
concerns the present – namely, PiS’s need for a legitimating myth – much more than the past”.86  
The same goes for the Polish actors mentioned. It is no coincidence that the Polish narrative mentioned 
Polish heroes. By focusing on persons such as Jan Karski, Witold Pilecki, and the Righteous among the 
Nations, a narrative is created which suggests the entire Polish society actively tried to fight the Nazi 
regime.87 Even the wording of the law creates this one-sided narrative by speaking of the innocence of the 
whole ‘Polish nation’.88 Academics criticized this for being part of constructing a narrative which benefits 
Poland but does not paint the whole picture. Grabowski, for example, states in an interview that “there is 
no such notion that ‘all Polish people’ are responsible”, to explain that equally as with the heroism, also the 
responsibility or collaboration was not a phenomenon inherit to the entire society.89  
                                                 
84 “Jan Tomasz Gross,” Princeton University, https://history.princeton.edu/people/jan-tomasz-gross. 
85 “Jan Grabowski,” uOttawa, https://uniweb.uottawa.ca/members/546. 
86 Sierakowski, “Criminalising the Truth.” 
87 The Righteous among the Nations are people who risked their lives to save Jews during the Holocaust and are chosen and 
awarded this title (as well as other benefits such as honorary citizenship from Israel) by Yad Vashem. While statistics about the 
nationalities of the awarded persons exist, it must be born in mind that due to the difference in availability of documents proofing 
someone is worthy of this award in different countries, future research might be able to change the statistics considerably. 
88 The term ‘Polish nation’ is also inappropriate in judicial context as it is extremely difficult to define who belongs to a nation. 




The question arises, whether different Holocaust narratives make a common European memory 
impossible. On one hand, this debate shows that the Polish Holocaust narrative, as promoted by PiS and 
the IPN, is indeed focused very much on the national suffering, and is thus very particular to the Polish 
nation, as well as the focus on Germans/ Germany as the Other, also suggesting a possible impact of their 
memory politics on bilateral relations. On the other hand, there was a focus on the Holocaust as European 
event: Polish politicians also talked about the occupation of Europe. This might be to make the Polish 
experience more relatable to other countries’ experiences but could also be evidence of a need for Poland 
to have its history recognized by the rest of Europe, stressing that the national history is part of a nuanced 
and balanced European history.  
Are different Holocaust narratives then impeding a pan-European Holocaust memory? Dutch historian 
De Jong states that “overcoming the tensions between the various national memories has proven to be 
difficult”.90 At the same time, the German response suggests that narratives might not be completely 
contradictory, but rather have different foci concerning the responsibility of the country. The key is then to 
discuss narratives, which makes it problematic that European and EU-politicians have not been engaged 
very deeply in the debate. Of course it needs to be mentioned that the debate around the Holocaust law is 
only part of the bigger picture. After “two years of Polish government policies that have damaged the rule 
of law”, the European Commission has decided to invoke Article 7 of the Treaty of the European Union 
against Poland.91 Thus, the response to the memory politics have been surely part of a bigger strategy of the 
EU’s and member states’ politicians. 
5.4. Part of a Bigger Issue? Memory Politics in Central Eastern Europe and the Focus on the 
Past 
Another point where Polish politicians and academics displayed opposite viewpoints is when it comes to 
the Polish-Jewish relationship. Apart from categorizing Jewish victims in the same group as Polish victims, 
Polish politicians painted a simplified, positive picture of this relationship by talking about “Polish Jewish 
brothers”. Academics, in contrast, focused on the negative side of this relationship. That Polish politicians 
only focused on the positive side of the relationship and even frame anti-Semitism as being a global issue, 
not specific to Poland, shows the one-sidedness of this narrative. Here one can draw many parallels to the 
memory politics of Hungary’s Fidesz, such as trying to clean up the past by “covering […] [the] active 
collaboration with Nazi officials”.92 Additionally, their Veritas Institute seems to be similar to the National 
Institute of Remembrance, as it was also founded in order to rebalance history. In fact, Ukraine likewise 
opened the Institute of National Memory, following Poland. Finally, they also talked about the need “to 
establish historical truth”.93 Polish politicians in the debate tried to establish one historical narrative, often 
mentioning “the historical truth”, and how people falsify history, or create a “lie” about history, denying 
German crimes. Academics, however, focused on how facts are not to be interpreted, while history is 
complex and has different narratives. They especially criticized the narrative established by the Polish 
government for being the “official, feel-good version of the country’s own national past”.94 Similarly, Russia 
has introduced “attempts to establish the ‘regime of truth’ using legislative means” and created “a 
bureaucratic institution to fight the ‘falsifications of history’”.95 Historian Torbakov even speaks about a 
wider “trend toward politicizing and instrumentalizing of history”, with two main objectives: “the 
construction of a maximally cohesive national identity and rallying the society around the powers that be” 
and ”eschewing the problem of guilt”.96 While the comparison between Poland and Russia might be an 
uneasy and potentially problematic approach, Grabowski goes so far to compare Poland’s introduction of 
memory legislation to Turkey’s legislation dealing with their responsibility in the Armenian genocide.97  
                                                 
90 De Jong, “Reframing the Past?,” 11. 
91 Marek Tatala, “The EU Invokes Article 7 Against Poland, But Only Poles Can Defend Their Liberty,” Acton Institute, 5 January 
2018, https://acton.org/publications/transatlantic/2018/01/05/eu-invokes-article-7-against-poland-only-poles-can-defend. 
92 Simone Benazzo, “Not All the Past Needs to Be Used: Features of Fidesz’s Politics of Memory,” Journal of Nationalism, Memory 
& Language Politics 11, no. 2 (2017), 204. 
93 Ibid., 208. 
94 Grabowski, “The Danger in Poland’s Frontal Attack on its Holocaust History.” 
95 Igor Torbakov, “History, Memory and National Identity: Understanding the Politics of History and Memory Wars in Post-
Soviet Lands,” Demokratizatsiya 19, no. 3 (2011), 210. 
96 Ibid. 
97 Grabowski, “The Danger in Poland’s Frontal Attack on its Holocaust History.” 
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It thus seems that a study dealing with memory politics beyond CEE countries would be extremely 
interesting for further research. For now, this law as part of the Polish IPN can be said to fit into a larger 
trend of memory politics in CEE countries, constructing a narrative with the focus on oppression in the 
past.98 While many facts are drawn upon to emphasize the Polish narrative of victimhood, it is remarkable 
that the Polish Foreign Minister labels Poland as “the first victim of the Third Reich during the war”.99 This 
is a gross clash with the consensus in Western Europe that de facto Austria was the first victim. After 1945 it 
“was the universally-acknowledged claim that responsibility for the war, its sufferings and its crimes, lay 
with the Germans”.100 Thus, “beginning with the Moscow Declaration of 1943, Austria was established as 
the ‘first victim’ of Nazi aggression”.101 While Austria has since worked through its past by acknowledging 
some responsibility, the Polish government now trying to claim this title seems interesting at least. Also 
taking the diverging categorization of victims into account, there seem to be various aspects that differ in 
the Holocaust narratives. While a European memory can incorporate different narratives, it seems there 
should be a consensus negotiated on important aspects as these. This points to the fact that at least the 
Polish narrative does not seem to be integrated. 
Apart from Poland, the common trend of memory politics focussing on oppression in the past is 
something that is somehow particular for post-communist countries.102 Tony Judt states that while the past 
is “bubbling its half-digested way back into the throats of politicians and journalists” in the West, this “has 
been as nothing compared to the dramatic implications of the recovery of memory in Central and Eastern 
Europe”.103 In fact, Torbakov argues that “it is precisely Eastern Europe’s devastating war experience that 
needs to be “recovered” and reintegrated into a European historical narrative” after being marginalized 
from a pan-European narrative.104 He further speaks of the failure of integrating national histories from the 
East, even after the EU-enlargement.105 This seems to be confirmed by the fact that Holocaust memory is 
contested by PiS in the public sphere, but the discussion seems to only come to a consensus when it comes 
to the fact that the Polish state is innocent. Other than that, the lack of engagement in the debate of EU-
politicians and other European politicians suggests that there is little effort to incorporate Eastern narratives. 
It is thus not surprising that at a landmark event in 2009 about European histories, the “participants agreed 
that a comprehensive 20th century European history has yet to be crafted, and that the first step toward this 
goal should be the integration of Eastern Europe’s tragic totalitarian experience into the overall European 
narrative”.106 While the discourse around the law tried to enforce a Polish collective identity by telling a 
national narrative of the Holocaust, the law also fits a larger trend in CEE and thus suggests that Eastern 
narratives are not yet incorporated into a pan-European memory. However, considering the scarce response 
by European and EU-politicians, it seems this debate does not speak for either a visible horizontal or vertical 
Europeanisation of the public sphere.  
6. Conclusion  
The law was proven to be part of the government’s memory politics, since firstly, the term “Polish death 
camps” is not mentioned in the law, and secondly, the vague wording of the law was not only used as an 
argument in the debate, but also proves that the law, being thus extremely difficult to enforce, is a political 
statement. A focus on a victimhood narrative was detected, also including Othering Germans and Germany, 
in order to strengthen a collective Polish identity. Although part of PiS’s memory politics, the law also hints 
at the lack of inclusion of Eastern narratives in a European memory. As the Polish government’s narrative 
deviates from the Western European one in some crucial aspects, a debate in the public sphere seems 
essential to create a more inclusive European memory. However, the debate seems to have been quite one-
                                                 
98 While scholars such as Torbakov refer to totalitarianism in CEE countries, I chose to adopt the more general term of 
oppression after receiving helpful feedback from Wiebke Keim. The term totalitarianism is part of a much broader debate than 
can be dealt with in this paper. 
99 Embassy of the Republic of Poland in London, “Statement by Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki.” 
100 István Deák, Jan T. Gross and Tony Judt, eds., The Politics of Retribution in Europe: World War II and Its Aftermath (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2009), 296. 
101 Ibid., 296. 
102 Torbakov, “History, Memory and National Identity: Understanding the Politics of History and Memory Wars in Post-Soviet 
Lands,” 213. 
103 Judt, “The Past is Another Country: Myth and Memory in Postwar Europe,” Daedalus 121, no. 4 (1992), 99. 
104 Torbakov, “History, Memory and National Identity,” 215.  
105 Ibid., 215. 
106 Ibid., 212. 
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sided in the bilateral sphere, suggesting that the public sphere here served as a space of contestation, but 
not discussion. Further, the scarce debate in the bilateral and EU-sphere shows that a vertical and horizontal 
Europeanization has barely been visible in this case. The fact that scholars outside of the EU were engaged 
in the debate raises the question of whether Holocaust memory is shaped exclusively by European actors 
and in a European public sphere. In this case, it seems that the debate was definitively exported outside of 
Europe, but most actors engaged had at least ties to Poland. I proposed that this law as part of a trend in 
Central Eastern Europe to focus on oppression in the past in memory politics shows that there is a need 
felt to have this past recognized and included in the European memory. The role of academics in this debate 
was crucial, and I suggested that historians can play a major role when it comes to shaping European 
Holocaust memory. Analysing the role of different groups in the debate, but also the language used by them, 
rather pointed to a lack of Europeanization of public spheres, but that there is much potential to form a 
European memory. This paper underscores the need to look beyond memory politics and for politicians to 
engage deeper in debates about memory.  
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Dialogue or Separate Realities? An Analysis of  Debating Europe in 
the European Public Sphere 
Linda Piersma 
1. Introduction 
Since the 1990s, the European Union (EU) has increasingly responded to the so-called “democratic deficit” 
by introducing several strategies aimed at stimulating a sense of European belonging, dialogue and 
identification.1 In the beginning, EU communication policies were mostly focused on a one-way process of 
providing information and “educating” the public.2 However, since the mid-2000s, the EU has committed 
itself to stimulating “genuine dialogue” and a two-way process of mutual engagement.3 It increasingly started 
to use the internet for that purpose, to create a direct relationship between the EU and its citizens.4 Online 
forums were set up by the EU, like Futurum in 2001,5 and Debate Europe in 2006.6 However, these online 
forums often only succeeded in engaging an already interested minority,7 and Debate Europe and Futurum 
have been archived in 2010 and 2011 respectively.8 
Through the Europe for Citizens Programme (EfCP), the EU now supports various external projects to 
encourage democratic participation and feelings of common history and belonging.9 The website Debating 
Europe (DE) received funding for several of its debates, in which it seeks to stimulate conversation between 
European citizens and politicians by directly connecting them on their online platform.10 Citizens can engage 
in a debate about European issues by sending in questions or posting comments. Debating Europe then 
takes these questions to certain “European leaders” like MEPs, policy-makers, academic experts or NGOs 
to respond to. Debating Europe is also active on Twitter and Facebook and regularly posts debates and 
other material on these platforms.11 Since 2011, it claims to have hosted around 155.000 comments and 
reactions from over 2.500 European leaders.12  
This paper will explore the online platform Debating Europe within the conceptual framework of the 
European public sphere; a central concept to discuss issues of European democracy and identity. Within 
academic debate on the term, much research has been devoted to understanding EU institutional structures 
                                                 
1 Asimina Michailidou, “Vertical Europeanisation of Online Public Dialogue: EU Public Communication Policy and Online 
Implementation,” in Mapping the European Public Sphere: Institutions, Media and Civil Society, ed. Cristiano Bee and Emanuela Bozzini 
(Surrey: Ashgate, 2010), 65. 
2 Ibid., 70.  
3 Cristiano Bee, “Understanding the EU’s Institutional Communication: Principles and Structure of a Contested Policy,” in 
Mapping the European Public Sphere: Institutions, Media and Civil Society, ed. Cristiano Bee and Emanuela Bozzini (Surrey: Ashgate 
Publishing Limited, 2010), 85, 87-90. 
4 Michailidou, “Vertical Europeanisation,” 81. 
5 “Inauguration of the Web-Site ‘FUTURUM’,” European Commission, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-01-
328_en.htm; Scott Wright, “A Virtual European Public Sphere? The Futurum Discussion Forum,” Journal of European Public Policy 
14, no. 8 (2007), 1167-1185. 
6 Michailidou, “Vertical Europeanisation,” 82. 
7 A. Hepp et al., ed. The Communicative Construction of Europe: Cultures of Political Discourse, Public Sphere, and the Euro Crisis 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 111.  
8 Debate Europe, see: “Democracy, Dialogue, Debate,” Europa, http://ec.europa.eu/archives/debateeurope/index_en.htm. 
Futurum, see: “Institutional Reform of the European Union,” Europa, http://ec.europa.eu/archives/institutional_reform/. 
9 “Europe for Citizens,” EACEA, European Commission, https://eacea.ec.europa.eu/europe-for-citizens_en. 
10 “Welcome to Debating Europe – The Platform that Lets You Discuss Your Ideas YOUR Ideas with Europe’s Leaders,” 
Debating Europe, http://www.debatingeurope.eu/about/.  
11 “Debating Europe,” Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/debatingeurope/. See also: “Debating Europe,” Twitter, 
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12 “Welcome to Debating Europe.”  
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and its interaction with civil society.13 Others have rather focused upon transnational media discourses,14 or 
more bottom-up understandings of everyday life experiences of European citizens.15 However, there is a 
need to connect these top-down and bottom-up studies more explicitly. Various actors, from EU 
representative bodies, the media and civil society to the European citizenry, are involved in the construction 
of a European public sphere. Especially in today’s digital society, these localities cannot be so easily separated 
and it is necessary to better understand discursive interaction online. 
Therefore, this research paper will ask the following question: How is the interactive process shaped 
between European leaders and European citizens on the online platform Debating Europe in the European 
public sphere? By answering this question, this research aims to contribute to a deeper understanding of the 
European public sphere by critically examining the way various voices interact in online discourse. The 
online platform Debating Europe has been chosen because of its intended purpose of bringing together 
European leaders and their citizens. It therefore provides a unique case to analyse interactive dynamics 
between institutional structures, its representatives and citizen participation online. Particularly, this paper 
will argue that the socio-political and online context of the digital public sphere significantly shape the 
discursive process and hamper the possibilities for genuine dialogue and fruitful interaction in an inclusive 
European space. 
The paper is structured as follows. The first section conceptualizes the European public sphere as a 
network of meaning-making in interaction and emphasizes the importance of studying online interactive 
processes to grasp the contours of this European space. The second section introduces the method of 
Angouri and Wodak, which is a combination of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) and interaction analysis, 
as a suitable approach to understand the relation between online context and discourse on Debating Europe. 
The third section makes up the analytical part of the paper, wherein the policy and online context, as well 
as the interactive process within one debate is analysed in-depth to understand the construction of questions, 
answers and comments. The conclusion answers the question whether Debating Europe stimulates dialogue 
or rather upholds a separation between Brussels and its citizens in the European public sphere.  
2. Networks and Interactive Processes in the European Public Sphere  
In his world-renowned book, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, Jürgen Habermas explores 
citizens’ political involvement in 18th and 19th century coffee houses to describe the rise and demise of the 
bourgeois public sphere.16 Ideally, the public sphere is conceived as a communicative space accessible to all 
in which citizens would come together to rationally and critically discuss issues of common concern. Such 
public deliberations would encourage political participation and pressure the state to adhere to democratic 
principles.17 This work of Habermas has inspired an abundance of research and many fruitful applications, 
but also criticism and reform – especially so after the book’s translation into English in 1989.18 
Within the European context, the concept stimulated research on the potential nature of a European 
public sphere. The resultant literature has been difficult to pin down. The problem seems to primarily lie 
with the inherently idealized nature of the concept that makes it very hard to separate normative standards 
and empirical reality.19 Consequently, questions of whether a European public sphere exists, what it 
would/should look like and how it needs to be studied, are often intertwined. 
For the purposes of this paper, it is useful to roughly outline three areas of research. First, since the 
1990s, academic literature on the European public sphere has increasingly concentrated on EU institutional 
                                                 
13 See for example: Michael Brüggemann, “How the EU Constructs the European Public Sphere: Seven Strategies of Information 
Policy,” Javnost 12, no. 2 (2005), 57-73.  
14 Caroline de la Porte and Arjen van Dalen, “Europeanization of National Public Spheres? Cross-National Media Debates about 
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Society 8, no. 3 (2012), 219.  
16 Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, transl. Thomas Burger and Frederick Lawrence (Cambridge: 
MIT Press, 1991). 
17 Hans-Jörg Trenz, “Public Sphere,” in The International Encyclopedia of Political Communication, ed. Gianpietro Mazzoleni (John 
Wiley, 2015), 1-2.  
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Democracy,” Social Text, no. 25/26 (1990), 56-80, and Craig Calhoun, ed., Habermas and the Public Sphere (Cambridge, London: MIT 
Press, 1992). For an overview of subsequent adaptions by Habermas, see Peter Lunt and Sonia Livingstone, “Media Studies’ 
Fascination with the Concept of the Public Sphere: Critical Reflections and Emerging Debates,” Media, Culture and Society 35, no. 1 
(2013), 87-96. 
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structures and policies, and their role in shaping the European public sphere.20 Michael Brüggemann has 
for example focused upon the information policy of the EU to understand how the EU promotes certain 
policy narratives and attempts to persuade the public through propagandistic means.21 By contrast, Yasemin 
Nuhoglu Soysal draws attention to more informal European institutional structures to understand the 
formation of a European space through school textbooks and curricula.22 These studies thus aim at 
uncovering the ways in which various elite actors are involved in shaping a European public sphere through 
carefully devised narratives about Europe and European issues. 
A second strand of research locates the European public sphere in transnational media discourses rather 
than institutional structures. These studies see a strong media sphere as a vital indicator of a public sphere 
as the media informs the public, and allows for critical evaluation and potential input into the political 
process.23 Subsequently, some argue against the existence of a European public sphere altogether due to the 
(perceived) lack of strong European media, while others rather focus on the degree of supranational, vertical 
and horizontal Europeanization of national public spheres.24 This has resulted in interesting research on 
European political communication in national quality newspapers,25 and explorations of transnational media 
like Euronews and Eurozine.26  
In critique of these approaches, the third strand of research has sought to diverge from this consensual 
top-down perspective on the public sphere and rather focus upon the way citizens’ everyday life experiences 
and contestations give rise to a European public sphere.27 As advanced by social scientist Markus Ketola, 
an ethnographic approach would allow for an understanding of the plurality of voices and local conflicts 
that underlie the European social space.28 In that spirit, some have already sought to understand the 
connection between these institutional, media and citizens’ discourses.29 Specifically, with the rise of online 
media, recent research has become more sensitive to the ways various actors interact in the European public 
sphere.30  
However, although these accounts provide relevant insights into how EU policies affect and are received 
by the larger public, there is a need to connect these top-down and bottom-up discourses more explicitly, 
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and to take the interactive process between European citizens and various media and institutional actors as 
the central object of analysis. As has been argued by Thomas Risse and Nilüfer Göle, it is within interaction 
and through contestation between various actors that the European public sphere is discursively constituted 
and becomes visible.31 Especially in current-day digital society, traditional media, political actors and regular 
citizens are all involved in the online ‘production, distribution, consumption and discussion of political 
content on issues of societal relevance.’32 It is thus necessary to better understand the various ways in which 
elite actors and citizens together give meaning to the European public sphere through their online discursive 
interactions.  
At the same time, some scholars have been critical of the online public sphere. Although it might enhance 
possibilities for people to raise their voice, this increased heterogeneity would also lead to fragmentation of 
the public sphere.33 Moreover, due to various algorithms and the possibilities for selecting personal content, 
people would be less exposed to different views and live in ‘echo chambers.’34 In this way, rather than 
stimulating public dialogue and contestation, online media would discourage the exchange of different 
opinions. 
However, fragmentation of the online sphere does not a priori exclude the possibility of meaningful 
interaction.35 Rather, the European public sphere should be seen as a network of online and offline 
interaction between various actors and groups, characterized by fragmentation, conflict and disagreement.36 
Discourses interconnect in several ways, allowing for the creation of meanings and the enrichment of debate 
and discussion.37 At the same time, as has been argued by critical theorists Nancy Fraser and Chantal 
Mouffe, not everyone has equal access to this sphere and some have more power to influence the discourse 
than others.38 Therefore, this paper will take a critical approach to the European public sphere, to uncover 
how the interactive process is shaped between European leaders and the European public on the online 
platform Debating Europe. The next section explains how this online discursive process is approached and 
analysed. 
3. The Online Public Sphere: CDA and Interaction Analysis 
For more than a decade, academic literature has tried to grasp the meaning of the internet for the public 
sphere.39 The online public sphere is made up of many websites, social media platforms, and online forums 
that make it possible for individuals and organizations to exchange ideas and opinions.40 In this sphere, 
people are increasingly involved both as passive audiences and active participants,41 who read, comment 
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and constitute their perceptions and identities through online engagement.42 Specific technological features 
like commenting, sharing, and tagging ‘reconfigure the relationship between interactive participants in 
varying ways,’43 and thereby impact upon the meaning-making process. Therefore, any analysis of the online 
public sphere needs to pay attention to the specific online context in which interaction takes place.44  
Although methods for studying online discourses are still very much in development,45 this paper will 
use the promising design by Angouri and Wodak, which combines a form of Critical Discourse Analysis 
and interaction analysis, to understand how the interactive process between citizens and European leaders 
is shaped on Debating Europe.46 Discourse analysis focuses on generating an in-depth understanding of 
oral and written texts by looking into how certain issues and subjects are constructed and intersubjective 
meanings are created in interaction.47 CDA is a well-known strand of discourse analysis that emphasizes the 
importance of social and discursive context to understand how meaning is created.48 Within the method by 
Angouri and Wodak for analysing online discourse, particular attention is paid to how the broader socio-
political context and the specific workings of the online platform tend to affect interactive processes and 
the construction of meaning.49 
For that purpose, the data that will be analysed consists of two elements. First, various policy documents 
and mission statements of the EfCP and Debating Europe will be analysed as well as the design and 
workings of Debating Europe to understand in what socio-political and discursive context the interactive 
processes take place. Specifically, this means looking into the defined aims, funding, technological features, 
online rules and moderation policies.50 Second, the interactive process in one debate will be analysed in-
depth. Particularly, the analysis will focus on how the debate is introduced by the website, what European 
leaders are invited to respond, what comments are used for that purpose, how these leaders answer, and 
how the issue is constructed in the comments by European citizens themselves. By focusing upon who gets 
to talk, about what and in what way, an understanding arises of how various actors are involved in defining 
what is meaningful to discuss and what topics are excluded from consideration.  
The chosen debate concerns Hungarian fence-building and is part of a larger debate series on Cities & 
Refugees that was explicitly co-funded by the EfCP.51 The project ran between 6 October 2016 and 31 
August 2017 in four European cities, involving 25 online and 4 offline debates and allegedly reaching over 
800 000 citizens.52 The debate on Hungarian fence-building was published on 28 August 2017, had one 
update on the 17 January 2018 and it generated a total of 223 comments by 121 people.53 This particular 
debate has been selected because of its sponsored nature within the EfCP, which allows for a more 
comprehensive analysis of how various actors are involved on the platform. Furthermore, the debate has 
generated enough comments to be able to conduct an in-depth analysis, and is relatively recent, yet enough 
time has passed for the discussion to have ended.  
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Several scholars have raised concerns about analysing one forum and “cherry-picking” texts, as it would 
not be representative of the entire online public sphere.54 Yet, the aim of this paper is not to give definite 
answers to the formation and structure of the entire online sphere; rather the intention is to come closer to 
understanding the complexity of online interaction. In other words, this case study is meant to illustrate the 
role of various actors and potential obstacles to open and honest debate between them in the European 
online sphere.  
The analytical section is structured as follows. The EfCP is explored first to gain an understanding of the 
larger policy context of the debate. Thereafter, the workings of Debating Europe are analysed to understand 
the online context in which interaction takes place. Finally, the interactive process within the debate is 
examined.  
4. Debating Europe 
4.1. Policy Context: Europe for Citizens Programme  
The current program of the EfCP runs from 2014 to 2020 and consists of two strands: ‘European 
remembrance’ and ‘Democratic engagement and civic participation’.55 A total budget of over 185 million 
euros was made available for the program,56 of which Friends of Europe (the overarching organization of 
which Debating Europe is a part)57 received 150.000 euros both in 2015 and 2016 within strand 2.3 (Civil 
Society Projects) for its website Debating Europe,58 and an operating grant of 350.000 euros in 2018.59 
When applying for grants, applicants must define the purpose of the project with regard to the general 
objectives of the program as well as the specific goals of the strand and measure, and the activities must 
specifically contribute to their designated outcomes.60 The general objectives are described as contributing 
to ‘citizens’ understanding of the Union, its history and diversity’ and ‘to foster European citizenship and 
to improve conditions for civic and democratic participation at Union level,’61 in order to ‘[enable] them to 
participate in the construction of an ever closer Europe.’62 Especially the connection between the local and 
the transnational is considered important, whereby intercultural dialogue should foster ‘mutual 
understanding’ and the formation of a European identity.63  
The applications for strand 2.3 should particularly allow for citizens’ actual engagement with European 
issues and policy-making to encourage common solutions at the European level.64 In addition, in its 
priorities of 2015 and 2016, the European Commission encouraged applicants to enter into debate with 
Eurosceptics to understand their concerns as well as to ‘explain the benefits of EU policies, acknowledge 
difficulties met and challenges ahead, as well as to put forward EU achievements and the cost of no 
Europe.’65 Other priorities of the framework focus on stimulating solidarity, and combatting the othering 
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and stereotyping of immigrants to foster mutual understanding and prevent populist and xenophobic 
discourses, ideally through the use of online instruments and social media.66 
With these requirements, it becomes clear that although the EU intends to facilitate citizen engagement 
on European issues, it does propagate a European framework to legitimize its own existence and work. This 
“persuasive communication” limits possibilities for open dialogue constituted by a mutual exchange of 
talking and listening.67 DE is in that sense positioned as an intermediate actor. When applying for funding, 
it had to specifically reflect upon these objectives and describe the purposes of its projects. With Cities & 
Refugees, it intended to connect everyday experiences of citizens in Europe with the policy-making process 
in Brussels in order to ‘foster a Europe-wide dialogue between citizens, refugees and asylum seekers, NGOs, 
politicians, and European leaders,’ and to encourage the sharing of common problems and successful 
solutions.68 The next section will look at the workings of Debating Europe to understand how DE intends to 
stimulate such conversation. 
5. Online Context: The Workings of Debating Europe 
On Debating Europe (DE), citizens can engage in a direct conversation with their European leaders by sending 
in questions or posting comments on debates. Next to certain co-funded debate series,69 DE also facilitates 
regular and ‘student-led’ debates. Student-led debates create the opportunity for schools and colleges to 
connect with other students in Europe and learn about the workings of the EU.70 Once posted on the 
website, other visitors can also engage in these debates. The student-led debates are rather transparent with 
regard to the degree to which suggested questions and debates are actually posted on the website.71 Citizens 
can also suggest debates themselves by sending in a video or a text message, but then it is somewhat less 
clear whether the debates are actually taken on and published on the platform, as debates do not specifically 
mention whether they have been proposed by particular users or not.  
Despite the origins of some of its funding, DE describes itself as an ‘editorially independent’ platform 
that decides over its own content and tries to be as inclusive of various views as possible.72 At the same 
time, a European outlook on problems seems to be preferred.73 Umbrella organization, Friends of Europe, 
also considers itself to be neutral and independent, but it does adhere to basic values of the EU and the idea 
that problems facing Europe should be solved together, seeing itself as an ‘advocate of the European 
project.’74 Concerning online rules,75 DE has the right to remove any uncivil comments that incite hate 
speech or are unnecessarily offensive. It also reserves itself the right to delete any comments that diverge 
from the topic of the debate. After writing a response on a debate, the comment is also not immediately 
visible, but ‘awaiting moderation’, a process that usually takes at least a day.76 
DE holds the same discretion with regard to comments placed on Facebook. A significant number of 
the comments published on DE are actually directly taken from their Facebook page, but it usually takes a 
couple of hours or even days before the submissions are transferred.77 Therefore, although their activities 
on Facebook do allow for a relatively faster pace of discussion (as comments are immediately visible there) 
and a bigger outreach to the public,78 DE’s moderation policy stimulates a situation in which debates are 
inclined to become more fragmented, dispersed and separate from one another. The workings of Debating 
Europe are thus closely linked to the dynamics of other platforms.   
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In short, DE tries to act as a neutral intermediate between elite actors and European citizens by 
stimulating civil and constructive debate about European issues on its platform. At the same time, it does 
seem to prefer a European integrationist perspective to find common solutions to European problems. 
Moreover, it reserves the right to remove certain comments if they are not in line with their Code of 
Conduct. The next section will look specifically into the interactive process to see how various actors are 
involved in the construction of meaning on Hungarian fence-building. 
6. Interactive Process: Hungarian Fence-Building 
The debate concerns the question: ‘Should more European countries build fences to keep out refugees?’79 
DE describes the case of a village in Hungary where a fence was built in 2015 to prevent illegal crossings 
along the Serbo-Hungarian border. In its introductory text, besides referring to potential environmental 
hazards, DE constructs the issue mainly as one of effectiveness. It points at the falling numbers of refugees 
who cross the border every day while explaining the critical viewpoint that it only diverts refugees’ routes, 
thereby stimulating riskier crossings and putting greater pressure on other countries. Via hyperlinks to 
articles from The Guardian and the UNHCR, the problems surrounding the fence are exemplified.  
Subsequently, DE uses a comment from Maia in which she explains why a fence would be a good 
solution. At first, it was not possible to see where such comments were taken from. However, recently, DE 
has introduced hyperlinks, which makes it possible to see that this particular comment is taken from a debate 
on the EU’s refugee crisis that stems from 15 October 2015; at that time almost two years ago.80 Comments 
from previous debates are thus used to exemplify certain viewpoints that the European leaders subsequently 
have to respond to. An associate professor in international relations and refugee law was asked to respond 
to Maia’s comment. He constructs the fence-building not as a solution but as a disaster, again pointing 
mostly at the ineffectiveness of the measure, as ‘it [pushes] the buck on someone else.’81 Thereafter, the 
issues of morality and values are introduced with a comment from Antonios, who refers to the irony that a 
couple of decades ago, it was the populations of (now former) Soviet states that fled to the West by crossing 
fences. This comment stems from a debate from early 2017 about Cologne’s New Year’s Eve assaults.82 
According to the associate professor, Eastern and Central European states ‘have a moral and historic duty’ 
to help as these people are now suffering under a similar oppressive regime like communism back in the 
day.83 
On 17 January 2018, the debate received an update, whereby the same questions were taken to a 
spokesman in the government of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, and to a representative of an NGO on 
human rights. On the question of effectiveness, the spokesman of Orbán adds a new perspective to the 
debate by representing the issue as one of obedience. Hungary is just trying to ‘fulfil [their] duties’ within 
the Schengen scheme to prevent illegal entry, while other European countries ‘basically promote and 
prolong what is happening.’84 The NGO representative then responds by questioning the efficiency of the 
fence as it would only divert their routes and fuel the migration industry. She also points at the refusal of 
Hungary to cooperate in many relocation schemes.85 
Finally, these European leaders also reflect on the morality of the fence and Europe’s history with 
division. According to the spokesman, the history of the Cold War cannot be compared to today’s situation, 
because it concerns protection from an external threat, constituted by Muslims who represent a ‘different 
world.’86 The NGO representative gets the final say on the issue and again emphasizes Hungary’s past as a 
country people were fleeing from during the Cold War, and whose refugees were taken in by other countries 
in Europe. In sum, with its introductory text and the contributions of the European leaders, DE mainly 
constructs the issue as a question of European effectiveness and historical morality. As will become clear, 
these constructions only receive limited resonance in the comment section. 
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As can be seen in Table 1, a significant number of comments has been directly taken from two Facebook 
updates and have been transferred by DE to their website. Of the 68 reactions that were not visible on 
Facebook, around sixteen appear to have been there first, but were removed.87 In turn, around eighteen 
comments are on Facebook, but not on DE. It is very difficult to determine what the exact policy is 
surrounding transfer, but it appears that most of the public debate actually occurred on Facebook and not 
on DE’s website. This also means that Facebook users would have had to press the link first, before being 
able to see the opinions of European leaders. With regard to the content of the comments, the analysis will 
focus on the discussion as a whole, as both updates are grouped together on DE and several of the same 
people are involved in both.  
 
 Update 1 Update 2 Total 
Date 28 August 2017 17 January 2018  
Comments posted 
between 
28 August – 7 October 
2017 
18 January – 22 January 
2018 
 
Number of comments on 
DE 
161 62 223 
    Of which from    
    Facebook 
98 57 155 
    Of which not on 
    Facebook 
63 (42 single ones)88 5 68 (49 single ones) 
    Of which were on 
    Facebook before 
15 1 16 
Number that is on 
Facebook but not on DE 
2 16 18 
Table 1. Division of comments 
Specifically, a division is visible between those in favour of the fence and those against. Various arguments 
are made back-and-forth and claims are countered from both sides. The main discursive strategies will now 
be discussed.89 Table 2 provides an exemplary overview of the different categories of comments and the 
striking modes of communication.  
On the pro-fence side, the need for control is a prominent argument. Some see this as a European or 
Schengen responsibility (comment 19), while others particularly point at the rights of a nation to take back 
control of its borders (comment 16). In this way, fence-building is not the only topic under discussion as 
commentators are also divided on the desired degree of EU involvement. The idea of national sovereignty 
is strengthened by the perceived ineffectiveness of the EU in handling the crisis and its ignorance with the 
everyday reality on the streets in Europe (comments 54 and 69). The sentiment exists that the EU, and 
particularly Germany, illegitimately enforces its ideology on the rest of Europe and its citizens, thereby 
‘assisting the invasion of [its] own continent instead of protecting it’ (comment 197). 
  
                                                 
87 This can be discerned from the way the interactive process develops as people specifically respond to what someone has said 
earlier.  
88 Certain comments appear multiple times on DE. This will be discussed later on. 
89 The comments will be shown in their original format, unless indicated otherwise (so potentially with spelling mistakes). 
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Pro-fencing Contra-fencing About each other Forms of 
communication 
Need for control 
European responsibility 
- Traffic over the outer 
border has to be 
controlled and if the 
people do not use the 
legal border crossing 
stations for entering 




- No they are not. The 
borders of those countries 
are their borders, their 
duty and their right. The 
EU is a supranational 
institution just like the 
UN. None have borders 
or any right to say what to 
do with them. (16) 
 
Ineffective EU and enforced 
ideologies 
- It already has one called 
Frontex. The fact it is 
totally ineffective in what 
it does is just typical of 
most EU agencies. (54) 
- I think my country 
should build “a big fat 
wall”, not to protect form 
refugees but from 
Europhiles, eurocrats and 
eurocorrupts… (69) 
- On top of it, Germany 
expects other European 
countries to take 
responsibility and host the 
guests that it invited. This 
kind of dictatorship has 
nothing to do with 
European values either. It 
is not solidarity, but 
imposing German 
migrant policies on other 
countries. (147) 
- EU leaders are betraying 
Europe and its citizens! 
It’s a shame that the EP is 
assisting the invasion of 
it’s own continent instead 
of protecting it!!! (197) 
 
Country as a house and 
refugees as animals 
- you don’t lock your 
doors? (20) 
- You can indeed compare 
a country with a house. 
Effectiveness of fences 
No long-term solution 
- Fences will only 
temporary be an agent of 
hinderance for people on 
the move. (84) 
 
Unfair burden 
- It is unfair for countries 
like Italy and Greece to 
carry the burden of 
refugees...even if EU is 
paying for their staying it 
is a burden for the 




raised and the economic 
disaster (especially for 
Greece islands) is 
unbelievable...in some 
islands the number of 




- I believe we can assure 
border controls and 
immigration control 
through others means 
(like having clearer legal 
procedures to enter and 
supporting development 
in may ‘critical’ countries 
etc) then fences and walls. 
(28) 
 
Source of the problem 
- No. we should intervene 
to stop wars. There is no 
refugees if there is no 
wars. (108) 
 
Historic responsibility  
- Should we look who is 
exploiting Africa and his 
poor countries, shall we 
ask ourselves why third 
world countries are full of 
resources [which] are 
fundamental for the first 
world industry, but they 
keep to be poor? Shall we 
ask ourselves why so 
many political coups have 
been brought forward 
inside that continent? 
Who give money to buy 
weapons? And why? Or 
Delusional/naïve vs. 
rational/informed 
- fail to see or accept what 
happens in your own 
backyard. (5) 
- At first I was like many 
others, ready to accept 
them with open arms. 
Then I kept myself 
informed, watched and 
studied who they are, how 
many, and compared that 
with what the media told 
us. All lies. (7) 
- You like majority of 
followers of western 
europes left seem to be 
delusional. (18) 
 
Well-informed vs. fearful 
and ignorant 
- you are just full of fear 
and prejudices. (26) 
- you seem to be a smart 
guy, yet, you manage you 
manage it to be 
completely ignorant and 
stupid…Syrians tried to 
make their country better, 
they got shot down by 
Assads army, remember? 
(191) 
 
Critique on Debating 
Europe 
- I’m unfollowing this 
page. It’s just angry-
making for no potential 
benefit at all. I don’t 
know whether you’re 
actually aiming to 
promote far right 
populism with these 
questions framed to 
provoke ethno-nationalist 
populist reactions or just 




ever, but either way it’s 





- Yes, I agree with you. 
Let all the rapists and 
murderers come in 
without any control. (24) 
 
Insults and hateful speech  
- :) – or you could be less 
of a moron (36) 
- kill yourself, do a favour 
to the humanity (44) 
 
Movie references 
- then you’d better brace 
yourself for the muslim 
clone army of Darth 
Soros who’ll turn Europe 





Ex: You love dogs and 
you decide to adopt tree 
dogs. One day, you go in 
the street and you see a 
pack of 10 starving dogs. 
You feel sorry for them, 
you may even cry a little, 
but you turn your face the 
other way and start 
walking because you 
know you can’t rescue all 
of them. (29) 
- However, the story is, 
the German people are 
getting ready to re-elect 
Merkel in a couple of 
months. Which, whether 
they realise it or not, will 
give her permission to fill 
Germany with millions 
more cheap fodder they 
will have to work to feed 
for life. (144) 
- It looks like feeding 
apes..they will never have 
the chance to be men.. 
(149) 
 
Illegal vs. legal / 
economic vs. real 
- Yes!!! Especially the 
illegal terrorists, who are 
posing as “refuges”. (72) 
- People that are flooding 
Europe are not refugees 
but immigrants mostly 
looking for an easy life 




- Yes. Europe should not 
turn into an Arab or 
African state. There is a 
limit. (208) 
- Germany invited the 
migrants, but failed to 
offer them safe transport 
to reach the country. In 
this way it encouraged 
them to travel in a 
dangerous way, resulting 
in thousands drowning en 
route to Germany. This is 
cruelty which absolutely 
violates European values 
and any human 
rights…What utter 
disrespect for human life, 
disguised hypocritically as 
compassion… (147) 
 
we shall just try to stop 
them like the Eastern 
European countries like 
to do? Building a new 
Berlin wall? (180) 
- Directly or not, 
migrations are a 
consequence of global 
inequality! Rich countries 
citizens must help 
undeveloped world 
citizens to have education 
housing and a basic 
income…paying a fair 
price for the resources 
they take! (125) 
- We should actually put a 
major economic boycot to 
the countries which are 
doing that! Hungary for 
example. They forgot that 
over a million refugees 
fled Hungary because of 
the Sovietes. (216) 
 
Solidarity and fairness 
- Its how the world 
moves. And what moves 
the world. (2) 
- ... But we Europeans are 
apparently already spoiled. 
Enjoying our own 
freedom of movement 
and being economic 
migrants...but stopping 
other people from doing 
so. (191) 
- There would be no need 
of fences if those people 
were provided in their 
country with what is 
necessary for a decent 
living…+ running water, 
drinkable water, 
electricity. Nobody likes 
to be a refugee or a forced 
migrant. (209) 
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Effectiveness of fences 
- Actually, the wall 
worked very well. Only 
about 5000 people have 
escaped. An estimated 2.6 
million East Germans 
have fled to the West 
befor construction…(183) 
Table 2: Exemplary overview of different categories of comments. 
The need for protection is exemplified by a comparison of a country to a house/home (comment 29). By 
means of this comparison, the position is taken that it is justified to keep out refugees as one has the right 
to decide who enters one’s house and to ‘lock [the] doors’ if necessary (comment 20). In that regard, refugees 
are often compared to animals, for whom you would ‘have to work to feed for life’ (comment 144). In 
addition, many commentators believe the fence is legitimate, because these so-called “refugees” are not ‘real’ 
but rather economic immigrants who try to enter Europe illegally and are ‘looking for an easy life thanks to 
European social benefits’ (comment 72 and 167). 
Morally speaking, the fences are justifiable for some as they safeguard European values and civilization 
and prevent Europe from turning into “an Arab or African state” (comment 208). This is mentioned both 
before and after the contribution by the Orbán spokesman. At the same time, some also see the possible 
lack of a fence as against European values and basic human rights, as it encourages people to take dangerous 
routes to come there without any protection (comment 147). The efficiency of walls and fences is only 
minimally discussed by the pro-fencers, mainly by referring to the workings of the Berlin Wall (comment 
183). 
However, the effectiveness of fences is more extensively mentioned by the contra-fencers. Fences are 
seen as only a temporary relief rather than a long-term solution as people will find other ways to reach their 
destination, which will only lead to an unfair burden on other border states (comments 84 and 113). They 
believe that there are other, more effective, means available to restore control and solve the crisis (comment 
28). In addition, some consider it important to focus particularly on the source of the problem (comment 
108).  
For other contra-fencers, Western interference actually constitutes the main problem, leading to 
exploitation of third world countries and stimulation of conflicts (comment 180). In this way, Europe is 
seen as having a historical responsibility to help refugees in exchange for past and current behaviour 
(comment 125). In that light, the Soviet past of Hungary and the resultant flow of Hungarian refugees is 
also reiterated to delegitimize the return of fences and walls (comment 216). 
Hungarian fence-building is not only constructed by the contra-fencers as an issue of effectiveness and 
historical responsibility, but also as a matter of solidarity and fairness. Migration is seen as part of life, ‘its 
[sic] how the world moves. And what moves the world’ (comment 2). To restrict (economic) migration is 
thus seen as hypocritical (comment 191), and these people coming to Europe have the right to move freely 
to secure a decent life (comment 209). 
These discursive strategies are visible in multiple threads of communication, in which people directly 
respond to each other in a relatively short period of time. Certain participants tend to be more visible and 
prominent than others and become influential in leading the discussion. The longest thread has 28 reactions 
and is particularly significant as one contra-fencer and multiple pro-fencers engage in a direct discussion 
with each other about the right to freedom of movement and the willingness to allow refugees to enter 
European societies.  
Within such discussions, pro-fencers delegitimize the arguments by the contra-fencers by calling them 
‘delusional’ and ‘naïve’, not facing the reality that is going on ‘in [their] own backyard’ (comment 5). By 
contrast, the contra-fencers construct the pro-fencers as ignorant and guided by fear (comments 26 and 
191). Others attempt to mediate by disseminating information to the commenting public. To prove their 
points, they not only make use of arguments, but also sarcasm, jokes and insults.90 Some people are straight-
up hateful (comment 44). 
Many of these comments would arguably go against the code of conduct, but only one comment has 
been removed by the moderators. What is also peculiar is how there are multiple comments that are posted 
                                                 
90 See last column of table 2. 
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more than once, yet none of these double comments have been removed. In turn, various people direct 
their attention to DE and criticize it for provoking hateful speech and discouraging the possibility of rational 
debate with its question (comment 145). The next section will further reflect on the kind of debate that DE 
stimulates.  
7. Discussion 
With the EfCP’s funding for the Cities & Refugees project, DE intended to foster genuine dialogue and 
mutual understanding between politicians, civil society and citizens on its platform, and encourage the 
sharing of European solutions to the refugee crisis. By uploading various debates with responses of 
European leaders, citizens would be able to engage in a fruitful discussion on European issues online. In 
the debate on Hungarian fence-building, DE invited responses from various sides to the discussion and a 
relatively open, critical and oppositional debate developed in the comment section in which DE is even 
criticized on various occasions. However, by carefully selecting comments from previous debates to frame 
its current debate, DE constructs the issue of Hungarian fence-building as mainly concerning questions of 
effectiveness and historical morality, while the pro-fencers, for example, associate the question with matters 
of national sovereignty and preventing “imposters” from illegally entering Europe. Although DE does give 
a platform for these viewpoints, the European leaders do not get a chance to respond to their public directly 
and therefore they engage little with citizen’s opinions and concerns about the topic. Open dialogue between 
European leaders and citizens is thus severely hampered, which results in a lack of opportunity to directly 
address and connect to citizens’ concerns. 
Moreover, the combination of its moderation policy and the transfer of Facebook comments to  create 
a situation in which the pace of interaction on the website is slowed down and most discussions do not even 
take place on DE, but on Facebook. Although this might positively affect the outreach and intensity of the 
debate, it could foster further separation between citizens and leaders’ discourses, as participants are more 
inclined to interact with each other, rather than engaging with the viewpoints of European leaders.  
To be sure, there are other ways for citizens to become more involved on DE, for example by engaging 
in student-led debates, whereby more direct communication between students and leaders is possible. In 
addition, it would be necessary to analyse more debates in order to fully grasp online interaction on DE. 
This would have to involve an exploration of who actually participates in these debates to determine its 
wider significance. Overall, this analysis has illustrated the complexity of the interactive process in an online 
context by means of an in-depth case study. Thereby, the analysis has shown relevant online dynamics and 
it has pointed at some considerations when actors attempt to foster European connections through online 
communication. For future research, it is necessary to look beyond Debating Europe to better grasp the 
multidimensional character of online communication in the European public sphere.  
8. Conclusion 
This paper has argued in favour of studying the interactive process between institutional, media and citizens’ 
discourses in the European public sphere. Especially with the increasing presence of digital media in our 
daily life, it has become vital to understand how various actors give meaning to the European public sphere 
through their online discursive interactions. A combination of CDA and interaction analysis has been used 
to understand how the discursive process is shaped on DE: a platform that intends to bring together 
European leaders and their citizens to discuss issues of common concern.  
The analysis has demonstrated how the interactive process on DE is shaped by a variety of actors in a 
network of online meaning-making. The EU, DE, European leaders and citizens are connected directly and 
indirectly via the platform and other social media, and together construct the debate on Hungarian fence-
building. In this process, the EU performs as a persuasive actor, intended to convince people of its value 
and importance. It creates an overarching framework for discussion by funding intermediate structures like 
DE. Although DE allows for a multitude of opinions to be represented on its website, its selection process 
of comments and respondents results in a lack of connection to citizens’ concerns. Its transfer and 
moderation policies further limit opportunities for fruitful two-way dialogue. Therefore, DE does not fully 
succeed in bridging the gap between European leaders and citizens.  
These findings are relevant to the study of the European public sphere as it shows the importance of 
understanding the way the socio-political and online context shape discursive processes and affect the 
possibility for open and inclusive dialogue. It also conveys how certain actors are in a potentially more 
influential position to affect discourses than others; the EU through its grant framework and Debating Europe 
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through constructing and setting debates. These issues raise important questions with regard to EU policies 
and the way it uses intermediate structures to enhance its own legitimacy. Further research could particularly 
focus upon evaluating the reach and impact of these policies and determine whether online engagement on 
European issues encourages the EU’s desired feelings of community and transnational identification.  
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The Case of  Euskara: Differences in and Impact of  Multi-Level 




Living in Bilbao, the biggest city of the Basque Autonomous Community (BAC), every-day confrontation 
with Euskara, the Basque Language, is inevitable. Apart from hearing the language on the streets, it is used 
for official contexts, including bilingual signs, administrative services, and educational contexts. New 
developments in Basque culture, such as literature, art and websites, are promoted by organisations such as 
the Etxeparre Basque Institute1 or events like the “International day of Basque” (Dia Internacional de Euskera), 
causing a rise in popularity of language and culture amongst young people.2 The situation of the Basque 
language has changed significantly in the last decades, due to changes in policies and attitude, but it varies 
in the different provinces up to this day. Basque can be considered a ‘unique’ minority language which is 
spoken in one or more than one state, however, it is not the majority language in any.3 It is spoken in 
different regions within different nation states, in the BAC and Navarra in Spain and Iparralde in France, 
but is in neither country fully classified as an official state language. 
Looking at the bigger picture, the European Union lists a total of 24 official languages on its website, as 
well as mentioning “over 60 indigenous regional or minority languages, spoken by some 40 million people. 
They include Basque, Catalan, Frisian, Saami, Welsh and Yiddish.”4 Another framework frequently referred 
to is the UNESCO Atlas of the World languages in Danger, which lists Basque as one out of five official 
minority languages in Spain, and assesses its vitality status as “vulnerable”.5 In the French Basque provinces, 
the status is even considered “severely endangered” due to the low number of speakers.6 If only a few 
people speak the language, it is in danger of extinction. Speaker numbers and usage, in this paper further 
referred to under the umbrella term “sociolinguistic reality”, are heavily influenced by language polices, 
amongst other factors. This paper aims to show how legal protection (or lack of such) makes a crucial 
difference for a minority language. One could say “language-policy debates are always about more than 
language.”7 In other words, these polices have a crucial influence on political, economic and social realities. 
My interest is mainly the last one, the social, however, the various aspects are often overlapping.  
My research is motivated by the question of how language policies influence sociolinguistic space, which 
was part of the IP conference subtheme 2: replacing Europe in everyday life, where this paper was originally 
presented. Linguistic variety is a key characteristic of Europe; for this reason, I argue that Europe can be 
found in its languages. I have decided to look at policies, because the legal situation, and in particular changes 
in such, have the power to replace a former status quo and reshape sociolinguistic reality. Therefore, my 
research question is the following: What is the impact of European, national and regional language policies 
                                                 
1 See http://www.etxepare.eus/en.  
2 Sergio Vinas, “Vivir en Euskera, el Gran Desafío de un Idioma en Continuo Crecimiento,” El Mundo, 3 December 2017, 
http://www.elmundo.es/pais-vasco/2017/12/03/5a22f3e7268e3e7e518b45c7.html.  
3 Durk Gorter and Jasone Cenoz, “Multilingual Education for European Minority Languages: the Basque Country and Friesland,” 
International Review of Education 57 (2011), 655. 
4 European Union, “Multilingualism,” https://europa.eu/european-
union/topics/multilingualism_en#regional_&_minority_languages.  
5 Christopher Moseley, ed., Atlas of the World’s Languages in Danger, 3rd ed. (Paris: UNESCO Publishing, 2010), 
http://www.unesco.org/culture/en/endangeredlanguages/atlas. 
6 UNESCO’s Language Vitality and Endangerment Framework (2002/2003) provides six degrees of endangerment. Vulnerable is 
described as “most children speak the language, but it may be restricted to certain domains (e.g., home)”, and severely endangered 
states that the “language is spoken by grandparents and older generations; while the parent generation may understand it, they do 
not speak it to children or among themselves”. See Moseley, Atlas of the World’s Languages in Danger.  
7 Thomas Ricento, An Introduction to Language Policy: Theory and Method (John Wiley: 2009), 8. 
Where is Europe? 36 
on the sociolinguistic reality in the Basque country and how does the legal framework differ within this 
region?  
Within this question, the paper will also investigate the questions of how different legislative frameworks 
concerning (minority) languages are implemented on a regional level, which sociolinguistic differences exist 
in the different provinces of the Basque country in Spain and France and if these can be explained regarding 
the impact of language policies on sociolinguistic space and power (referring to the concept of language 
hegemony). Still, it should be kept in mind that more factors than policies are shaping linguistic reality and 
while this paper is not analysing economic or ideologic factors in detail, it does not neglect their importance. 
Moreover, this paper is attempting to find the importance of policies in a complex interplay of various 
factors. 
This paper will begin by clarifying some important terms and providing a short historic discourse on the 
case study. In a next step, the methodology will be outlined. In connection to that, a theoretic framework 
will be briefly established before the actual analysis looks at language policies in the different regions and 
different legislative levels. Information on the sociolinguistic reality is derived from statistical data, more 
specifically the Sociolinguistic Survey of 2016. Leading from the analysis and linking to concepts, the 
discussion will try to assess the situation of language policies in the Basque country. 
2. Background 
2.1. Terminology 
Before we move on to the actual analysis, it is important that we clarify some of the concepts that are central 
to this research. In general, language policies include legislative texts, frameworks, or guidelines that are 
related to language rights, teaching, usage and preservation. Fernand de Varennes, human rights expert and 
United Nations Special Rapporteur on Minority Issues, states that “the expression ‘language rights’ or 
‘linguistic rights’ is one that may involve very different or even contradictory meanings, depending on 
whether a sociolinguist, a philosopher or an educator is using the term.”8 He also stresses the fact that, 
depending on the case in which language issues are being discussed, they are motivated by different reasons 
and objectives for the legal situation.9 ‘Linguistic reality’, the product of language policies, is describing the 
space in which the language is used, mainly administration, education and everyday life. The most important 
indicator of linguistic reality are speaker numbers of the languages within a specific territory (or group). The 
term ‘sociolinguistic reality’ – a term used in this paper – extends speaker numbers to factors linked to 
language use such as social status, identity, bilingualism.10 
In this context, it is important to stress the difference between human rights, which “have a claim to 
universality” and linguistic rights, which are “necessarily group-related” as expert in Basque studies and 
linguist, Viola Miglio, makes clear.11 Important when talking about language rights and policies is that these 
may “benefit one group to the exclusion of another.”12 Thus, when referring to ‘minority language,’ the 
term implies the existence of a ‘majority language’, usually distinguished by the number of speakers each 
language has in a region. There are many definitions for ‘minority language,’13 this paper, however, adopts 
the one provided by the European Commission’s Euromosaic study, as it includes the issue of power that will 
become important later in the discussion:  
‘The concept of minority by reference to language groups does not refer to empirical measures, 
but rather to issues of power. That is, they are language groups, conceived of as social groups, 
marked by a specific language and culture, that exist within wider societies and states but which 
lack the political institutional and ideological structures which can guarantee the relevance of 
those languages for everyday life of members of such groups.’14 
                                                 
8 Fernand de Varennes, “The Language Rights of Minorities in Europe: A Critical Look at the Law and Practice,” in Language 
Rights and Cultural Diversity, ed. Xabier Irujo and Viola Miglio (Center for Basque Studies Nevada, 2013), 95. 
9 Ibid., 97. 
10 Oxford Dictionary, “Sociolinguistics,” https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/sociolinguistics. 
11 Viola Miglio, “Endangered Languages and Self-Determination,” in Language Rights and Cultural Diversity, ed. Xabier Irujo and 
Viola Miglio (Center for Basque Studies Nevada, 2013), 36. 
12 Ibid., 36. 
13 Niamh Nic Shuibhne, EC Law and Minority Language Policy: Culture, Citizenship and Fundamental Rights (Kluwer Law International, 
2002), 48 ff. 
14 European Commission, Euromosaic, 1, as cited in Shuibhne, 50. 
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With reference to the case study, the usage of the term ‘Basque Country’ in this paper includes the greater 
area of the Basque Country (called Euskal Herria in Basque), four historic provinces (Bizkaia, Gipuzkoa, 
Araba and Navarra) in the North of Spain and three provinces (Lower Navarra, Lapurdi, Zuberoa) in the 
South of France.15 As this paper focuses on legislation, it uses the official administrative units instead of the 
historic provinces. These are: the Basque Autonomous Community (BAC), which includes Bizkaia, 
Gipuzkoa and Araba, and Navarra, which opted to be an independent unit and will thus be treated separately 
in the analysis. Both are part of Spain’s seventeen autonomous regions. As the French Basque provinces are 
not an official administrative unit in the French state, they are referred to as Northern Basque Country or 
Iparralde.16 How closely regional belonging and language are, shows the example of the adjective for 
“basque”, which is “eskalduna”; this is at the same time the term for “a person who speaks Basque”.17 
2.2. Historic Background 
The origin of the Basque language is still discussed amongst linguists. However, it is the only surviving non-
Indo-European Language in Western Europe, with approximately 600.000 speakers.18 It is also an 
autochthonous language, meaning that it originated in the area where it is still spoken.19 A standardized 
form Euskara batua was developed by the Academy of the Basque language in the 1960s.20 
Historically, language rights and the creation of the nation-state are closely interlinked. The case of 
Basque is exemplary for many regional and minority languages that were oppressed to make way for the 
unification of a state. In Spain, and even more in post-1789 France, proclaiming a common language created 
parts of national identity. Sharing a common language determines the belonging to a group, and thereby 
contributes significantly to group identity. Hence, regional identity was supposedly “detrimental to national 
unification” because it conflicted with the idea of national unity claiming all citizens to “be equal, and by 
extension homogenous.”21 Furthermore, scholars Iruju and Miglio argue that by portraying regional 
languages as “enemies of progress” and not allowing them any space in the institutional design of the new 
states, the national governments followed a strategy that resulted in a “loss of prestige” of these languages.22 
As a consequence, a growing number of speakers abandoned their regional language to have better 
possibilities for social improvement and participation in the state. The French revolution demanded human 
rights, but not linguistic rights. French as a language was used to reach equality and unity, and ‘cultural 
genocide or linguicide’ was regarded as a necessary part of the language policies implemented by the French 
government at that time.23 The planned destruction of regional languages such as Breton, Basque and 
Catalan served to spread the French language and strengthen its position. The goal of “unity of the state 
through monolingualism,”24 was reflected in policies and strategies in education, e.g. the punishing of 
students not speaking French but a regional language in schools. Similar processes were observed in Spain, 
but only reached its extreme later under the Franco dictatorship.  
By the end of the nineteenth century, a ‘Basque Renaissance’ started to develop, producing Basque 
literature and giving an increased value to Basque culture and language, predominately in the Bilbao and San 
Sebastián area, with important figures such as philosopher and writer Miguel de Unamuno, and politician 
and writer Sabino Arana.25 Spanish Basque provinces (except Navarra) first received autonomy in 1936, a 
historic moment for Basque nationalism and also for the Basque language, which started to be included in 
the school curriculum.26 Unfortunately, autonomy did not last long, as General Franco took over power in 
Spain and suppressed regional movements. Under his dictatorship (1939-1975), discrimination of Basque 
                                                 
15 Xabier Zabaltza and Iván Igartua, A Brief History of the Basque Language (Exepare Basque Institute: 2016), http://www. etxepare. 
net/en/basque>. 
16 William A. Douglass and Pedro Güell. “A Basque Referendum: Resolution of Political Conflict or the Promised Land of 
Error?,” Empire & Terror: Nationalism/Postnationalism in the New Millennium (Center for Basque Studies Nevada, 2004), 138. 
17 Estibaliz Amorrortu, Basque Sociolinguistics: Language, Society, and Culture. (University of Nevada Press, 2003), 12. 
18 Gorter and Cenoz, “Multilingual Education for European Minority Languages,” 655. 
19 Ibid., 663. 
20 Amorrortu, Basque Sociolinguistics, 24. 
21 Xabier Irujo and Viola Miglio, “Introduction: The Lack of Legal Status,” in Language Rights and Cultural Diversity, ed. Xabier Irujo 
and Viola Miglio (Center for Basque Studies Nevada, 2013), 22. 
22 Ibid., 24. 
23 Ibid., 17-19. 
24 Ibid., 20. 
25 See Mark Kurlansky, The Basque History of the World (London: Vintage Books, 2000), 158 ff.  
26 Ibid., 190 ff.  
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and other regional languages in Spain was part of his regime and an important instrument to exercise power 
(thus legitimizing his regime and nationalist discourse). During the Francoist occupation of the Basque 
Country, Spanish was promoted as the superior language. Kurlansky, a journalist who published a book on 
Basques and their history, reports that Basques were told to “speak Christian”, meaning Spanish as the 
language of the Catholic Church and the nation Spain.27 Other actions to diminish the status of the Basque 
language included the reversal of tax regulations, public burning of books in Basque, replacement of Basques 
as teachers and public servants, and a ban on Basque names, with the justification that these “would present 
an offence to the national unity. ”28 Not only was the usage of language prohibited, owning anything written 
in Basque or pictures showing Basque leaders, was punished with fines or even imprisonment.29 This 
strategy was “aimed at robbing Basque of its role as preferred means of expression of the Basque people, a 
fundamental pillar of their identity.”30 Paradoxically, as historian Núñez Seixas notes, strategies for cultural 
assimilation and promotion of Castilian Spanish did not cause the disappearance of minority languages.31  
Since the end of the Francoist regime, the Basque language has recovered from repression, thanks to 
successful revitalization strategies, e.g. in the form of legislation and language promotion. These measures 
have had a significant impact on the number of Basque speakers, which have risen from around 528.000 in 
1991 to more than 751.000 in 2016, a rise of more than 40%, in the past 25 years. Whereas in 1991, 22.3% 




Figure 1: Development of Speaker numbers in the Basque country (all provinces), 1991-2016. Source: Sociolinguistic Survey 2016. 
The analysis of policy documents below will show differences in legislation within the different countries 
and administrative units. It will also link these to linguistic/sociolinguistic reality, including speaker numbers, 
in more detail. 
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28 Miglio, “Endangered Languages and Self-Determination,” 43-44. 
29 Ibid., 45. 
30 Ibid., 45. 
31 Xosé M. Núñez Seixas, “The Iberian Languages and Spanish Nationalism,” in Language Rights and Cultural Diversity, ed. Xabier 
Irujo and Viola Miglio (Center for Basque Studies Nevada, 2013), 183. 
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3. Methodology and Theoretical Framework 
3.1. Methodology 
This paper uses an interdisciplinary approach to link the sociolinguistic reality to legal frameworks on 
different governmental/administrative levels (European, national, regional) in the Basque Country. 
Language policies will be compared on both sides of the border (French and Spanish Basque provinces), 
and between the BAC and Navarra. The differences identified will be connected to most recent statistics 
(Sociolinguistic Survey 2016), and the findings will serve to evaluate the impact of language policies within 
a theoretical framework of power of language policies and consequences for a minority language. These two 
variables, legislation and sociolinguistic data, are necessary to answer the twofold research question 
presented above.  
The method I will be using is a comparative analysis of language policies and their implementation in a 
trans-border region with a linguistic minority (the Basque Country). By reviewing the material and using 
qualitative content analysis of legal and secondary texts, similarities and differences not only between the 
two sides of the border, but also between different legislative levels with regard to minority language policies 
will be contrasted and explained, if possible. For a more detailed analysis, I developed three categories for 
comparison: official status of the minority language (Basque) compared to the majority language 
(Spanish/French), accessibility of public services in the minority language; and education in minority 
language. These categories were chosen because they are fields shaped by language policies and directly 
impacting the sociolinguistic reality. Then, the conceptual data developed by the analysis of empirical data 
concerning the two cases (Spain and France) and the results of the sociolinguistic survey will be related to 
relevant theories (language hegemony and power). The discussion serves to bring the results of the analysis 
together with the concepts and contributions of other authors on the topic. 
3.2. Theoretical Concepts 
This section presents key variables of interest for the analysis, identified by the author and other scholars, 
as well as theories of power and language hegemony. Due to the scope of this paper, the review of related 
theories can only be selective. 
To begin with, the key variables that influence the sociolinguistic reality and the status of language in the 
Basque country are: politics, language policies, educational policies, availability of languages for public and 
private services, media, tradition, and personal preferences.32 Shohamy, an expert on multilingualism and 
language education, also argues that actual practices are heavily influenced by mechanisms that are steered 
by language policies, such as education, street signs, and more.33 While individual factors such as personal 
influence and tradition vary, and private services and media are demand-orientated, general factors such as 
legislation and public services are constant and ubiquitous. Accordingly, this prevalence makes legislation 
and public services the most important variables influencing the social, including sociolinguistic, reality. To 
be able to exert influence on something is a demonstration of power, therefore this paper will be working 
with concepts of power and language hegemony mainly. When explaining reasons for language attrition and 
death, Iruju and Miglio argue that not only language policies, but also “sociological, cultural and even 
economic […] factors have their origin in political manipulation at the hands of one linguistic community 
(usually a majority) over others (usually the minorities).”34 Here, the overt or covert influence of the group 
in power (politically) controls the situation of the other group in many ways, not only concerning language. 
Therefore, it can be said that power (as in political power) is the primary factor determining the status of a 
language. Economic power might become political power; however, this goes beyond the focus of this 
section.35  
DePalma and Teasley, both scholars who intensively researched bilingualism and education practices, 
argue that social factors such as status and perception of a language also reinforce the majority language, 
using the contrast of Spanish in Spain and Spanish in the United States:  
‘[T]he language or dialect that is used by a powerful group becomes part of this cultural capital. 
In this sense, ‘free’ choice can become an unwitting instrument of hegemony, as speakers of 
                                                 
32 See for instance Amorrortu, Basque Sociolinguistics, 64 ff. 
33 Elana Shohamy, Language Policy: Hidden Agendas and New Approaches (Routledge: 2006), xv. 
34 Irujo and Miglio, “Introduction: The Lack of Legal Status,” 21. 
35 See for more on these factors: Abram de Swaan, Words of the world: The Global Language System (John Wiley, 2013). 
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minority languages, whether Spanish-speakers in the US or speakers of other languages in 
Spain, may become convinced that rejecting their minority language is the most expedient path 
to acquiring the more powerful and promising majority language, including all the cultural capital 
that is thought to come with it.’36  
This observation shows that not only power decides which language is used more, but also that speakers 
make the choice for the language they perceive as more powerful, thereby enhancing its power further. Also, 
personal preference or political orientation influences this decision. Thus, depending on established political 
power structures, a construction of language status takes place in the social sphere. The existing structures 
often can be traced back to historic developments and strategies to discriminate minority languages, as 
described in the section above under the Franco dictatorship. We can see that during the expansion of 
Spanish on the Iberian peninsula in the last century, a “subtle hegemony of Spanish [was] fostered by neoliberal 
discourses on educational choice, flexibility and competition, and by the lingering prejudices about languages 
that are conditioned by attitudes towards their speakers.”37 While one might refer to the possibility of the 
speaker’s free choice, this observation suggests that, ultimately, the linguistic reality is steered by notions of 
power and hegemony, which can still be applied to the situation today. Additionally, this means that liberal 
language policies can also further the hegemony of one language, if language ideologies are used as a power 
instrument, they influence the “neoliberal discourse” and cause that the free choice of the individual is often 
in favour of the majority language.38  
This raises the question if a balanced situation between two languages competing in a region is possible 
at all. As DePalma and Teasley critically acknowledge, even “[i]gnoring these historical processes can leave 
us open to neoliberal discourses of personal choice, equal balance, language as personal commodity and, in 
some political arenas, to protest-rhetoric involving reverse discrimination and imposition.”39 In 
consequence, policies can be seen as a power instrument that decides principally over the extent a language 
is given in social space, while moving on a narrow line between equality and (positive) discrimination. 
4. Analysis 
4.1. Legal Frameworks on the European Level 
This first section of the analysis investigates linguistic rights and linguistic diversity on the European level, 
with the EU and the Council of Europe being selected here more specifically. However, it does not claim 
to list all frameworks linked to this issue, as this exceeds the scope of this paper. When broadly speaking of 
legislation on the European level, this can in principle refer to different supranational institutions. This 
section will briefly present the main legislative texts linked to linguistic diversity and language rights, and 
then concentrate on one example that is considered most relevant for approaching the research questions 
posed above.  
To begin with, the legislation of the European Union provides some guidelines for language policies in 
its 28 member states. The Treaty of the European Union (TEU), signed in Maastricht in 1992, states in 
Chapter 3, Art. 126: 
‘I. The Community shall contribute to the development of quality education by encouraging 
cooperation between Member States and, if necessary, by supporting and supplementing their 
action, while fully respecting the responsibility of the Member States for the content of 
teaching and the organization of education systems and their cultural and linguistic diversity.’40 
Apart from stressing the need of member states to become active and the importance of education, the 
concept of cultural and linguistic diversity is pointed out. It remains open to interpretation if the notion of 
‘community’ language includes minority languages that are not officially state languages. EU legislative texts 
leave the implementation to the members and lack concreteness. 
More concrete than the EU legislation is the Council of Europe’s European Charter for Regional or 
Minority Languages (ECRML) from 1992, which aims to “protect and promote historical regional and 
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38 Ibid., 111. 
39 Ibid., 115. 
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minority languages in Europe.”41 Spain ratified it in 2001 for 6 minority languages, including Basque. As the 
Charter is content-wise more relevant and explicit when it comes to minority language rights, it will be used 
here for means of comparison of a legal framework on the supranational level.  
The Charter aims to protect and promote linguistic diversity (Article 7, 10), not only endangered 
languages. It can be considered an instrument that “does not create any right that individuals or communities 
can exercise directly, rather they create obligations for ratifying states to take steps in favor [sic] of the 
maintenance of languages in general — and not only those on the verge of extinction.”42 However, the 
Charter also has its drawbacks when it comes to the implementation by nation states. In theory, it can 
impose legal duties on governments, e.g. in the field of education.43 Even though the Charter is a treaty in 
international law, individuals cannot bring issues up to any court, therefore problems occur with practice 
and enforcement. National governments, possibly pushed by civic society movements, must take action. 
Other limitations constraining the application of this law include the fact that not all languages are covered, 
and case-specific factors such as territory, numbers of speakers, situational context and capacities of public 
authorities have to be taken into account.44 
As a result, cases cannot be brought before the European Court of Human Rights, and the only 
enforcement mechanism available is an advisory committee, that gives recommendations – but only rarely 
criticism – on individual cases.45 In conclusion, legal frameworks on a European level in this matter are not 
as influential on a national level as one might assume. As described before, content and national 
responsibilities connected to them are too weak. Both frameworks, the TEU and the ECRML, lack concrete 
definitions of which languages are included (or in which context a language can be considered a minority 
language), how concrete measures by governments should look like, how governments that do not even 
officially acknowledge a minority language as such can be motivated to do so, and which consequences will 
follow if they do not comply with the regulations of the legislative framework.  
4.2. National Levels: Spain and France 
As shown previously, the strong historic link between language and the nation state has had important 
consequences for languages not declared official state language(s). Additionally, the EU lacks a common 
language policy, as discussed above. Therefore, this policy field is still largely the responsibility of national 
governments. This section looks at the main legislative frameworks at the national levels guiding language 
policies in the regions of the Basque country. 
In the case of Spain, the constitution gave the 17 different regions the possibility to determine the design 
of regional government individually, resulting in varied degrees of autonomy. This liberty on the regional 
level might also explain the differences between legislation in the BAC and Navarra described in more detail 
below.46 Regarding language, the “constitution introduces factors of inequality, including a generalized duty 
to know Spanish”.47 Thus, the Spanish constitution underlines the dominant position of Spanish as the 
official language. As a consequence of this constitutional design and the strong position of the Spanish 
nation state, other restrictions for Basque (and other regional languages in Spain) emerge, such as territorial 
limitation, dependence on regional politics, and most importantly, the strong position of Spanish guaranteed 
by the constitution (despite the fact that the number of speakers might not always confirm this). This “legal 
superiority”48 is also reflected in access to public services and education: Spanish must be used for official 
purposes and taught in all schools in Spain.  
In France, the constitution does not allow any space for regional minorities and their languages, even 
though their existence in Brittany, Corsica, Iparralde (Northern Basque Country) and others is undeniable. 
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It is clearly stated in the second article of the 1958 constitution: “The language of the republic is French”.49 
Declaring French the only official language follows the emphasis on equality of all citizens in Article 1 and 
does not mention nor leave space for minority/regional languages. This monolingual state constitution is 
also reflected when looking at the UNESCO endangered languages list, which considers 26 languages in 
France as endangered, as opposed to only 6 in Spain. 50 
France has furthermore not ratified the Council of Europe’s European Charter for Regional or Minority 
Languages, whereas Spain has. Linked to the outstanding ratification by France, an initiative by the French 
parliament in 2006 attempted to make amendments to the constitution and grant regional minority languages 
in France official status. It was rejected by the French National Assembly, with reference to Article 2 of the 
constitution and the argument that such a change would threaten ”the unity of the French people” as well 
as potentially cause “serious communitarian drifts.”51 
4.3. Basque Provinces 
Basque Autonomous Community 
In the BAC, the Statute of Autonomy (1979), as well as the Euskera Act (1982) present the main legal texts. 
Article 6 of the Statute of Autonomy addresses language issues, Basque and Spanish are co-official: “All its 
inhabitants have the right to know and use both languages,”52 which is in a strong contrast to the Spanish 
constitution of 1978, where citizens have the right to know the languages of their respective autonomous 
communities (Basque, Catalan, and Galician), but “the right and duty” to know Spanish.53 Other important 
articles are: Art. 6.2. Access to the languages guaranteed by public authorities and Art. 6.3. No discrimination 
for speakers of either of the two languages.54 
One example of flexible language policies in the BAC is the educational system, offering three types of 
immersion programs for schools as part of its revitalization strategies of Basque language:55 Firstly, mainly 
Spanish as the language of instruction for all subjects, Basque language as subject. Secondly, both languages 
as medium of instruction and as subjects, and thirdly, mainly Basque instruction, Spanish as subject.56 
Because of this concept, a transformation in language use amongst students and teachers can be observed. 




In the Foral Community of Navarre, (CFN), the legal situation is different than in the BAC. Even though 
supported by various parties and discussed in the regional parliament, Basque was not declared an official 
language next to Spanish.58 Spanish is mentioned first, then Basque. Basque does not have co-official status 
everywhere in Navarra, only in some parts. The important document here is the 1982 CFN autonomy 
statute, particularly Article 9, which reads: 
1. Spanish is the official language in Navarre. 
2. Vascuence will also have official status in Basque speaking areas of Navarre. A Foral law 
will determine these areas, regulate the official use of Basque, and within the framework of 
general state legislation, organize teaching of this language.59 
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Thus, Basque is only acknowledged in the regions where it is already spoken. Interesting, as Irujo and Urrutia 
point out, is that the choice of words in the statute already has a different connotation than in similar 
contexts in the neighbouring BAC, using the Spanish word Vascuence instead of Basque Euskara. Hence the 
“law reveals clear political interest” as it “recognizes Vascuence, but it does not mention Euskara which it 
believes belongs in the Basque Autonomous Community.”60 Therefore, it is not surprising, that speakers of 
Basque lack language rights while the law from this region has a connotation that Basque is something 
foreign requiring translation, thus placing Euskara (Basque) outside Navarra, and that there is no indication 
of language policies aimed to actively promote and revitalize the language. 
So far, legislation in Navarra is different from the legislation and co-officiality in the BAC described 
above, showing less identification with the language, and a stronger sign of power of the national 
constitution of Spain and the regional government of Navarra following this line. However, this changed in 
1986 after the Spanish government also acknowledged the status of minority languages within Spain, and 
Law 18/1986 created the possibility for co-officiality for Basque. Yet, this was only put into use in those 
areas of Navarra where this language is predominantly used, i.e. the north.61 Thus, it does not represent a 
major shift to the previous law and the recognition of Basque in Navarra is still limited, as described above. 
It adds measures for the presence and protection of the language, including its presence in media, access to 
administration, and education, in respective Basque areas.  
Miglio also notices that the “vagueness of statements” about Basque language rights in mixed regions in 
Navarra could become problematic for Basque speakers to rely on.62 Compared to the legislation in the 
neighbouring region of the BAC, Basque speakers in Navarra have significantly fewer possibilities to use 
the language in official contexts, especially when moving within the region. The language itself is maintained 
but not promoted, thus speaker numbers are unlikely to increase.  
Irujo and Urrutia find the “legal and social situation of Euskara [to be] much more precarious”63 than in 
other regions and criticise a “zoning of linguistic rights […] which divides citizens into three large groups 
according to their place of residence.”64 Especially in the mixed zone, this vagueness is confusing, 
particularly concerning access to public services and administration for monolingual speakers of Basque, as 
these services might only be offered in Spanish. Rights for speakers of Basque in third zones are non-
existent, Basque has no co-official status, consequently “Basque does not legally exist in this zone.“65 In the 
field of education, the principle of zones is also applied: Basque is a subject in the “Basque zone”, a voluntary 
option in the mixed zone, and not offered or only as an elective in schools in the non-Basque zone. In all 
zones, there is no primary instruction in Basque, as seen in the model of the BAC.66 Since 2000, a regression 
of language politics in Navarra can be observed, which is considered a “step backward”67, in addition to the 
already prevalent lack of linguistic rights and obstacles to equal access. This could be linked to the language’s 
loss of relevance in official contexts as well, and it not being compulsory in all schools.  
 
Iparralde 
Speakers of Euskara in the Basque provinces in France (Iparralde) have significantly different language 
rights compared to their Spanish neighbours. There is no legal framework on the regional level in Iparralde. 
As the French constitution does not give any legal space to other languages than French, no language policy 
that could be analysed in this subsection exists. Promoting and maintaining Basque in the Northern Basque 
Country, therefore, is only done by community efforts and organisations such as the Public Office of the 
Basque Language in Bayonne, France.68 
4.4. Sociolinguistic Reality 
To assess the effectiveness of language policies and to measure the sociolinguistic impact of the different 
legal provisions in the Basque country, it is necessary to compare these in terms of statistical data. This 
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subsection will recap the findings of the 2016 sociolinguistic survey, looking at the following indicators: 
speaker numbers (Figure 2), age, and use of the language. 
 
Green: active speakers of Basque; Pink: passive speakers who understand the language; Blue: non-speakers 
Figure 2: Linguistic competence in the different provinces of the Basque Country, Source: Sociolinguistic Survey 2016.  
Translated from original by author 69 
As visible in Figure 2, total speaker numbers (active and passive) were the highest in the BAC with 53%, 
29,5% in Northern Basque country, and lowest in Navarra with 23,2%. Looking at the factor age, we notice 
a very high percentage of young people that are active speakers of Basque in the BAC (71,4) and Navarra 
(25,8%). In the Northern Basque country, the population 65 years or older has the highest speaker rate of 
Basque.70 This is possibly a result of changed education policies in BAC and Navarra, of which the young 
generation profited from. Asked which language they use most intensively, 20,1% of respondents in BAC, 
6,6% in Navarra, and 8,1% in Northern Basque country said they prefer Basque. 71 
5. Discussion 
This part serves to summarise and interpret the findings in this paper. The analysis of selected legal and 
policy documents has shown that Basque has its strongest position in the BAC provinces, due to the co-
official status of Basque and Spanish in this administrative region. In Navarra, Basque is only co-official in 
sub-zones in which it has had historically high speaker numbers. In the Basque province in France, however, 
the language lacks official status, as the recognition of this minority language (and other languages) is absent 
in the French constitution, and thus the language is not officially dealt with by regional authorities. Still, the 
national legislation in Spain shows a certain “legal asymmetry”, as Spanish citizens have the “duty to know 
Castilian, but only the right to use and know the sub-state languages” [sic].72 Especially because provinces 
vary in their degree of self-government, the policies and strategies for language promotion (which is linked 
to ideology and a general political position towards the minority language, but could not be treated in more 
detail in this paper) are decisive. The contrast between BAC and Navarra illustrates this best. Iruju and 
Miglio explain why the differing legislations are so problematic and will crucially determine the language’s 
future:  
Reducing a language to the brink of extinction implies a lack of legal status, because legal status 
is one of the main guarantors of social prestige. The status of endangerment of a minority 
language is mainly due to its lack of officiality (or recognition of legal status) in the past and 
its level of endangerment is directly proportional to the level of legal recognition that the 
language has now and has had in the past.73  
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They argue that legal representation is the only way to sustain a minority language. This includes factors 
such as bilingual administration and an inclusive, bilingual education system, based on the acceptance of 
cultural and linguistic diversity.  
The most recent sociolinguistic survey from 2016, published jointly by the Basque Government (BAC), 
the Government of Navarra, and the Public Office of the Basque Language (NGO, Bayonne, France) allows 
for optimism (Fig.1, Fig.2). The numbers reflect how inclusive policies (in BAC) have a more positive 
impact, i.e. growing speaker numbers of an endangered language, than more restricted (Navarra) or non-
existent ones (Ipparalde). Especially educational policies have an impact, as Miglio argues for the importance 
of a young generation of Basques in the recovery process, particularly amongst so-called euskaldun berriak, 
new speakers of Basque that learn the language at school instead of at their home.74 But also the numbers 
of students in immersion schools differ heavily in the different Basque regions, as Miglio shows: 63% in 
BAC, 27 % in Navarra, only 9% in Iparralde (immersion programs).75 Next to education, it can be stated 
that “political and legal factors contribute to a language’s fate, as well as social prestige in the broadest 
possible sense as the status of a language in so far as it provides its speakers with the opportunities for 
economic and social advancement.”76 
However, it should be kept in mind that policies cannot be the only indicator for the extent a minority 
language is used in social space. As the results of the sociolinguistic survey showed (Fig.2), the number of 
speakers in the Northern Basque country (29,5%) is surprising, considering that the analysis showed that 
this area lacks any legal status for Basque, compared to Navarra with only 23,2%. Thus, legislation is only 
one element, possible factors such as tradition, ideology and non-official attempts to promote a language 
can also have a positive impact on speaker numbers. Without a doubt, social realities – for instance contexts 
and spaces where language is used (formal/informal) – have to be taken into account. Hence, speaker 
numbers can be misleading, as they sometimes include passive speakers and bilinguals in the same category 
as monolinguals. But, as argued by Gorter and Cenoz, speakers of a minority languages need to be 
multilingual, thus at least speak also the majority language they are in contact with, to have equal access to 
public services and equal possibilities.77 Monolingual speakers of a minority language are faced with several 
obstacles, if these services are not offered in the minority language, as in the case of Basque in Iparralde. 
Hence multilingualism in these regions is more common. In this context, the argument of Debra Suarez, 
expert on multilingualism, could present an explanation to assess the attempts to maintain the minority 
language.78 Suarez claims that a struggle for linguistic hegemony occurs rather through bilingualism than 
monolingualism in the minority language.79 Her argument is that for monolingual speakers, only one 
language is available, whilst for bi- or multilinguals, a decision which language to use has to be made, 
consciously or unconsciously, in private and public contexts. Resulting from this, the multilingual speaker 
is likely to choose the ‘easier’ language (the majority language) and neglect the lesser used language. This 
could serve as an explanation for heritage language maintenance and revitalization of Euskara in the BAC 
as resistance to linguistic hegemony, but also with regard to ‘inevitable’ bilingualism in Navarra or Iparralde.  
Concerning the supranational level, the existing legislation is not directly influencing regional ones, as 
far as this paper could find out. Furthermore, because of the links of minority languages to regional identity 
and culture, and often also nationalism, it is difficult to propose a ‘one solution fits all’ approach. Thus, 
individual developments and decisions on a regional level are inevitable. Regional varieties are rarely granted 
legal status on a national level, therefore a European level could fill this void. Irujo and Miglio argue that, 
compared to the sociolinguistic reality and including variations and dialects, only around 10% of the 
languages spoken in EU countries also have official status, often as national language, granted by national 
governments.80 They also identify a connection between “language loss, dialect attrition — and the lack of 
legal protection and therefore official representation afforded to minority languages.”81 Hence, there is a 
need for more concrete legislation and mechanisms for implementation on this level. 
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Whereas Gorter and Cenoz argue that the legal framework provided by the EU and the Council of 
Europe (ECRML) can have a positive impact to promote and protect cultural heritage of languages in 
Europe,82 Miglio concludes that “international law can only help in a marginal way.”83 As a main reason for 
this limitation of supranational legislative influence, the scholar stresses that linguistic rights are considered 
a “part of cultural rights, rather than fundamental human rights.”84 The distinction is important and explains 
the attention language rights receive when ‘competing’ with other issues on a political level. Thus, it is 
fundamental that minority groups actively claim their rights to achieve changes in legislation and 
implementation practices. In the introduction of this paper, the distinction between human rights and 
linguistic rights was made. Consequently, if rights, cultural or linguistic, “benefit one group to the exclusion of 
another”85, we are dealing with a complex set of power relations between minority and majority. This, in turn, 
raises the question of the extent to which a majority must acknowledge the rights of a minority. Even though 
not the focus of this paper, it should be noted that this does not only refer to language rights, but can also 
be extended to freedom of speech, movement, religion, and more. This can also be applied to DePalma and 
Teasley’s conception of power (see above). Consequently, regional and national authorities have the power 
to decide over the fate of the minority language. They can either decide to empower the regional language 
or weaken its position (also by not acting).  
6. Conclusions 
This paper has shown that language policies and the resulting legal status are very important for a minority 
language to maintain its speaker numbers and serves as a valuable basis for possible revitalisation strategies, 
as in the BAC. It also emphasized how the theoretical concept of power can express itself in political power 
and thus influences legislation and sociolinguistic reality. Nevertheless, it should be kept in mind that 
language usage and hegemony also develop from previous legal status and linguistic strategies, as well as 
economic, social and cultural factors that this paper did not analyse in detail. To sum up, while the 1978 
Spanish constitution acknowledges multilingualism in Spain to some degree, language rights are still not 
equally granted. In the BAC, since the 1979 Statute of Autonomy, followed by the 1982 Act of normalization 
of Basque Language, Basque and Spanish have equal rights and must be used by public institutions as such.86 
In Navarra, the Basque Act of 1986 provides limited rights to Basque speakers in territorially limited areas. 
Also, no revitalization or promotion strategies are employed, and the speaker number is mainly kept on a 
constant level.87 On the French side, in Iparralde, Basque is not even recognized as an official language, due 
to the limitations stemming from the design of the French constitution. The analysis and discussion have 
shown that there is still room for improvement of minority language rights. The void in European legislation 
allowing national governments to decide if and how minority language rights are granted causes significant 
variation in legal status, even within a country as shown by the examples of the BAC and Navarra in Spain, 
and even more on the other side of the border in Iparralde in France. The scope of this paper did not allow 
more comparisons, however, there are various examples of minority languages in European countries 
struggling for recognition and legal status. Therefore, I believe the topic of minority languages and language 
policies will gain more prominence in a European context in the future. Coming back to the IP theme 
“Where is Europe?”, the findings of this paper support the notion that Europe can be found in linguistic 
diversity, as already indicated in the introduction. Institutions and language policies shape the sociolinguistic 
reality and determine how much space a language comprises in contrast to another, thus having a significant 
impact on everyday life in Europe. 
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The Squatting Effect: From Urban Removal to Urban Renewal 
Martina Adinolfi 
1. Introduction 
Squatting is an action repertoire consisting in using void or abandoned properties for housing purposes 
and/or for the promotion of social activities; and simultaneously an autonomous and radical urban movement 
with a pragmatic orientation.1 Whereas squatting of vacant properties without legal permission has always 
existed, this paper will focus on Urban Squatting as a cultural and political phenomenon, organised or 
inspired by social movements. Not only has squatting been a widespread place-making practice all over 
Europe since the 1970s, it has also grown so multifaceted, multi-nuanced and heterogeneous that the 
sociologists such as Hans Pruijt has developed a typological categorisation of it. 
Those who have been defined as “Conservational Squatters”2 represent the starting point for this 
research. By holding that “it is better to squat and mend than to own and destroy”,3 conservational squatters 
strive to collectively re-imagine, rebuild and rehabilitate the urban space. The city and its empty spaces are 
thus reclaimed as an arena of social transformation, experimentation and endurance, where abandoned, 
vacant buildings become an opportunity to foster autonomous and non-institutional modes of citizen 
participation. Squatting is one of them: it embodies a grassroots, intervention-driven practice which, by 
generating direct-democratic forms of decision-making, collective engagement, and horizontal consensus 
challenges the bourgeois logics of urban speculation, ownership, and consumerism. As such, squatting is 
naturally political—and intrinsically politicised. To the cry of “Right to the City!”, conservational squatters 
reclaim a more sustainable understanding of the urban space, advocating for urban renewal as an ethical 
alternative to urban removal. 
Arguing that it is the everyday experience of living the city that entitles one to the “Right to the City”, 
the squatters take up the motto of the French intellectual Henri Lefebvre. The Lefebvrian notions of urban 
re-appropriation, ‘autogestion’ and political awakening are indeed embraced by conservational squatters, 
and represent the theoretical framework for their practice of place-making. Nevertheless, squatters’ 
conceptualisation of the urban space also goes beyond Lefebvre’s notion. While the city is outlined by the 
former as a collectively elaborated ‘social space’—where a political-economic order is forged and 
maintained—rather than as a socialised one, the squatted urban is also a transformed space, conceived from a 
more non-hierarchic and horizontal angle. 
In the aftermath of Lefebvre’s conceptualisation, this paper grasps the new theorisation of urban space 
developed by squatters. In particular, the aim of this essay is investigating how the notion of urban space 
has been re-conceptualised by conservational squatters to serve as a ground for their place-making practice 
in Europe. Practical examples will be simultaneously linked to theoretical assumptions from Critical Urban 
Theory and Urban Social Theory. Empirical evidence from some marginal, not-gentrified4 European 
squats—Casaloca in Milan, Italy; Rhino squat in Geneva, Switzerland; and ROG Factory in Ljubljana, 
Slovenia5—will be presented with the purpose, on the one hand, of depicting the place-making experience 
of squatting in Europe; on the other hand, of illustrating how studying European squats may offer an answer 
to the question “Where is Europe?”.  
Serving as a catalyst of anti-capitalist values, squatting has become an incubator of more sustainable 
structures of organizing, sharing and living. While investigating the intimate experience of meaning-making 
in squatting as a socially constructed practice is fundamental to this research, it is primarily important to 
grasp the theoretical notion of space lying behind and developed through Conservational Squatting. The 
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ultimate purpose of this paper is therefore contributing to developing a deeper knowledge of this widespread 
grassroots practice. Understanding squatting also means exemplifying how the European urban space has 
been re-shaped, and more crucially how the European urban space can be re-shaped from below. 
2. Methodology 
In order to tackle the re-conceptualisation of the urban space developed by the squatters, and additionally 
present practical examples from the three European squats, an ad hoc methodology—that is, the triangulation 
of grounded theory and qualitative content analysis—has been adopted. Originally developed by Barney 
Glaser and Anselm Strauss, grounded theory consists in the progressive identification and integration of 
categories of meaning from a corpus of data. Grounded theory offers guidelines on how to identify 
categories and how to establish relationships between them, thereby paving the way for the development of 
new, contextualised theories. 
In this paper, grounded theory methodology has been used to highlight and problematise the concepts 
of space and squatting—the former tackled both from a Lefebvrian and a “beyond Lefebvre” angle. 
Theoretical assumptions (Lefebvre’s “Production of Space”, and Harvey’s understanding of Lefebvre’s 
“Right to the City”; Quilligan’s approach to the Commons; Featherstone’s study on “Spatial Relations of 
Solidarity”; and Leach and Hauss’ theory of “Movement Scenes”) which represent the cornerstone of 
conservational squatters’ conceptualisation of space, embody the explanatory theoretical framework 
through which to understand the spatial quest. Devised to substantiate the theoretical framework, practical 
examples—from Milan, Geneva and Ljubljana’s squats—provide a multi-dimensional perspective on how 
space may be interpreted, organised and self-managed in the three European squats. In this case, the 
embraced methodology has consisted in qualitative content analysis designed to illustrate—and eventually 
disentagle—the complexity of spatio-social situations. Qualitative content analysis has involved secondary 
sources, both textual and visual artifacts. The former includes newspaper articles and websites respectively 
released and created by activists of the three squats either in English, Italian or French; the latter includes 
pictures from the squats (with a specific focus on graffiti, flyers and murales), zines, press releases and movie 
clips realised by the squatters of Casaloca, Rhino and ROG and accessible online. This selected material has 
been analyzed because, in both textual and iconographic forms, it acts as visual vehicle to convey ideological 
and theoretical messages.  
All in all, the triangulation of grounded theory and qualitative content analysis has sucessfuly served the 
two-fold goal of, on the one hand, developing a theoretically grounded understanding of urban spatiality 
and, on the other hand, of encouraging a more holistic insight on squatting in Europe. In view of further 
research, nevertheless, an inquisitive methodological approach—based on ethnographic research—may 
pave the way for a more overarching analysis, besides enriching a purely theoretical overview with a perhaps 
necessary pragmatism. 
3. Urban Space and Squatting 
3.1. The Urban Space  
According to the Oxford Dictionary, space is “a continuous area or expanse which is free, available, or 
unoccupied”.6 However this is just the first of 17 definitions. Despite its clear etymology—from the Latin 
spatium, which in French becomes espace and spazio in Italian—it is emblematic that there is no precise 
definition of the word. Space has been indeed variously re-appropriated by scholars, becoming a metaphor 
for innumerable abstract concepts, furthermore acquiring disparate meanings in relation to the 
accompanying adjectives.7 Space could be open, dimensional or rural; it could be visual, imaginary; public, 
or infinite. Space might also be urban and wasted. This is the framework where the squatting practice occurs.  
While urban space—alternatively referable to as a noun, ‘the urban’—generally denotes a town or a city, 
the very definition of urban is rather controversial. On the one hand, this has been conceived in terms of 
its multi-scalar outline and its interconnections to other spaces. Triggered from a critique of political 
economy, this idea conceives urbanisation as a global phenomenon that links various places and scales with 
each other, from the local to the global.8 On the other hand, scholars have studied the urban space as the 
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realm of the (modern) everyday activity. From this sociological perspective, the city is understood as an 
arena of encounters, nest of action and incubator of ideologies. In the city, peoples of all cultures and classes 
mingle, albeit reluctantly and agonistically, to generate a common of perpetually changing and transitory 
life.9 In his book “La Production de l’Espace”10, the French intellectual Henri Lefebvre embraces this very 
second concept. Rejecting the idea that the economic base of society is what determines space,11 Lefebvre 
delves into the urban space to break open the limits of an economist approach.12 As it will be shown, his 
theoretical definition of the urban as an autonomous, all-encompassing entity holds pivotal relevance in the 
urban studies disciplines, preparing the ground for squatters’ place making practice. 
The city, nevertheless, is also a site where abandoned buildings, empty properties and vacant homes 
abound. Used carelessly, squandered, ruined, or let lapsed,13 these incongruous ‘wasted’ spaces amounted, 
in 2014, to around 11 million across the EU.14 They are the result of various phenomena—such as 
deindustrialisation, war damage, or incomplete urban projects. Whatever the case, the destiny of these 
wasted spaces could follow a twofold path. They could remain involuntary exceptions, barren patches, bereft 
of uses and sense,15 lying uncultivated and unoccupied, absences of city within the city. Or, void could 
acquire a new significance. The emptiness of European “in-betweens”16 may offer the opportunity to 
recover urban gaps, to enrich them with new unimagined attributes; what is wasted would become cradle 
of endurance and experimentation, subversion and struggle.17 Here is where squatting comes about. 
3.2. Squatting: What, Where, When, and Why 
Today, more than 2400 squats exist in Europe.18 Squatting is the appropriation of empty or unused 
properties for housing needs and/or for the promotion of cultural and social activities.19 While the tenancy 
of occupying a property without legal permission has always existed,20 urban squatting is a child of our time. 
It is not a contingency that it has started blossoming in Europe in the 70s, few years after May 1968 and 
immediately after the publication of Lefebvre’s masterpiece, La Production de l’Espace. 
In 1968, the Italian pop singer Adriano Celentano competed in the Sanremo Festival21 with the song “I 
Ragazzi della via Gluck”22. By singing “where there was grass; now, a city” (là dove c’era l’erba ora c’è, una 
città) the song bitterly described the massive urban speculation of the 1960s that had drastically changed the 
urban identity of Milan. In the same years, along with majestic grey buildings and smoky factories, the first 
squats—Haffenstrasse in Hamburg and Mainzer Strasse in Berlin, Grote Keyser in Amsterdam and 
Christiana in Copenhagen—started mushrooming in numerous European cities. In the late 1970s, Geneva 
was supposedly the most squatted city in Europe, with roughly 120 buildings occupied by around 2,800 
inhabitants.23 In the wake of May 1968, the squatting movements which had sprung up in such an 
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“international business hub”24 could be described, according to the urban studies scholar Luca Pattaroni, as 
“the irruption of a pluralist, burgeoning, slightly off-beat world in the highly ordered universe that is the city 
of Geneva.”25 Here, squats were a reaction to real estate speculation, and an explicit critique to mainstream 
cultural production. 
Despite a common root, squatting is an extremely heterogeneous phenomenon, triggered by a wide 
variety of social needs. In order to address the diversity of squatting, a typological categorisation has been 
developed by the sociologist Hans Pruijt. The resulting five-fold configuration illustrates the disparate 
potentials of squatting. If deprivation-based squatting tackles problems related to the supply of social 
housing, squatting as an alternative housing strategy addresses housing shortage, while simultaneously 
organizing protests against property speculation. Entrepreneurial squatting acts as a response to cultural 
demands by generating space for encounters and exchange; and political squatting creates a space for 
engaging in anti-systemic politics.26 Last but not least is the so-called ‘conservational squatting’ which 
represents the starting point for this paper. Designed to prevent a non-sustainable transformation—and to 
promote a development in a different direction—conservational squatting serves as a tactic to preserve, and 
to conserve, the European cityscape. Urban, wasted spaces are reclaimed and transformed: residence, events 
and social centers activities are combined, coexisting in the same building.27 
Among the roughly 2400 European squats,28 the conservational squats are relatively few. The cases of 
not yet gentrified squats are even fewer. Casaloca squat in Milan, Italy and ROG Factory in Ljubljana, 
Slovenia are some of those. Adopting the acronym ‘‘CSOA’’ (Centro Sociale Occupato Autogestito)29 Casaloca 
squat has blossomed in 2005 in the peripheral, industrial district of Bicocca—on the middle of a popular 
neighborhood in the north east of Milan. As it will be shown, the Casaloca squat acts as a new laboratory 
of ideas; here wasted spaces are re-animated and re-shaped aiming at a different understanding of what the 
city is and how we may live (in) it.30 
The conservational squat ROG Factory in Ljubljana, Slovenia, is another peculiar case of conservational 
squatting. Prior to its occupation in 2006, the space was best known as the gigantic factory where ROG 
bikes were manufactured between 1953 and 1991.31 Located in the center of the city— five minutes walk 
from Metelkova32, between the central train station and old town—33 the building was abandoned, neglected 
and robbed for around 15 years until 2006, when an informal group of youth took the matter into their own 
hands. After months of collective maintenance and rehabilitation, ROG has been re-generated, becoming a 
hotbed of the protest generation. Inherently anti-capitalist, it is now a space for people and about people,34 
incubator of revolutionary ideas and collective change. By advocating for urban renewal as a sustainable 
alternative to urban removal, conservational squatters of Casaloca and ROG see empty buildings as an 
opportunity to be re-imagined and collectively rehabilitated. The famous slogan embraced by the 
conservational squatters, “It is better to squat and mend than to own and destroy,”35 highlights the 
uniqueness of their practice, in itself both cultural and political. 
The cultural dimension of urban squatting is immediately recognizable in Instand(be)setzung, the German 
word for squatting. Coined in the 1970s by the German activists to describe their actions, Instand(be)setzung 
is indeed a clever combination of the German for maintenance (Instandsetzung) and squatting (Besetzung).36 
Squatting clearly flourished as a makeshift process of repairing and emending void—and often highly 
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damaged—buildings, which were gradually and painstakingly restored through the combination of DIY37 
practices.38 Rot was removed, windows were fixed, roofs patched, electrical and hydraulic systems 
renovated, and a new space living created. Repair and rehabilitation were a collective practice; architecture 
a hands-on affair—radical, jury-rigged and experimental,39 but also, inherently ephemeral. That is why 
squatters became also keen archivists. Magazines, press releases, pamphlets, photographs, videos and films 
are being produced by the activists; even manuals. It’s all part of the story they are creating, of living the city 
in different ways.40 Not only has the DIY ethic been elevated to a tool for radical activism and creative 
maintenance—and to a veritable form of art contributing to the daily struggle against capitalism—41, it has 
also become the starting point for a systematical theoretical elaboration. Published for the first time in 
Amsterdam in 1969 with the title Squatters Handbook, this ‘manual’ for squatters represents a blueprint for 
an alternative urbanism.42 Along with presenting a sharp critique to the ‘institutional’ urban planning, this, 
and subsequent manuals provide rough and ready instructions about DIY patching strategies. Recycling, 
dumpster-diving and sharing resources were highlighted as low impacts means to be environmentally 
friendly in urban settings.43 
 
Fig. 1: Outside ROG Factory: DIY in action 
(Rog Factory, Wikipedia. 4 December 2017) 
In its cultural dimension, squatting thus acts as urban infrastructure, springing from architectural activism 
that combines community design, artivism, and participation with an understanding of the environment as 
a fuel of perpetual invention.44 Conservational squatters re-think and make space differently. They are 
makeshifts, artists compelled to “give themselves totally to the process by which their works are created”.45 
Squatting, however, represents far more than a crude exercise of architectonic experimentation. 
Architecture, art and DIY are not an end in themselves; instead they serve a political purpose, striving to 
create new participatory forms of living, organizing and working. Because it encourages dwellers to think 
out of the box of what is dominant, thereby questioning the way the city is thought and inhabited, urban 
squatting is inherently political—and intrinsically politicised. Holding that the right of use is prior to the 
absolute ownership, squatters challenge the logics of urban speculation, gentrification, and consumerism, 
while reclaiming the city as a realm of social transformation and radical resistance. 
The structural dynamics behind the squatting movement coherently mirror its political orientation—that 
is, anarchism. As an autonomous, anarchic movement, squatting embraces “direct-democratic forms of 
                                                 
37 Acronymous for “Do It Yourself”. 
38 Vasudevan, “Squatting the City,” 13. 
39 Ibid., 13.  
40 Bliss, “What Squatting Can Teach Us.” 
41 Aguilera, “The Squatters’ Movement in Europe.”  
42 Vasudevan, “Squatting the City,” 14. 
43 Ibid., 15. 
44 Ibid., 15.  
45 Shields, “Spatialisations,” 25. 
Adinolfi 53 
decision-making”, “self-managed consensus” and “spontaneous forms of militant resistance” to domination 
in all the domains of life, society and politics.46 While, among the squatters, “anarchism is the word”47, the 
term used by Deleuze and Guattari to describe the horizontality of the decision-making process is 
‘rhizomatic’48. Directly derived from the term ‘rhizome’, the adjective pictures a structure that allows for 
multiple, non-hierarchical entry and exit points in data representation and interpretation.49 A ‘rhizomatic’ 
social movement like urban squatting, then, “presents multiple connections between the ‘nodal points’ of 
networks, composed of people, ideas, identities and spaces, characterised by non-linear evolution based on 
ruptures, reconstitutions and alliances, with the opening up of new possibilities for expression, entry and 
metamorphosis”. 50 It is through such a non-hierarchic decision-making process that squatters make 
decisions, embrace ideologies and, overall, confer the space a new, revolutionary significance.  
Occupation, resistance and experimentation—these are leitmotivs of squatting as an urban practice. The 
theoretical foundation of this bottom-up experience, however, is rooted in a clear academic tradition 
pioneered by the French scholar Henri Lefebvre. In his writings on the City, Lefebvre has contributed to 
developing a first conceptualisation of the urban space as a locus of political struggle—definition which has 
been embraced and further extended by conservational squatters. The next session will shed light on 
Lefebvre’s theoretical conceptualisation of urban space which serves as a first ground for squatters’ place-
making practice. 
4. The Lefebvrian Space  
4.1. Henri Lefebvre 
French thinker of the twentieth century, renowned author of La Révolution Urbaine and La Production de 
l’Espace, Henri Lefebvre may be considered the pioneer of the squatting ideology. Despite his intellectual 
eclecticism—reflected in a widely diverse work encompassing philosophy, sociology, politics, anthropology 
and geography—his thought is held together by a resolute commitment to the project of imagining and 
accomplishing radical change in human society.51 Inspired by intellectuals such as Marx, Hegel, Nietzsche, 
and Heidegger, Lefebvre’s political and intellectual ideal pursued a twofold aim. Not only did he yearn to 
offer a sharp critique of society—thereby paving the way for an alternative social model, namely “a possible 
world beyond capitalism, the state, and consumer society,”52 he also relentlessly strove for a more holistic 
understanding of social life, one that embraced multiple aspects of the human experience.53 Foregrounding 
the notion of the urban space as a ‘lived space’ was arguably crucial to “apprehend human life as a complex 
whole and avoid reducing our understanding of experience to small fractions of life, such as class status, 
gender, race, income, consumer habits, marital status, and so on.”54  
What Lefebvre advocates for is a new understanding of the city, in which the urban space is an all 
embracing, overarching ‘whole’, a kaleidoscopic multitude of drives, identities and networks not reducible 
to economic imperatives. This new idea suggests a broader, nonconforming understanding of the intrinsic 
potentiality of space; an entity located beyond market and state. The root of Lefebvre’s inquiry into l’espace 
lies in his book La Production de l’Espace. Written in the aftermath of the May 1968’s countercultural 
movements, the book has been referred to by his author with the French word ‘spatialisation’,55 meaning 
an analysis of the relation between spatial order and urban place-making. Here, Lefebvre analytically defines 
the urban space as “perceived through involvement in ‘social practices’, conceived in ‘representations’ of 
that space, and lived through the association of images and symbols with specific ‘representational 
spaces’.”56 
The practical implications of this theoretical definition are glaring. The urban space embodies an oeuvre, 
an ongoing and collective work of art, created, used, and reshaped by its dwellers;57 a social arena which can 
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or rather must be reclaimed by its spectators. Intervening in the space is a legitimate right of the urban 
dwellers, the citizens, who are entitled of the “right to the city”. 
 
4.2. Right to the City 
“The right to the city is like a cry and a demand…a transformed and renewed right to urban life” 58 states 
Lefebvre in “Writings on Cities”59. Near the end of his life, working with a group of activists and scholars 
in Naverrenx, France Lefebvre wrote an essay that outlines his project for radical politics. In 1968, Le Droit 
à la Ville was published. The book holds a fundamental relevance in the field of urban studies, furthermore 
laying the foundation for squatters’ practice of urban renewal. The opening is emblematic. the citizenry, 
argues Lefebvre, are entitled to various rights: right to information, to difference, to self-management; and 
the right to the city. Because the city belongs to those who inhabit it, the right to the city is far more than 
the individual freedom to urban spaces: it is a right to change ourselves by changing the city, that is, 
according to the sociologist and Lefebvre’s scholar David Harvey, “one of the most precious yet most 
neglected of our human rights”.60 
Lefebvre’s interest in the sphere of rights may seem odd, at a first glance. Heir of the Marxist school of 
thoughts—which tends to ignore questions of citizenship and rights as part of a liberal-democratic and, as 
such, inherently bourgeois project—Lefebvre slightly distances himself from his model. Nonetheless, he 
yearns to recapture the revolutionary potential of what is called ‘rights. The right to the city is not intended, 
like in the neoliberal framework, as a political goal towards an egalitarian society; it is rather a beginning, a 
point of departure for a political struggle. A vigorous cry and a legitimate demand, indeed. Due to its 
grassroots-driven ambition, the Lefebvrian motto immediately had a worldwide resonance. One of the 
earliest initiatives for the right to the city sprang up in Brazil, where organisations among the metropolitan 
favelas began to advocate a right to the city for slum dwellers.61 In Europe, the right to the city has been 
accomplished through various arts of spatialisation. Squatting is one of those. 
Ultimate expression of a perpetual struggle, European squatting is a grassroots response to the 
Lefebvrian project, a radical attempt to move beyond state and market, and to achieve thoroughgoing 
political awakening and democracy. Becoming democratic, according the social scientist Mark Purcell, is an 
open-ended process, an aeonian62 struggle. It is both a personal and a collective endeavor: it primarily 
requires citizenry continually to cease being the political spectator and decisively to become the political 
actor; afterwards, individually to reject heteronomy and passivity and to engage collectively in the political 
process of becoming democratic together.63 Arguably, democracy is a reality in the European squats. The 
slogan on the main facade of Casaloca squat firstly portrays the democratic essence of Casaloca motto: “Our 
home, the entire world, our law; freedom”.64 
Willing to welcome the entire world in their home, the squatters make ‘freedom’ the leitmotiv of their 
place-making practices. Freedom, however, does not entail chaotic anarchism. A systematic and rigorous 
decision-making model is necessary; ‘our law’, indeed. During Casaloca’s weekly meetings—the so called 
“Collettivo” —the decision-making process follows rhizomatic patters, based upon horizontal consensus. 
Only when unanimity is not reached, no decision is taken and the matters under discussion are momentarily 
suspended to be tackled later.65 
When the community goers freely and democratically engage in the collectives, it is usually to discuss 
how the space should be self-managed—autogéré, to adopt a Lefebvrian term. Usually translated as “self- 
management,” the very significance of autogestion is rooted in its primordial use. Originally the notion referred 
to workers in a firm who take control of the means of production and manage it themselves,66 autogestion 
here refers to a radical attack on the roots of the capitalist system; it insists on bottom-up decision making 
and on the decentralisation of control to autonomous local units. Autogestion is a pivotal concept in the 
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ROG Factory. Here, around 15 organised collectives and 15 active individuals engage in the assembly, 
which, following the principle of direct-democracy in decision making,67 is the main political body of the 
squat. Against a production of space triggered by property ownership, autogestion entails the de-alienation 
and, consequently, the re-appropriation of the urban. Because the city belongs to those who inhabit it, 
dwellers must reclaim, re-appropriate and thereby de-alienate the urban space, reintegrating it into the web 
of social connections.68 As an answer to the cry of “right to the city!”, ROG squatters take the urban space 
as their own, they reclaim what is rightfully theirs.  
As it has been resolutely stated in their first press release (2006), “as long as city council doesn’t 
implement a clear strategy to solve the problem of these empty decaying premises, we self-initiatively wish 
to open it to all individuals and groups, for the realisation of independent production of cultural and social 
content.”69 After ten years of working in precarious conditions, regenerating the area and producing cultural 
content in public interest, the ROG community has become legitimately entitled in the eyes of the 
municipality to use and manage the property even if it does not legal possess it.70 Appropriation becomes a 
way to rethink the concept of legitimate ownership; it is an act of reorientation. It reorients the city away 
from its role of engine of capital accumulation and it renders it a constitutive element in the web of 
cooperative social relations.71 
The right to the city represents a landmark for conservational squatting place-making practice. By taking 
over void properties, squatters experience a political awakening; by rightfully reclaiming and re-
appropriating the urban, they participate in the city. Although Lefabvre’s motto is undeniably embraced, the 
theoretical assumption underlying the squatters’ ideology has transcended the Lefebvrian thought. Because 
Lefebvre’s notion of the urban is tied to a particular temporality72—namely, the industrial city of Fordist’s 
capitalist production—it might prove to be only partially relevant in today’s multifaceted, post-Fordist 
Europe. A novel theorisation has been implicitly developed by conservational squatters, urban scholars and 
like-minded activists, not only to better comprehend the current narrative of urban politics, but also to make 
urban practices such as squatting embrace a new pragmatism. Going ‘beyond Lefebvre’ is then necessary. It 
is pivotal to understand how space has been given meaning, and how the grassroots, bottom-up practice of 
squatting is making Europe a different place to live. 
5. Beyond Lefebvre 
5.1. Towards a New Definition 
Lefebvre’s urban is a reclaimed, re-appropriated, and lived space. Squatters’ urban is not only a reclaimed, 
re-appropriated, and lived space; it is also a space which is made ‘place’ and transformed by human 
interaction. Space produces society and society produces space: by engaging with space, urban squatters 
use and transform everyday landscapes in the enduring process of place-making. That is why, while taking 
up the Lefebvrian ideology, the squatted urban acquires a new meaning far beyond its original framework, 
enriched by new theoretical concepts. Studies on the commons, on spatial relations of solidarity, and on 
politicised scenes are reshaping the activated the urban space on a theoretical level. The result, in practice, 
is manifest in the squats: here, space is transformed in an arena of encounters, in a platform for personal 
exploration,73 where identities are forged, and networks of solidarities perpetuated. Ultimately, squats 
become spaces of Europe, and for Europe.  
5.2. Re-conceptualizing the Urban Space: Commons, Solidarity and Inclusion 
The logic of the commons—defined as “the collective and horizontal stewardship over shared resources 
and social practices that are maintained by communities in a sustainable manner”74 — is intrinsically 
embedded in the squatting practice. Examples of commons have existed in Europe for many centuries. In 
medieval England, the common was a piece of land termed ‘manor’ which was owned by the lord of the 
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manor but over which certain classes held right to access and use. Squats can be considered today’s manors, 
where sets of norms to collectively and sustainably manage shared resources are developed and preserved. 
Although the commons has no definitional reality in the neoliberal ideology, James Quilligan, analyst 
and activist working with the principle of the ‘common heritage of mankind’,75 argues that the root of the 
commons paradoxically lies in the neoliberal framework: “The core principles of production and 
management in these commons are actually idealised by neoliberalism—i.e., spontaneous, self-regulating 
freedom (through markets) and rule-based equality (as enforced by the state).”76 Nevertheless, he adds, 
when “consumers choose to become co-producers of goods and services through their own commons, 
however, their mutual, integrative work transcends the premises of neoliberalism. It’s evident that the 
freedom and equality expressed through a commons does not result from privatisation, centralised 
institutions or the top tiers of a social hierarchy.”77 It does derive, instead, from those values of human 
cooperation, communitarism and voluntary collective action which, going beyond state and market, resulting 
in communities of responsibility and solidarity. This is the case of the squats. Those relations of solidarity 
and mutual exchange, which are primarily fueled through collective occupation, are further preserved during 
the communal practice of maintenance and repair.  
The exercise of repairing, decorating and knowledge-sharing in the squatting movement, indeed, does 
not represent a purely hands-on activity; it is a ritual, an emotional practice which facilitates alternative 
connections among the squatters and, crucially, with the space itself. As pointed out by Alexander 
Vesudevan, historical geographer, in his seminal work Metropolitan Preoccupations78, the practice of space-
making incarnates a sensorial experience: it consists in the process of investing mental or emotional energy 
in a person, object or idea.79 For the inhabitants of the Rhino squat in Geneva, Switzerland, occupying 
wasted spaces reflects the opportunity to “invest in new spaces; to create space together; to enjoy”.80 
Symbolised by its giant red horn hung on the facade on the outside of the building,81 Rhino squat82 was 
born in 1989 as an autonomous space, a sustainable alternative to dominant lifestyles and capitalistic culture. 
Rhino inhabitants created a space for an independent cinema, music, bar and restaurant, besides providing 
a home for around 70 people. It reunited different types of urban dwellers: for young artists, as well as for 
the socially vulnerable working class, Rhino represents not only a roof over their head, but also a chance of 
being part of an otherwise unaccessible culturally creative scene 83 and a space of creative expression. The 
walls of the squat are the frame for squatters’ artistic flair; the facades, canvas for squatters’ protest art.84 
These art works are characterised by their portability and disposability; they are intrinsically politicised, 
inherently—and even intentionally—ephemeral.85 They are commons; neither authored nor owned, they 
explicitly challenge the bourgeois concepts of ownership and property. 
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Pic. 2: Protest Art on the facade of a French squat. Source: Wikipedia: Squat à Paris-59, rue de Rivoli. 
By using decoration to oppose the spatial language of gentrification,86 squatters act as urban players “for 
whom urban spaces is something to be discovered, squatted, conquered”.87 The urban space becomes a hub 
of new experimental geographies where, as a Rhino activist has said, “you develop that kind of relation to 
which you could call responsibility. You know where the cables run, the sounds of the environment, the 
people, it is all interconnected”.88 The urban space then represents an opportunity for an “iditorhythmic 
community” —a community wherein each person can live at their own pace—89 to explore new identities 
and intimacies, a cradle of encounters where identities are shaped, and networks of solidarities 
perpetuated—from below.  
The concept of solidarities, crucially tackled by the human geographer David Featherstone, is pivotal in 
the squatters’ experience for two main reasons. On the one hand, because it is forged through the activists’ 
political struggle, it is an indispensable component of the process of politicisation. On the other hand, 
solidarities are perpetual community-fuels. They transform the space in an arena of encounters, where a 
sense of community and togetherness triumph over self-interest. 
It is not a contingency that Featherstone tackles solidarity as a plural noun: if bonds connect together 
members of one squat, relations with other communities could also be tessellated. In this very case, 
transnational networks of solidarities come about. The project “Cafè Rebelde Zapatista” in Casaloca clearly 
illustrates how solidarities enrich the space of a new meaning, thereby embracing the socio-cultural 
dynamism of today’s world.  
In collaboration with other local organisations, the squat cooperates with Zapatista co-ops coffee 
producers.90 Since 2002, coffee importation from the Los Altos region, in Mexico, has started. Once arrived 
in Italy, the coffee is roasted, grind, parceled and delivered across the country by local distributers. 
Remarkably, during the last few years, the coffee has been manufactured in the prison of Turin—thereby 
facilitating the detainees’ professional reorientation. The proceeds from the sale cover the expenses of 
transportation and manufacture and are further invested in autonomous educational and medical projects 
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Liberation Army,” 23 June 2017, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Zapatista-National-Liberation-Army. 
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in the Mexican Zapatista communities.91 The Cafè Rebelde Zapatista initiative represents a glaring example 
of how squats could be more than just occupied spaces. By connecting three different geographical and 
social realities—Milan, Turin and Chiapas—Casaloca becomes an incubator of solidarity, conviviality and 
creativity, where the political is deeply intertwined to the intimate, the personal to the communal. Here, 
boundaries are rethought, identities tessellated, and daily lives reshaped through sustainable patterns.  
Transformed by the commons and continuously fueled by transnational networks of solidarities, the 
empty urban is re-brought into life by the squatters, thereby becoming what Leach and Haunss92 termed “a 
socialized scene”.93 Defining it as a network of free spaces encompassing multiple subcultures and⁄or 
countercultures,94 Leach and Haunss hold that “a scene is simultaneously a network of people who share a 
common identity and a common set of subcultural or countercultural beliefs, values, norms, and convictions 
as well as a network of physical spaces where members of that group are known to congregate”.95 Although 
capturing the intrinsic essence of squats as a spatial mosaic of identities, this definition of social scene could 
be seen as problematic. The idea that, arguably, a scene is a stable entity whose boundaries are constantly in 
flux,96 suggests that such scenes would work as identity markers, rather than as identity makers.  
It is undeniable: where there is an inclusivity there that may also be exclusivity—and much has been 
written about the debatable inclusiveness of European squats. Marco, an activist in the anarchistic Eurodusnie 
collective in Leiden, the Netherlands, criticised the Dutch squats for being exclusive scenes: ‘fenced’ 
communities which base their ontological reasoning on the chasm between us—the squatters—and them—
the others.97 Undeniably, a tension between two extremes—gentrification on one hand, exclusiveness on 
the other—permeates the logic of squatting, representing a dangerously precarious equilibrium. Even 
though squatting means drawing a narrow line between a “ghetto mentality” and a “possible normalization 
as social enterprises”,98 it has been argued that “[the squatters] seek to create space—both literally and 
figuratively—for the less ‘desirable’ denizens of urban life—the homeless, the skaters, the goths and punks, 
the kids hanging out—those, in general, who do not have consumerism as their main reason for participation 
in the city”.99 With these words, the sociologist Kimberly Creasap challenges the concept of social scene as 
an enclosed ghetto. Admittedly, this very notion would raise questions of how, when, and by whom symbolic 
boundaries are drawn to signify who is an ‘insider’ or ‘outsider’.100 On the contrary, squats appear to be 
open-ended scenes, they are works-in-progress. Being the product of rituals (e.g. direct action, maintenance, 
discussions, etc) and prefigurative practices (like cooking together, or planning activities), the squats are 
constantly fueled by their goers. Squats are never permanent, but rather temporal; always coming and 
going—and, as such, they are ambitiously inclusive. 
By reclaiming the urban space, squatters challenge gendered divisions of physical and affective labour; 
by transforming the urban space, squatters create a socialised scene where dominant patterns are questioned; 
new lifeworlds are created, and identities woven. In Casaloca, Rhino and ROG, people, art and ideas mingle. 
Ateliers, workshops, shelters, language classes, galleries, skate-park, and bike-repairing are established. 
The space embodies the opportunity to find solutions on how to live in today’s Europe as a migrant, refugee 
or precarious worker. 101 It also offers the opportunity, however, to make a different Europe, beyond state 
and market or institutional patterns; and, ultimately to shape this Europe, from below. 
6. Conclusion 
Much has been written about urban squatting. Perhaps due to the heterogeneity of this place-making 
practice, however, little research has been produced on the link between squatting and space. This paper 
intended to pursue this very last aim, investigating how the notion of urban space has been re-conceptualised 
                                                 
91 Valeria Pecorelli, Spazi liberati in città: i centri sociali. Una storia di resistenza costruttiva tra autonomia e solidarietà(Loughborough 
University, 2015), 291. 
92 Respectively anthropologist and political scientist. 
93 Darcy K. Leach and Sebastian Haunss, “Scenes and Social Movements,” in Culture, Social Movements and Protest, ed. Hank 
Johnston (Ashgate Publishers, 2009), 255-276. 
94 Kimberly Creasap, “Social Movement Scenes: Place-Based Politics and Everyday Resistance,” Sociology Compass 6, no. 2 (2012), 
182-91.  
95 Leach and Haunss, “Scenes and Social Movements,” 5. 
96 Creasap, “Social Movement Scenes,” 187. 
97 Pruijt, “The Logic of Urban Squatting,” 14. 
98 Ibid., 14. 
99 Creasap, “Social Movement Scees,” 185. 
100 Ibid., 187. 
101 “Second Home,” Autonoma Tovarna Rog, 16 December 2017, http://atrog.org/en/places/second-home. 
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to serve as a ground for conservational squatter’s place-making practice. In order to answer this question, 
theories, definitions, notions, and examples have been combined and discussed through a triangulation of 
qualitative research methodologies (grounded theory and qualitative content analysis). The result is an 
intricate, multi-layered research scenario: albeit disorganised in appearance, it is inherently rhizomatic—just 
like the phenomenon that it depicts. 
Having tackled the definition of conservational squatters elaborated by Pruijt, it has been argued that the 
Lefebvrian motto “right to the city” represents the theoretical foundation of conservational squatting. Right 
to the city is “a vigorous cry and a legitimate demand”, it is the right to change the city, and to change 
ourselves by changing the city. Echoing Lefebvre, squatters reclaim the urban, and re-appropriate of its 
‘wasted’ spaces. Their perpetual struggle, however, has transcended Lefebvre. Not only is the urban 
something to be reclaimed and re-appropriated; the city also has to be transformed, in order to embrace and 
even to welcome the challenges of today’s multi-faceted Europe. 
Squatting, as an art of spatialisation, then becomes a sensorial experience. Everyday practices from 
Casaloca, Rhino and ROG are paradigmatic of this sensorial transformation. Here, the abandoned space is 
revived through rituals and collective DIY practices; the urban becomes a commons, an arena of encounters, 
a platform for personal exploration where identities are forged and networks of solidarities nourished. 
Squatting, however, is not just a sustainable response to a need. It also represents a way of doing, and, 
maybe more importantly, a way of being. By challenging the exploitative strategies of Neo-liberal urban-
planning in particular,102 the status quo of whatever is mainstream and dominant in general, the occupation 
of void spaces incarnates ways of being in Europe and tools to make Europe, differently. If space belongs to 
those who inhabit it, then Europe belongs to—and is in—its dwellers. 
  
                                                 
102 Andrzej Zieleniec, “A Review of ‘the Squatters’ Movement in Europe: Commons and Autonomy as Alternatives to 
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The Rescaling of  German Statehood in the Context of  the So-
called “Migration Crisis” of  2015 and 2016 
Magdalena Kohl 
1. Introduction 
Germany is unquestionably a country of immigration. Figures on foreign population in Germany show a 
steady increase over the last ten years. The European Financial and Sovereign Debt Crisis of the early 2000’s 
as well as the freedom of movement within the European Union can be named as contributing factors in 
this development. However, the so-called “migration crisis”1 of 2015 and 2016 caused another growth of 
the figures. The numbers rose from around seven per cent in the year 2014 to twelve per cent in the year 
2016.2  
German towns and cities are directly and immediately faced with the practical matters resulting from the 
high influx of newcomers. They are responsible for providing initial aid and care for refugees and asylum 
seekers and for integrating them into society on a long term.3 Formulating responses to migration poses a 
challenge for cities from this viewpoint. However, this is also seen as an opportunity to foster diversity and 
cultural exchange. Especially the association of German cities and towns, the Deutscher Städtetag (in the following 
also shortly referred to as ‘association’), states that the “migration crisis” had shown a need for the capacity of 
municipalities to mobilise resources on a short-term to perform its duties for the better of all citizens.4 The 
question that arises against this background is whether the increased migration to Germany created a 
momentum for the urban scale to recalibrate its position within the German state scalar organisation.  
Various aspects of the position of cities within global politics and economics are discussed within Urban 
and Global Studies.5 Scholars following a first line of argumentation forecast the demise of the national 
state due to processes of globalisation and Europeanisation. In contrast, a second line of argumentation 
argues for a fundamental transformation of statehood rather than its eradication.6 Many of these 
transformational approaches take either the national or supranational level as starting point. Even though 
following the transformational reasoning, this research focuses the urban scale and its actors and 
representatives to understand how the scope of urban policies and urban responses to current societal and 
political issues is renegotiated. The question addressed is formulated as follows: To which extent did the 
German association of cities and towns, the Deutscher Städtetag, use the momentum of the so-called 
“migration crisis” in 2015 and 2016 to engage in rescaling processes of German statehood? Sub-questions 
with regard to the probable answers to rescaling activities and tendencies are formulated throughout the 
following discussion of this question to collect hints for long-term developments and trends. Particularly 
the formulation of the residence obligation, which obligates asylum seekers living in Germany to stay within 
the city that they are residing at and hence registered at and that was first formulated in the integration law 
                                                 
1 The terms “refugee crisis” and “migration crisis” to describe the increased income of refugees and migrants to Europe within 
the last three years is understood as problematic in this research. It negatively discriminates a vulnerable group of people that 
already is exposed to discrimination in many cases. The term suggests that the refugees themselves are causing a critical situation, 
which conceals the implication of their home countries and of other decision makers throughout the world. Nevertheless, the 
term is widely used in popular and academic debates to describe the influx of migrants to Europe within the last years. For want 
of a better term it will be applied in quotation marks in this contribution. 
2 Statistisches Bundesamt, “Pressemitteilungen - Ausländische Bevölkerung Wächst Im Jahr 2017 Um 5,8 %,” 12 April 2018, 
https://www.destatis.de/DE/PresseService/Presse/Pressemitteilungen/2018/04/PD18_133_12521.html;jsessionid=90259DF54
EB5A943B7D0F23FE91C781B.InternetLive1. 
3 Stefan Anton, Flüchtlinge vor Ort in die Gesellschaft integrieren: Anforderungen für Kommunen und Lösungsansätze, Beiträge des Deutschen 
Städtetages zur Stadtpolitik, Band 109 (Berlin Köln: Deutscher Städtetag, 2016). 
4 Ibid., 5–6. 
5 The literary debate on the role of cities within global politics and economics is not taken into further consideration here. An 
entry point into the discussion can be the works of Saskia Sassen such as Saskia Sassen, The Global City: New York, London, Tokyo 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001); and Saskia Sassen, Global Networks, Linked Cities (London: Routledge, 2002). Other 
recommended contributions are: Patrick le Galès, European Cities: Social Conflicts and Governance (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2002) and Benjamin R. Barber, If Mayors Ruled the World: Dysfunctional Nations, Rising Cities (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2013). 
6 Neil Brenner, New State Spaces: Urban Governance and the Rescaling of Statehood (Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 
1. 
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of August 2016 is used as a focal point within this contribution, representing one possible example of the 
manifestation of rescaling processes.  
For purposes of a better understanding of the presented analysis, first an overview of the position of the 
urban scale within the German state system is given. In this context, the German association of cities and 
towns, the Städtetag is introduced as an important representative of the urban scale. Subsequently, the 
existing theory on the rescaling of statehood is explored. A special focus is thereby set on the works of 
urban theorist Neil Brenner. In this context the hypotheses on an assumed rescaling of German statehood 
are introduced. Then they are examined in a comprehensive analysis using a ‘Process Tracing’ (PT) inspired 
approach. A concluding critical discussion of the results of the analysis allows drawing conclusions on 
probable recalibrations of the German state scalar organisation. Furthermore, tendencies contributing to a 
possible rescaling of German statehood are made visible in this context. On this basis further hypotheses 
on the position of cities within the space of the German state that can inspire and inform future research 
are formulated.  
2. The German Association of Cities and Towns within the Federal German State System 
The German state system constitutes a federal structure. This is established by a multitude of levels 
developing vertical and horizontal manifestations and relations.7 The scale is thereby understood as the 
space and scope within which the influence and action of these given level materialises. The interconnected 
system of these scales that emerges in parallel to the federal structure is understood as defining a state scalar 
system. This research focuses on the relations and interactions of – and between – the national and federal 
state scale as well as the urban scale. The emphasis is thus set on the exploration of the hierarchical 
organisation of the German state scalar system along the vertical axis and its possible recalibration. 
Recalibrations of this system are thereby understood as reconfigurations or renegotiations of the space and scope in which the 
influence and power of a given level becomes manifest.8 
The Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, the Grundgesetz (in the following also referred to as 
GG) lays out the responsibilities of these different scales and their relations to one another, which is why 
they are not discussed in detail here.9 The relationships between the federal government and the federal 
states as well as their successive reforms are widely discussed in the academic and public discourse.10 The 
position of subordinated scales such as the urban one and their evolving relations to the federal government 
and the federal states, however, have been mostly left unattended.11 This is why this research shall explore 
the urban scale and its position within the German state-scalar organisation further.  
To locate the urban scale within the multiscalar German state system, a basic understanding of its 
position as defined in law is an indispensable starting point for an analysis focusing on the rescaling 
processes. Generally, the urban scale is located at the lower level of the German scalar organisation and 
thus, municipalities mainly perform duties assigned to them by superordinate scales, which significantly 
determines their scope of action.12 In Germany, towns and cities lie within the responsibility of the federal 
states. They define the framework conditions for the cities’ administrative nature and fields of activity as 
well as their institutional structure. They play an important role in the (re-)distribution of municipal 
finances.13 On the national level, in contrast, solely general principles regarding the urban scale are laid out. 
Here, especially article 28 of the GG, defining the principle of local self-governance of municipalities and 
touching upon the financial endowment of cities, is of relevance.14  
Due to the varying federal state rulings, divergent demographics and the different capacities of urban 
spaces to attract investments and to create job and leisure opportunities, cities are equipped differently for 
                                                 
7 The extensive discussion of the German federalism lies beyond the scope of this research, which is why only some key aspects 
that are important in the context of rescaling processes are taken up within the present study. 
8 Brenner, New State Spaces; Roland Sturm, Föderalismus in Deutschland, Beiträge zur Politik und Zeitgeschichte (Opladen: Leske + 
Budrich, 2001), 8. 
9 See, inter alia, articles 20.1, 30, and 70-74 GG.  
10 Nathalie Behnke, “Stand Und Perspektiven der Föderlismusforschung,” ed. Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, Aus Politik 
Und Zeitgeschichte, no. 65. Jahrgang. 28-30/2015 (2015), 9–11. 
11 Ralf Kleinfeld, “Politikwissenschaft und Kommunalpolitik in Deutschland: Ein Forschungsüberblick,” in Kommunalpolitik, 
Grundwissen Politik (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 1996), 18. 
12 The concrete competences and responsibilities of German municipalities are mainly laid out in articles 28, 84, 85, 91, 104, 106, 
and 108 of the GG.  
13 Hans-Georg Wehling and Andreas Kost, “Kommunalpolitik in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland — eine Einführung,” in 
Kommunalpolitik in den deutschen Ländern (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2003), 7. 
14 Ibid., 7. 
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the tasks and responsibilities they perform. Also, the rapid digitalisation and globalisation contribute to 
growing differences among cities.15 In addition, broader challenges such as the integration of migrants and 
refugees, taken a closer look at in this research, defy cities. In order to find solutions to those problems 
urban entities are working together closely.16 The largest association of cities organising the interests of 
municipalities in Germany is the Deutscher Städtetag. 
The origins of the Städtetag date back to the early 20th century. Nowadays it unites the majority of German 
towns and cities. The association understands itself as “the voice of Germany’s cities” and represent their 
interests vis-à-vis the federal government, the federal states and other entities, such as the European Union 
or non-governmental organisations.17 The Städtetag furthermore advises its member cities on topics that are 
relevant to municipal policies.18 The activity of the Städtetag thus extends along both axes of the German 
state system, attempting to influence decision-making processes at various levels, which is why it is 
understood as an important mediating or intermediary actor within the state scalar organisation in Germany. 
By basing its work on the mentioned article 28 of the GG the association is understood as having a genuine 
interest in re-negotiating their member cities’ scope of action and increasing their flexibility to act. This is 
why the organisation has been chosen as entry point for the study of the possible repositioning of the scope 
of urban policies and actions and thus the urban scale within the German state space.  
3. Towards a Theoretical Approach to the Rescaling of German Statehood  
Even though the state scalar organisation as being based on the responsibilities of different hierarchical 
levels is laid out in German law, it is expected to undergo constant changes and renegotiations that enable 
the state and other entities and scales to react to changing societal and political influences and conditions. 
Thus, the German state space is understood as an evolving process rather than a fixed condition. The 
conceptualisation of state space as “on-going processes of change” corresponds with the spatial approach 
to statehood presented by Neil Brenner.19  
The US-American urban theorist has been investigating the transformation of modern states since the 
mid-1990s.20 In his 2004 publication New State Spaces. Urban Governance and the Rescaling of Statehood he is the 
first one to clearly define and theorise rescaling processes and the underlying mechanisms. Urban spaces are 
shown to be ‘key sites of contemporary state institutional and spatial restructuring’.21 The special attention 
given to urban spaces in Brenner’s work is the reason why it is chosen as a theoretical framework for this 
research. Building upon Brenner’s findings, this analysis examines whether the Städtetag was engaged in 
rescaling activities during the ‘migration-crisis’ that either enhanced or diminished the urban scale within 
the German state system. It is thus investigated, if the association engaged in a renegotiation of the scope 
and space in which urban migration policies became influential or manifest.  
Drawing on the French sociologist Lefèbvre’s ideas about the social production of space, Brenner argues 
that scalar arrangements might be unsettled when socio-political forces are having an ‘influence on 
institutional structures, borders or functions of administrative units’.22 Accordingly, it is assumed that the 
increased migration in 2015 and 2016 had an impact on the scales constituting the German state space and 
their regulatory and political activities. It is further assumed that windows of opportunity opened up for 
various actors to engage in rescaling processes. 
The first ones to integrate Brenner’s approach into migration studies were the researchers Nina Glick 
Schiller and Ayşe Çağlar. In their work Locating Migration: Rescaling Cities and Migrants they focus on the 
pathways established by migrants in cities that are differently positioned within globalisation processes.23 
                                                 
15 Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung, ed., “Kommunalpolitik,” Informationen zur politischen Bildung / izpb, no. 333 2/2017 (2017), 
7. 
16 Ibid., 3.  
17 Deutscher Städtetag, ed., "Association of German Cities - the Voice of Germany’s Cities," 2018, 
http://www.staedtetag.de/imperia/md/content/dst/veroeffentlichungen/sonstige/dst-flyer_english_2018.pdf. 
18 Ibid. 
19 cf. Brenner, New State Spaces, 70–74. 
20 In the formulation of his theoretical approach Brenner mainly focuses on the rescaling of statehood under contemporary 
capitalism. This research does not primarily focus on the effects of capitalism on the herein investigated recalibrations of German 
statehood. Even if the capitalist shaping of the German state is an important contextual factor it is not particularly looked at since 
that would go beyond the scope and interest of this research.  
21 Brenner, New State Spaces, 2. 
22 Ibid., 75–78; cf. Henri Lefèbvre, The Production of Space (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991). 
23 Nina Glick Schiller and Ayşe Çağlar, eds., Locating Migration: Rescaling Cities and Migrants (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
2015). 
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They thus concentrate on identifying the role of migrants as scale makers. Scale makers are thereby 
understood as actors that contribute to establishing and (re-) defining the scope of actions and policies. 
Thus, scale makers decide about the space in which these are applied. The present research, in contrast, 
focuses on the windows of opportunity created through migration that allowed actors representing different 
levels that are usually confined to act at given scale, such as the Städtetag representing the urban level, to 
engage in rescaling processes.  
Brenner further argues that varying actors at the different scales can influence, modify, and transform 
state spatial configuration.24 The analysis will clarify whether the Städtetag is one of these actors. The Städtetag 
repeatedly emphasises challenges and opportunities created for cities in the course of the “migration-crisis”. 
One of the main challenges described is the uneven distribution of newcomers among towns and cities. 
This is seen as problematic especially against the background of the already described fractures between 
more or less powerful, attractive and economically strong cities.25 As stated by other experts many migrants 
are moving to bigger cities and metropolitan areas. Those movements are influenced not only by a city’s 
attractiveness, but also by job opportunities and the migrant communities already present in these cities. As 
a consequence, many newcomers are moving to urban agglomerations in the West of Germany. This is 
perceived as problematic especially due to limited absorption capacities of local housing and labour markets 
that could act as barriers to successful integration when overstretched.26  
According to the Städtetag some of the cities that became popular destinations for migrants got close to 
their breaking point during the “migration crisis”.27 The association identifies the former lack of a residence 
obligation for asylum seekers in the frame of the Königssteiner Schlüssel to be a reason for this.28 Such a 
residence obligation is formulated for the first time in the German integration law of August 2016. In the 
frame of this research, this specific ruling and the discussions on its formulation is emphasised in order to 
assess whether the national level responded to the Städtetag’s activities aimed at recalibrating the scalar 
organisation of the German state space. This also allows to draw conclusions on whether the activities of 
the association can not only be identified as struggles for influence and power going beyond the usual 
(urban) scale of their actions but also allow to discover whether the rescaling tendencies even became 
manifest in state projects or strategies.  
Basing his explanations on Bob Jessop’s strategic relational approach to state theory, Brenner argues that 
the organisational coherence, operational cohesion, and functional unity of the state are not pre-given.29 In 
contrast, state space is established by state spatial projects focusing on the state’s own territorial and scalar 
configuration and state spatial strategies focusing on geographies of state intervention into socio-economic 
life.30 Both actively contribute to the production and transformation of state spatiality. Therefore, rescaling 
processes are only clearly existent when translated into corresponding projects and strategies.  
The opening of windows of opportunities in the course of the “migration-crisis” in 2015 and 2016 in 
Germany and their possible exploitation by the Städtetag as well as the possible response of the superordinate 
scales are understood as a causal sequence of events. In order to identify possible rescaling tendencies, the 
underlying processes and mechanisms are assessed using a Process Tracing-inspired approach that is further 
explained in the following section. 
4. A Methodological Framework for the Analysis of the Rescaling of German Statehood 
4.1. The General Approach of Process Tracing 
The methodological approach of Process Tracing was first developed in the fields of psychology and 
usability studies. Political scientists Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett significantly contributed to 
the introduction of PT to Social Sciences. They stipulate that ‘[t]he general method of Process Tracing is to 
                                                 
24 Brenner, New State Spaces, 94. 
25 Anton, Flüchtlinge vor Ort in die Gesellschaft integrieren, 8-13. 
26 Nadine Körner-Blätgen and Dr Gabriele Sturm, “Internationale Migration in deutsche Großstädte,” ed. Bundesinstitut für Bau-
, Stadt- und Raumforschung im Bundesamt für Bauwesen und Raumordnung, in BBSR-Analysen KOMPAKT (2015), 24. 
27 Anton, Flüchtlinge vor Ort in die Gesellschaft integrieren, 14. 
28 The so-called “Königsteiner Schlüssel” was introduced as a distribution formula for research funding with the agreement of 
Königstein in 1949. Since 1969 it is enshrined in article 91b, 2 GG. Since the reform of federalism of 2006, it is also applied to the 
initial distribution of refugees and asylum seekers to the different federal states.  
29 Brenner, New State Spaces, 85; See also Bob Jessop, State Theory: Putting the Capitalist State in Its Place (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
1990); and Bob Jessop, The Future of the Capitalist State (Cambridge: Polity, 2002). 
30 Brenner, New State Spaces, 89-94. 
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generate and analyse data on the causal mechanisms, or processes, events, actions, expectations, and other 
intervening variables, that link putative causes to observed effects.’31 Accordingly, PT allows researching the 
temporal sequence of events in which single steps, or snap-shots, can be pointed out and made visible.32 Thus, 
in this research, PT allows focusing the events and steps leading to a possible recalibration of the German 
state system.  
PT cannot be understood as a single method, but rather as a collective term for different methodological 
approaches. Beach and Pedersen provide one of the most detailed overviews of these, which present an 
excellent guide for conduct analyses using PT. Based on their theory-testing approach a hypothesis-testing 
approach is developed here. It allows to evaluate the above-formulated hypotheses in regard to their validity 
and explanatory power.33  
4.2. Methodological Considerations  
Analyses using PT require a multitude of preliminary methodological considerations. In a first instance, the 
starting point and outcome of the process under investigation have to be defined. The point of departure 
of this research is the above-described vertical state scalar organisation that is laid out in German law. The 
potential result of the investigated process is understood as a rescaled scalar organisation of German state 
space. Such a reconfiguration would show in a redefinition of the urban scale. With the focus on the 
formulation of the residence obligation against the backdrop of the ‘migration-crisis,’ the investigation 
period is confined to the time span between spring 2015 and summer 2016.34 
The analysis thus aims at shedding light on the rescaling processes, the mechanisms and actors operating 
in it and shall also evaluate the actual outcome. It is assessed whether the presumed rescaling privileges a 
single scale rather than distributing activities among multiple spatial scales.35 It is, however, important to 
note, that there is little likelihood for the urban scale and its representative, the Städtetag, to gain factual 
supremacy over the federal states and the federal government. As Brenner argues, there can be no 
unidirectional processes “in which a single scale (…) is replacing the national scale as the primary level of 
political-economic coordination.’36 This research is instead expected to render tendencies of the 
recalibration of the German state scalar organisation visible.37 As a result of the rather recent character of 
the events under investigation, this research is mainly directed at collecting and summarising evidence to 
make trends and tendencies visible that could provoke rescaling processes on a long-term. 
Process Tracing approaches allow investigating who knew what at which point in time. In addition, 
reactions to these facts by different actors and their interactions throughout time can be taken into 
account.38 The basic tool of this analysis therefore is a timeline that builds on material published by 
representatives of the various German scales throughout the “migration-crisis”.39 First crucial moments, 
which Beach and Pedersen call “snap-shots” where identified with regard to the research interest within the 
established timeline.40 Following a mapping approach relevant documents providing information on these 
moments such as official press releases, statements, resolutions, notes, meeting protocols, and speeches 
have been identified and chosen as corpus of this analysis. However, it has to be stated, that the research 
process underlying an analysis using PT is an open one that gathers information in a snowball system until 
no new information can be gathered. To distinguish relevant material from less useful texts, the above-
named documents were scanned for information related to the research problem and the date of publication. 
                                                 
31 Andrew Bennett and Alexander L. George, “Process Tracing in Case Study Research,” MacArthur Foundation Workshop on 
Case Study Methods, 1997. 
32 David Collier, “Understanding Process Tracing,” Political Science & Politics 44, no. 4 (2011), 824. 
33 cf. Derek Beach and Rasmus B. Pedersen, “Process Tracing Methods: Foundations and Guidelines,” (The University of 
Michigan Press, 2013), 14–15. 
34 As already mentioned in the introduction of this paper, the years 2015 and 2016 represent the high-peak of migration to 
Germany within the last ten years. Furthermore, the negotiation of the residence obligation can be confined to Spring 2015 to 
August 2016, when the integration law was adopted. 
35 Brenner, New State Spaces, 97. 
36 Ibid., 3. 
37 cf. Ibid. 
38 cf. Andrew Bennett, “Process Tracing and Causal Inference,” in Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards, ed. Henry 
E. Brady, Second edition. (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2010), 2–3. 
39 An overview of the timeline created for the purpose of the conducted analysis is to be found in the annex. An overview of the 
primary data assessed in the context of the analysis is to be found added to the bibliography.  
40 Derek Beach, "Process Tracing Methods," (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 55. 
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The chosen documents were then assessed in regard to their content to search for the evidence necessary 
to prove (or disprove) the assumed rescaling processes and the presumed engagement of the Städtetag.  
4.3. Conceptualisation and Operationalisation of the Rescaling Process 
The causal processes linking the above-described starting point and outcome are seen as a two-step process 
in this research. Whereas the first part is defined through the actions of the Städtetag as one representative 
of the urban scale, the second part is understood as reaction or response by the superordinate scales. The 
second part, thus, particularly assesses the actions of actors on the national level and the federal state level. 
The conceptualisation of the rescaling process as a two-step mechanism allows setting the focus on the 
interplay of the different scales. In this regard it has to be noted that Brenner points to the fact that rescaling 
processes can provoke uneven and discontinuous restructuring processes. This means that not all 
dimensions of the state spatial structure change simultaneously.41 “[…] Processes of state spatial 
restructuring may […] be understood as a continual ‘layering’ of successive rounds of state regulation within 
a constantly evolving mosaic of state spatiality.”42 Hence, several successive rounds of state spatial regulation 
can take place. Therefore, the conceptualisation of the assessed rescaling process in two steps is to be 
considered as a simplification made for analytical purposes. The focus on the case-specific and thus the 
empirical level in the analysis allows redirecting the focus again on the circularity of the described processes.  
Another indispensable preparatory step for the analysis is the formulation of observable manifestations 
and evidence that is to be found in the frame of the analysis to prove the existence of the different parts of 
the assumed rescaling process.43 This contributes to sharpening the focus and also the validity of the analysis. 
The formulation of these presuppositions that are deduced from the above-described theoretical and 
contextual background are presented in linkage with the actual findings of the analysis in the next part of 
this text to allow a more comprehensive presentation of the different analytical steps.  
Conclusions are drawn following Bayesian theory.44 Hence, sources and evidence found are only taken 
into account if they can be identified as being “relevant”. The relevancy is given, when the evidence proving 
a consequential fact makes the researched action more probable than it would have been without the 
evidence.45 Beach and Pedersen describe four kinds of evidence that are considered to assess the content of 
the analysed material. “Pattern evidence,” which relates to predictions of statistical patterns in the evidence 
found, is not expected in this research due to the nature of the examined material. More important are 
“sequence evidence,” which proves the temporal and spatial chronology of events, “trace evidence,” which 
is present when the mere existence of a certain material proves a part of the hypothesised causal relationship 
and lastly “account evidence” that refers to the content of the material.46 The presence or absence of 
evidence for the existence of the different parts of the presumed causal mechanism will allow drawing 
conclusions on the probable rescaling of German statehood. 
5. Analysing the Rescaling of German Statehood: Finding Case-specific Evidence 
5.1. Examining Part One of the Causal Mechanism 
Within the assumed two parts of the rescaling process, smaller steps can be distinguished in the analysis. 
The first part, the activities of the Städtetag, entails the opening of windows of opportunity as well as their 
recognition and exploitation by the association. Supplementary to the theoretical and contextual 
assumptions made on the possibilities to engage in rescaling processes, the analysis further explores the 
mentioned windows of opportunity on the case-specific level. The analysis is especially interested in the 
Städtetag’s possible recognition and exploitation of these. It is not assumed that it directly refers to them. 
The association is rather expected to point to a change of context for urban policies and activities or 
transformed influences on municipal responsibilities and duties. Hence, mainly account evidence would 
have to be present. Also sequence evidences proving that the Städtetag’s recognition of the chances to engage 
in rescaling processes happened at the beginning of the period under investigation would have to be found. 
                                                 
41 Brenner, New State Spaces, 107–10. 
42 Ibid., 198. 
43 cf. Beach and Pedersen, “Process Tracing Methods: Foundations and Guidelines,” 14 f. 
44 The Bayesian theory also known as Bayes’ rule or theorem describes the probability of an event, based on prior knowledge of 
conditions that are assumed to be related to an event.  
45 U.S. Federal Rule of Evidence 401 as quoted in Beach and Pedersen, “Process Tracing Methods: Foundations and Guidelines,” 
99. 
46 Beach and Pedersen, “Process Tracing Methods: Foundations and Guidelines,” 99. 
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To substantiate the exploitation of the windows of opportunity by the Städtetag, mainly account evidence 
presenting, inter alia, calls for adjustments and changes along the multiscalar organisation of the German 
state and lobby activities in regard to that are expected.  
In the vast majority of the documents of the Städtetag that were assessed in the frame of the analysis, the 
Städtetag points to the challenges that cities are facing in the context of the increased migration to Germany. 
Especially in the earlier publications, the Städtetag expresses the necessity for (financial) support from the 
national and federal state level to better deal with the increased migration to urban spaces. 47The urgency of 
this request is not only expressed in the high number and frequency of statements and documents issued 
especially in the year 2015 that follow this line of argumentation, but also by the increased use of words 
such as “rapid,” “quick,” “urgent,” and “immediately”48 in this context. The association furthermore 
repeatedly emphasises that some cities are close to reaching a breaking point. In the aftermath of the high 
peak of the income of migrants to Germany in summer 2015 the president of the Städtetag Eva Lohse states: 
“The cities are working at the limit and have to create more and more emergency shelters and interim 
solutions out of thin air.”49 The Städtetag further develops on this in October of the same year:  
‘An increasing number of asylum seekers and refugees cause a persistent pressure to act on the 
municipal level. The cities do what they can to receive refugees and politically persecuted 
persons and to care for them. Regular procedures are however meeting limits or are no longer 
applicable due to the number of arriving people.’50  
In the context of describing the emerging challenges the association frequently refers to the commitment 
of the cities to the initial reception and the integration of migrants. The utterance “[c]ities know how to 
integrate”51 is used consistently to emphasise the knowledge and experience that cities have with integrating 
migrants into society. In one of their documents, the Städtetag argues with the proximity of cities to their 
citizens for the valuable contribution to integration and migration policies and thereby starts developing the 
vision of cities as important participants in discussions on related topics:  
‘The cities as entities that are closest to citizens are aware of their responsibility to assure social 
peace and cohesion within society. They are very committed to promoting the identification 
of the people with their homes and the togetherness within the urban society.’52 
In this respect it is noted that the association increasingly does not only ask for rapid assistance, but also 
respect of the federal state and national level for their work and experience in tackling the issue of migration. 
In June 2015, the Städtetag argues the following:  
‘If the federal government and the federal states are holding so-called asylum summits and are 
discussing a topic that lies mainly within the operational responsibility of the municipalities – 
after all, the success of integration is determined in cities and municipalities –, if the 
commission on federal financial relations that is enshrined in the coalition agreement, of which 
we would be a part of is not called for, but instead it is negotiated in different rounds without 
us, then there is a lack of respect.’53 
                                                 
47 Temporal indications given in this report in regard to statements, declarations and actions and documents are referring to the 
period under investigation. 
48 In the following citations taken from the material assessed are presented as own translations within the text. The German 
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Kommunen tun, was sie können, um Flüchtlinge und politisch Verfolgte unterzubringen und zu versorgen. Reguläre Abläufe 
stoßen allerdings inzwischen angesichts der Zahl der ankommenden Menschen häufig an Grenzen oder können nicht mehr 
eingehalten warden,” Deutscher Städtetag, 29 October 2015. 
51 “Städte können Integration”. 
52 “Die Städte sind sich als bürgernächste Ebene ihrer Verantwortung bewusst, den sozialen Frieden, und Zusammenhalt in den 
Städten zu sichern. Sie sind mit großem Engagement dabei, die Identifikation der Menschen mit ihrer Heimat und das 
Miteinander in der Stadtgesellschaft zu fördern,” Deutscher Städstetag, 11 June 2015. 
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Deutscher Städtetag, 10 June 2015. 
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It explains that it understands cities and the Städtetag as its representative as equal partners. The recognition 
as such by the national and federal state level strengthens its position in the discussion on migration. This 
development from presenting cities as burdened with the challenges of migration to showing them as 
important partners with valuable knowledge in the field can be interpreted as account evidence for the 
presence and recognition of windows of opportunity by the Städtetag.  
The association repeatedly refers to the urban scale, the federal state scale and the national one as a 
“community of responsibility”54 and thereby emphasises the need it sees for these different scales to work 
together. Over time, the Städtetag moves away from rather vague requests for help and proposes and 
supports specific suggestions for a better support of cities in responding to migration; one of which is the 
residence obligation. This change in rhetoric and type of requests vis-à-vis the national and the federal state 
level points to account evidence as the association indeed tries to exploit the existing windows of 
opportunity.  
Further indications for the Städtetag’s active engagement in rescaling processes are direct interactions in 
the form of meetings with state and federal state officials. According to the association, it discussed asylum 
and migration policies with the chancellor, Angela Merkel, and several federal state representatives on 11 
June 2015. The association frames this meeting as a first step towards more recognition of the urban scale. 
In a report on a successive meeting with chancellor Merkel, Federal Minister for Special Affairs Peter 
Altmaier and Federal Minister of the Interior Thomas de Maizière on 22 September 2015, the Städtetag 
comments: ‘The constructive and open exchange of ideas happened in a good atmosphere’.55 It thereby 
creates the image of an exchange on eyesight that allows assuming that the association was accepted as a 
negotiation partner. Furthermore, the Städtetag declares that especially the national level showed willingness 
to negotiate with them and to implement some of the Städtetag’s proposals on migration policies. To which 
extent this has been the case is explored in more detail in the next part of this analysis.  
5.2. Examining Part Two of the Causal Mechanism 
The second part of the causal mechanism is defined as the action of the national and the federal state scale. 
The analysis not only assesses whether and to which extent the representatives of these scales responded to 
the actions of the Städtetag, but also the possible development of related state projects and strategies. The 
focal point is the formulation of the residence obligation. To prove a reaction to the association’s actions 
direct interaction between both sides is a precondition. First hints for this interaction have already been 
found in the context of the previous analytical step. These interactions are explored further in this part. To 
substantiate the assumptions with case-specific findings sequence evidence is of high importance. Equally 
so, account evidence is expected to provide necessary insights and indications.  
As already mentioned, the Städtetag over time started connecting its claims for support with specific 
proposals for measurements to guarantee this support. One of these was the residence obligation that was 
increasingly referred to from the early 2016 by the Städtetag. The association understands it as a tool allowing 
cities to better tackle migration since it could prevent the uneven distribution of migrants among cities and 
thus ensure better initial reception and integration. In an answer to a parliamentary question in December 
2015 it was clearly stated: ‘The federal government examines to which extent residence obligations are legally 
possible for recognised refugees or rather people granted subsidiary protection’.56 While it becomes clear 
based on the assessed material that the government discussed proposals for a potential residence obligations 
the emergence of such an idea cannot be clearly traced back to the association’s activities. The missing of a 
sequence evidence in this case shows that that the formulation of the residence obligation cannot be clearly 
defined as response to the Städtetag’s activity. However, the analysis shows that the Städtetag still had several 
possibilities to take influence on it. The association thus can be understood as again using a window of 
opportunity rather than creating own activities. The Städtetag is thus rather responsive than active in regard 
to the discussions on the residence obligation.  
The first reading of the legislative draft of the integration law entailing the residence obligation in the 
Bundestag took place on 3 June 2016. The debate on the residence obligation shows that it was strongly 
supported by the coalition parties, whereas it was criticised as creating a barrier against integration and 
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marginalising newcomers by opposition parties.57 The coalition parties furthermore advanced the residence 
obligation in clear connection to the clear demand for it by the urban level. This, however, does not allow 
drawing conclusions on the direct reference to the Städtetag’s activities since the association is never directly 
referred to. Nevertheless, there is a clear trace and account evidence for the ongoing lobbying of the Städtetag 
for the residence obligation within the legislative procedure: The association spoke at the hearing of the 
responsible Committee, the “Labour and Social Affairs” Committee, on 8 June 2016.58 There it clearly 
formulated its position in regard to the residence obligation stating that it would present a necessary relief 
for German cities. The on-going publication on statements of the Städtetag on the topic and its interaction 
with the “Labour and Social Affairs” Committee is understood as trace evidence for the circularity of the 
assumed recalibration processes. 
In the first reading of the draft law in the Bundesrat on 17 June 2016 representatives of various federal 
states refer to the “community of responsibility”59 that also the Städtetag calls upon repeatedly. Interestingly, 
some representatives especially refer to necessary common decisions with the urban scale that were 
demanded by the Städtetag. A direct link cannot be established. However, the opinion of members of the 
Bundesrat on the residence obligation is generally similarly wide-spread as in the Bundestag. Whereas some 
regard it as a valuable tool to better distribute newcomers, others understand it as interference with the 
freedom of movement. The renewed rise of publications of the Städtetag on the residence obligation in the 
summer 2016 can be understood as a response to those mixed voices.  
After the publication of the recommended resolution by the “Labour and Social Affairs” Committee on 
6 June 2016, the second and third reading of the draft law took place in the Bundestag on 7 June 2016. 
Similarly, to the first reading, the opinions on the residence obligation were positive among the coalition 
parties and negative among the opposition parties. This session of the Bundestag nevertheless is interesting 
in regard to very clear references made to the claims of the urban scale. Josip Juratovic (SPD) stated: ‘Federal 
states and cities asked urgently for more specific control methods. They want to provide better care for 
refugees, but also exonerate themselves in parts. They now get the opportunity to do so’.60 This, then, is 
also a reference to the claims made by the Städtetag. At the same time, though, no direct linkages based on 
evidence can be established. The integration law and thus the new ruling on the residence obligation were 
accepted in this third reading of the draft law in the Bundestag.  
5.3. Summary and Critical Discussion of the Findings  
The analysis investigated the assumed rescaling of German statehood in the context of the so-called 
migration crisis. The above-formulated hypotheses could be partly confirmed in the frame of the analysis. 
The first part of the analysis focusing on the opening and recognition of windows of opportunity and the 
exploitation of these by the Städtetag substantiates the existence of the assumed windows of opportunity and 
their recognition by the Städtetag with account evidence. The argumentation of the association allows for 
conclusions on their willingness to exploit these windows of opportunities. Based on sequence and account 
evidence, it can be stated that the Städtetag used the momentum of the “refugee crisis” to enhance the 
importance and influence of the urban scale with regard to the federal state and the national scale. The 
analysis, however, does not allow drawing a final conclusion on the question whether the association mainly 
pursues own institutional interests or is only committed to the claims and goals of the municipal level.  
The second part of the analysis clearly shows that the Städtetag exploited the windows of opportunity 
successfully in the sense that it managed to represent the claims and opinions of the urban scale on the 
residence obligation vis-à-vis the superordinate scales in a way that they are recognised by these. Different 
account evidence was found for this. However, it must be noted, that it stays rather responsive than being 
a driving force in the discussions. The rulings formulated on the residence obligation in the integration law 
therefore cannot be understood as an answer to the Städtetag aiming at rescaling processes. Thus, the second 
part of the hypotheses formulated above can be verified only partly. One could assume that the Städtetag 
lobbies for a possible recalibration of the state scalar system by positioning the urban scale in a better 
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negotiation system. Yet, whether these tendencies could develop in rescaling processes in a long term would 
have to be explored in further research.  
In order to better judge the conclusions drawn in the frame of this analysis in regard to their validity, the 
results need to be critically evaluated. Regarding the material that builds the foundation of the analysis it can 
be stated that solely primary sources were used. One of the most important criteria of selection in regard to 
the material was the date of publication that had to lie within the assessed period of time. This allows for 
the collection of authentic information. Through this and the use of different kinds of texts such as press 
releases, resolutions, speeches, and legal texts a comprehensive and veridical mapping of the time period 
assessed could be carried out. A weak point might be the rather open choice of data. A more pointed 
selection of data could however only be made in a bigger research in which more data can be processed 
As already stated before, the conclusions drawn within this analysis are based on Bayesian theory. This 
does not only allow for the evaluation of evidence found, but also allows testing the validity of the final 
results. The testing method used here is based on the explanations of van Evera.61 It takes both, the expected 
and the found observable manifestations and the corresponding evidences into account. Generally, the 
evidences that support the previously expected observable manifestations are understood as supporting the 
previously formulated hypotheses. Consequently, the probability to verify a hypothesis increases with the 
evidence found.  
In this research, no contra-factual investigations were made. Thus, the results of the analysis solely pass 
the so-called “smoking-gun test”, which is applied when the predictions made are unambiguous but also 
not certain, which holds true for the predictions made in this research. The passing of the test proves that 
the prediction is true. If the test is not passed, however, the prediction cannot be disproven.62 Consequently, 
the assumptions made in the hypotheses regarding the opening of windows of opportunity and their 
exploitation and recognition through the Städtetag can be considered as proven. The parts of the hypotheses 
focusing on the response of the superordinate scales to these activities and the formulation for resulting 
state spatial projects and or strategies in which the rescaling tendencies become manifest cannot be proven. 
However, they cannot be disproven either. Further research on this second part of the assumed causal 
mechanism would have to explore this part of the hypothesis further.  
6. Conclusions and Outlook  
The aim of this research was to evaluate to which extent the German association of cities and towns, the 
Deutscher Städtetag, used the momentum of the so-called migration crisis in 2015 and 2016 to engage in 
rescaling processes of German state space. The analysis showed that the Städtetag did recognise the windows 
of opportunity for a possible recalibration of the German state scalar organisation created in the course of 
the “migration crisis”. It contributed to presenting the urban scale as an important and equal partner for 
negotiations on asylum-, refugee, and integration policies. These activities have been identified as 
contributing to rescaling tendencies within the analysis. Thus, it was shown that a change in the socio-
political context in which national state spaces are produced can enable different actors representing specific 
scales to engage in rescaling processes.  
Overall this analysis contributed to the development of a more spatial approach to the German federal 
state space by focusing on the urban scale that has so far been rather neglected in the literature. By making 
rescaling tendencies within the German state scalar organisation visible, a new understanding for the 
relations of the assessed scales is developed that can inspire further research in the field. 
In this research, no final conclusion on the responses to these activities and tendencies of actors 
representing other scales could be drawn. Especially the manifestation of possible recalibrations of the 
German state space in state spatial projects and strategies should be further explored in future research.  
Even though the urban scale was positioned in a more advantageous position within the time period 
under investigation, no statements regarding a possible long-term relocation of the urban scale can be made. 
Based on Brenner’s explanations and the analysis conducted, it is expected that constant rescaling tendencies 
provoked by different societal and political influences perpetually change the state scalar organisation of the 
German state. These developments are moreover expected to proceed asymmetrically in regard to different 
policy areas and fields of activities. Further investigations would have to examine these assumptions. 
Especially the integration of migrants into the German society is still debated controversially within society 
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and politics. Therefore, it can be assumed that further rescaling tendencies could be provoked in this 
context, providing fruitful grounds for future research. 
Especially within the second part of the analysis it became apparent that the Städtetag assessed here as 
representative of the urban scale is not the only (institutional) body recognising the opening of windows of 
opportunities to engage in rescaling processes in the context of the migration crisis. Further research on 
related topics would have to take other representatives of the different scales into account to create a more 
comprehensive picture of the recalibration of the German state scalar system.  
In this context, it can be stated that also investigations focusing on the horizontal relations between and 
within the herein assessed scales could contribute to more insights into rescaling processes. A research 
project focusing on this aspect would, for example, allow to take party political interests and intra- or inter-
institutional struggles into account that have not been looked at in this research.  
Moreover, spatial research building upon the theories developed in urban studies and global studies on 
the position of urban spaces in the world that were mentioned in the beginning of this text would be 
considered a valuable advancement of the ideas presented here. At the edges of the analysis, it became 
apparent that the urban scale also significantly interacts with the European level. The exploration of the 
relations of, for instance, the European scale as a scale that is superordinate to the national one and the 
urban scale would not only allow drawing further conclusions on the recalibration of the national state space 
but also on the recalibration of the spatial organisation of other entities such as the European Union. Such 
research would particularly uncover interesting insights with regard to the notion of a “Europe of Regions”.  
Kohl 73 
7. Bibliography 
Anton, Stefan. Flüchtlinge vor Ort in die Gesellschaft integrieren: Anforderungen für Kommunen und Lösungsansätze. Beiträge des 
Deutschen Städtetages zur Stadtpolitik, Band 109. Berlin, Köln: Deutscher Städtetag, 2016. 
Barber, Benjamin R. If Mayors Ruled the World: Dysfunctional Nations, Rising Cities. New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2013. 
Beach, Derek, and Rasmus B. Pedersen. Process Tracing Methods: Foundations and Guidelines. Ann Arbor: The University 
of Michigan Press, 2013.  
Behnke, Nathalie. “Stand Und Perspektiven der Föderlismusforschung.” Edited by Bundeszentrale für politische 
Bildung. Aus Politik Und Zeitgeschichte, no. 65. 28-30/2015. 9–16. 
Bennett, Andrew. “Process Tracing and Causal Inference.” In Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards, 
edited by Henry E. Brady, Second edition. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2010. 
Bennett, Andrew, and Alexander L. George. “Process Tracing in Case Study Research.” MacArthur Foundation 
Workshop on Case Study Methods. 1997. 
Brenner, Neil. New State Spaces: Urban Governance and the Rescaling of Statehood. Oxford/New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2004. 
Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung, ed.. “Kommunalpolitik.” In Informationen zur politischen Bildung/izpb, no. 333 
(2017). 
Collier, David. “Understanding Process Tracing.” Political Science & Politics 44, no. 04 (2011): 823–30.  
Deutscher Bundesrat. Meeting Protocole 18/946. Session 946. 17 July 2016. “Stenografischer Bericht 946. Sitzung.”  
Deutscher Bundesrat. Meeting Protocole 18/947. Session 947. 8 July 2016. “Stenografischer Bericht 947. Sitzung.”  
Deutscher Bundestag. Meeting Protocole 18/174. Session 174. 3 June 2016. “Stenografischer Bericht 174. Sitzung.” 
Deutscher Bundestag. Meeting Protocole 18/183. Session 183. 7 July 2016. “Stenografischer Bericht 183. Sitzung.” 
Deutscher Bundestag. Printed Material 18/3144. 11 November 2014. “Gesetzesentwurf der Fraktionen der CDU / 
CSU und SPD. Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Verbesserung der Rechtsstellung von asylsuchenden geduldeten 
Ausländern.” 
Deutscher Bundestag. Printed Material 18/7181. 30 December 2015. “Schriftliche Fragen mit den in der Woche vom 
21. Bis 30. Dezember 2015 eingegangenen Antworten der Bundesregierung.” 
Deutscher Bundestag. Printed Material 18/8615. 31 May 2016. “Gesetzesentwurf der Fraktionen der CDU / CSU 
und SPD: Entwurf eines Integrationsgesetzes.” 
Deutscher Bundestag. Printed Material 18/9090. 6 July 2016. “Beschlussempfehlung und Bericht des Ausschusses 
für Arbeit und Soziales.” 
Deutscher Bundestag. Short Note. Hib 377/2016. 21.06.16. “Regierung legt Integrationsgesetz vor.” 
https://www.bundestag.de/presse/hib/201606/-/428806.  
Deutscher Bundestag. Short Note. Hib 416/2016. 06.07.16. “Ausschuss billigt Integrationsgesetz.” 
https://www.bundestag.de/presse/hib/201607/-/434616. 
Deutscher Städtetag, ed.. “Association of German Cities - The Voice of Germany’s Cities.” January 2018. 
http://www.staedtetag.de/imperia/md/content/dst/veroeffentlichungen/sonstige/dst-flyer_english_2018.pdf. 
Deutscher Städtetag. Press Release. 26 February 2015. “Spitzengremien des Deutschen Städtetages berieten in Berlin. 
Städte engagieren sich für Integration von Flüchtlingen – Akkzeptanz der Bevölkerung aufrechterhalten.” 
http://www.staedtetag.de/presse/mitteilungen/072610/index.html. 
Deutscher Städtetag. Press Release. 21 April 2015. “Präsidium des Deutschen Städtetages beriet in Mühlheim an der 
Ruhr: ‘Investitionsinitiative hilft finanzschwachen Kommunen – Leistungsfähigkeit der Städte dauerhaft sichern.” 
http://www.staedtetag.de/presse/mitteilungen/073164/index.html. 
Deutscher Städtetag. Press Release. 9 June 2015. “Auftakt der Hauptversammlung des Deutschen Städtetages in 
Dresden. Deutschland braucht leistungsfähige Städte – Investitionskraft stärken, Strukturschwäche bekämpfen.” 
http://www.staedtetag.de/presse/mitteilungen/073795/index.html. 
Deutscher Städtetag. Press Release. 10 June 2015. “Rede Städtetagspräsident Maly zu Beginn der 
Hauptversammlung. Kommunen erwarten Respekt von Bund und Ländern – Flüchtlinge integrieren und 
Energiewende sichern.” http://www.staedtetag.de/presse/mitteilungen/073804/index.html. 
Deutscher Städtetag. Press Release. 11 June 2015. “Deutscher Städtetag verabschiedet ‘Dresdner Erklärung’ 
Entwicklungschancen für alle Städte sichern – Kommunen bei Sozialausgaben entlasten – Städte fördern sozialen 
Zusammenhalt.” http://www.staedtetag.de/presse/mitteilungen/073859/index.html. 
Deutscher Städtetag. Press Release. 19 August 2015. “Deutscher Städtetag nennt zentrale Erwartungen. Neue 
Flüchtlingszahlen: Städte brauchen mehr und schnellere Unterstützung durch Bund und Länder.” 
http://www.staedtetag.de/presse/mitteilungen/074858/index.html. 
Deutscher Städtetag. Press Release. 22 September 2015. “Präsidium des Deutschen Städtetages tagte in Neuss. 
Appell vor dem Flüchtlingsgipfel in Berlin: Kommunen brauchen mehr und schnelle Unterstützung von Bund 
und Ländern.” http://www.staedtetag.de/presse/mitteilungen/075335/index.html. 
Deutscher Städtetag. Press Release. 29 October 2015. “Deutscher Städtetag veröffentlicht Gemeindefinanzbericht 
2015. Herausforderungen Flüchtlinge: Kommunen finanziell entlasten, Integration ermöglichen.” 
http://www.staedtetag.de/presse/mitteilungen/075614/index.html. 
Where is Europe? 74 
Deutscher Städtetag. Press Release. 5 November 2015. “Deutscher Sädtetag zu Ergbenissen der Steuerschätzung. 
Kommunale Herausforderungen wachsen – finanzielle Ressourcen für Integration der Flüchtlinge sichern.” 
http://www.staedtetag.de/presse/mitteilungen/075674/index.html.  
Deutscher Städtetag. Press Release. 26 November 2015. “Spitzengremien des Deutschen Städtetages berieten in 
Hamburg. Bund und Länder müssen Integration verstärken – Kitas, Schulen, und Arbeitsmarkt unterstützen.” 
http://www.staedtetag.de/presse/mitteilungen/075924/index.html. 
Deutscher Städtetag. Press Release. 5 January 2016. “Deutscher Städtetag veröffentlicht Positionspapier zur 
Flüchtlingspolitik. Zuwanderungs steuern und reduzieren – Kommunen nicht überfordern – 
Integrationsmaßnahmen ausweiten.” http://www.staedtetag.de/presse/mitteilungen/076606/index.html. 
Deutscher Städtetag. Press Release. 17 March 2016. “Deutscher Städtetag zur Kommunalwahlkonferenz 
‘Zuwanderung in Berlin.’ Integration erfordert gemeinsame Anstrengungen. Konzepte müssen finanziell 
unterlegt werden.” http://www.staedtetag.de/presse/mitteilungen/077206/index.html. 
Deutscher Städtetag. Press Release. 23 March 2016. “Deutscher Städtetag zum Kabinettsbeschluss für 
Haushaltsplanung des Bundes. Kommunen brauchen deutlich mehr Unterstützung, um Aufgaben der Integration 
zu bewältigen.” http://www.staedtetag.de/presse/mitteilungen/077264/index.html. 
Deutscher Städtetag. Press Release. 20 April 2016. “Präsidium des Deutschen Städtetags beriet in Jena. Städte 
drängen auf Beschlüsse über Finanzmittel zur Integration. “Erfolgreiche Integration nciht zum Nulltarif.” 
http://www.staedtetag.de/presse/mitteilungen/077452/index.html. 
Deutscher Städtetag Press Release. 25 May 2016. “Deutscher Städtetag zum Kabinettsbeschluss Integrationsgesetz. 
Wohnsitzauflage für verbesserte Integration einsetzen – Kommunen bei Integrationsaufgaben finanziell 
entlasten.” http://www.staedtetag.de/presse/mitteilungen/077847/index.html. 
Deutscher Städtetag. Press Release. 23 June 2016. “Spitzengremien des Deutschen Städtetages berieten in Berlin. 
Wohnsitzauflagen zeitnah einführen und consequent nutzen – Finanzierung der Integartionsaufgaben rasch 
klären.” http://www.staedtetag.de/presse/mitteilungen/078252/index.html. 
Deutscher Städtetag. Position Paper. 10 June 2015. “Positionen des Deutschen Städtetages zur Flüchtlingspolitik.” 
http://www.staedtetag.de/imperia/md/content/dst/positionspapier_fluechtlingspolitik_160105.pdf.  
Deutscher Städtetag. Resolution. 23 June 2015. “Integrationsgesetz und Integrationsförderung / Bericht und 
Gespräch mitBundesinnenminister Dr. Bundesinnenminister Dr. Thomas de Maizière.” 
http://www.staedtetag.de/presse/beschluesse/078378/index.html. 
Deutscher Städtetag. Resolution. 21 September 2016. “Umsetzung der Wohnsitzauflage.” 
http://www.staedtetag.de/presse/beschluesse/079178/index.html.  
Deutscher Städtetag. Statement. 1 March 2016. “Deutscher Städtetag begrüßt Urteil des EuGHs als Beitrag zur 
rechtlichen Klarstellung der Zulässigkeit von Wohnsitzauflagen.” 
http://www.staedtetag.de/dst/inter/presse/statements/077070/index.html.  
Deutscher Städtetag. Speech of Dr. Ulrich Maly. “Rede von Oberbu ̈rgermeister Dr. Ulrich Maly, Präsident des 
Deutschen Sta ̈dtetages,anla ̈sslich der Hauptversammlung des Deutschen Sta ̈dtetages am 10. Juni 2015 in 
Dresden.” 
http://www.staedtetag.de/imperia/md/content/dst/presse/2015/hv_dst_rede_dr_ulrich_maly_20150610.pdf. 
Die Bundesregierung. Press Release. 25 May 2016. “Meseberger Erklärung zur Integration.” 
https://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Pressemitteilungen/BPA/2016/05/2016-05-25-meseberger-
erklaerung.html.  
Evera, Stephen van. Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997. 
Jessop, Bob. State Theory: Putting the Capitalist State in Its Place. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990. 
Jessop, Bob. The Future of the Capitalist State. Cambridge: Polity, 2002. 
Kleinfeld, Ralf. “Politikwissenschaft und Kommunalpolitik in Deutschland: Ein Forschungsüberblick.” In 
Kommunalpolitik, 17–71. Grundwissen Politik. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 1996.  
Körner-Blätgen, Nadine, and Dr Gabriele Sturm. “Internationale Migration in deutsche Großstädte.” Edited by 
Bundesinstitut für Bau-, Stadt- und Raumforschung im Bundesamt für Bauwesen und Raumordnung. In BBSR-
Analysen KOMPAKT (2015): 24. 
Lefèbvre, Henri. The Production of Space. Oxford: Blackwell, 1991. 
Le Galès, Patrick. European Cities: Social Conflicts and Governance. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002.  
Schiller, Nina Glick, and Ayşe Çağlar. eds. Locating Migration: Rescaling Cities and Migrants. Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 2015.  
Sassen, Saskia. The Global City: New York, London, Tokyo. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001. 
Sassen, Saskia. Global Networks, Linked Cities. London: Routledge, 2002. 
Statistisches Bundesamt. “Pressemitteilungen - Ausländische Bevölkerung Wächst Im Jahr 2017 Um 5,8 %.” 
https://www.destatis.de/DE/PresseService/Presse/Pressemitteilungen/ 2018/04/ PD18_133_12521.html; 
sessionid=90259DF54EB5A943B7D0F23FE91C781B.InternetLive1. 
Sturm, Roland. Föderalismus in Deutschland. Beiträge zur Politik und Zeitgeschichte. Opladen: Leske + Budrich, 2001. 
Wehling, Hans-Georg, and Andreas Kost. “Kommunalpolitik in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland — eine 
Einführung.” In Kommunalpolitik in den deutschen Ländern, 7–19. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 
2003.  
Kohl 75 
8. Annex: Table 1 Timeline 
(Own research, based on primary sources listed in the bibliography) 










leistungsfähige Städte – 
Investitionskraft stärken“ 
 
„Städte engagieren sich für 
Integration von Flüchtlingen“ 
 
Demand for financial support 
   
10.06.15  Respect of federal government / 
states is required  
President Maly: „Wenn Bund und 
Länder sogenannte Asylgipfel 
abhalten und dort ein Thema 
behandeln, dessen operative 
Zuständigkeit überwiegend bei den 
Kommunen liegt – schließlich wird 
über Wohl und Wehe der 
Integration in den Städten und 
Gemeinden entschieden -, wenn die 
im Koalitionsvertrag vereinbarte 
Kommission zu den Bund-Länder-
Finanzbeziehungen, bei der wir 
dabei wären, nicht einberufen wird, 
sondern stattdessen in verschiedenen 
Zirkeln ohne uns gesprochen wird, 
dann fehlt es an Respekt. Aktuell 
gibt es nun wenigstens einen 
Lichtblick, der uns freut. Wir sind 
eingeladen, morgen an einer 
Besprechungen der Bundeskanzlerin 
mit den Ländern zu Asyl- und 
Flüchtlingspolitik teilzunehmen.“ 
   
11.06.15 Meeting representatives of the Städtetag with representatives of federal states and the chancellor 
Merkel  
 
16.07.15 Press release: important 
commitment of cities, 
residence obligation 
   
21.09.15 Meeting of representatives of the Städtetag with chancellor 
Merkel and Ministers Altmaier and de Maizière 
  
28.12.15  Federal government considers 
residence obligation (answer 




11.01.16  Again: Statement: Coalition 
considers residence obligation 
  
12.01.16 President Lohse appreciates 
consideration of residence 
obligation by grand coalition 
   
24.02.16 President Lohse demands to 
set limit to migration to 
Germany, faster asylum 
procedures 
   
Resolution, inter alia, on 
residence obligation should be 
considered 
01.03.16 President Lohse appreciates 
ECJ judgement on residence 
obligation that was already 
earlier considered by Federal 
government 
  ECJ judgement 
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13.04.16  Coalition Committee agrees 
on key points of a possible 
integration law 
  
14.04.16 President Lohse appreciates 
agreement on key points by 
coalition committee 
   
20.04.16 Resolution of committee on, 
inter alia, Integration in Cities, 
Financial Relations, Residence 
Obligation 
 
“Integration happens in 
Cities” 
   
Once again call to consider 
residence obligation 
22.04.16 President Lohse calls for a 
residence obligation  
Presentation of a common integration concept (No reference 
to cities / Städtetag / But: residence obligation for better 
distribution) 
 
25.05.16 Lohse: Städetag appreciates 
declaration, answers to needs 
of cities, federal states have to 
implement 
Federal cabinet decides on 
draft of an integration law, 
includes residence obligation 
“Declaration of Meseberg on 
integration” 
(“Fördern und Fordern”, 
residence obligation for better 
distribution) 
  
31.05.16  Draft integration law of 
CDU/ CSU and SPD 
(coalition parties / governing 
parties) 
(Printed material 18/8615) 
  
03.06.16  1st reading draft integration 
law (printed material 18/8615) 
in the Bundestag, Session 174 
 
• Minister of the Interior 
de Mezière: residence of 
obligation as tool for 
federal states (not 
referring to cities / 
Städtetag) 
• Criticism of Opposition: 
residence obligation as a 
tool to marginalise 
newcomers, pushing 
them into areas without 
perspective 
• Coalition parties: 
residence obligation as 
important tool to avoid 
ghettoisation, better 
possibilities for 
regulation (not referring 
to cities), 
“Verantwortungsgemein
schaft”, useful for cities 
(avoid overload in 
metropolitan areas) 
• Karl Schiewerling 
(CDU): “Kommunen, 
Länder und der Bund 
[…] müssen 
zusammenarbeiten. 
Deswegen haben wir in 
dieser Frage eine 
gemeinsame Aufgabe.” 




wahr“ -> responsibility 
of the national level 
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First Session of the main 
responsible Committee 
(Labour and Social Affairs) – 
public hearing is agreed upon 
08.06.16  Public Hearing of the Labour 
and Social Affairs Committee 
on draft integration law:  
-> Advocacy groups, experts, 
inter alia, Städtetag 
 
Hearing of the Städtetag:  
• Generally appreciates 
draft, special focus on 
some measures, inter alia, 
residence obligation 
(allows to better regulate 
migration) 
• Emphasis on the federal 
states: need to develop 
reasonable distribution 
mechanism, in consultation 
with cities 
• Cooperation of the 




17.06.16   1st Reading of the draft 
integration law in the 
Bundesrat, Session 946 
 
• Increased migration as 
challenge for the 




• Integration happens in 
cities and federal states 
• Financial support from 
the federal government 
is requested 




interference in freedom 
of movement, but still 
purposeful 
• Necessity of residence 
obligation for more 
equal distribution 
(direct referring to 
urban scale), integration 
 
Mostly discussed: technical 
details (date) 
 
20.06.16  Legislative proposal 
integration law of Federal 
Government (Printed material 
18/8829) 
  
Hearing of the responsible 
Labour and Social Affairs 
committee – divided response 
of experts 
22.06.16 Sitting Nr. 216 of the main 
committee: calling for federal 
states to quickly implement 
residence obligation 
Comment on the opinion of 
the Bundesrat (printed material 
18/8883) 
  
23.06.16 Resolution of main committee 
on residence obligation, calls 
to clarify financial relations in 
regard to integration 
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06.07.16  Final discussion on draft 
integration law in Labour and 
Social Affairs committee, 
recommended resolution, 
Absent on amended version 
  
07.07.16  2nd and 3rd Reading of the 
draft integration law (printed 
material 18/8615) in the 
Bundestag, Session 183 
 
• Coalition Parties: 
Commitment of Cities is 
acknowledged, residence 
obligation is important to 
better distribute 
newcomers among 
bigger and smaller cities, 




answering to calls for 
help of municipalities, 
necessary tool to better 
control migration to 
cities 
• Josip Juratovic (SPD): 
Länder und Kommunen 
baten dringend um 
gezieltere 
Steuerungsmöglichkeiten
. Sie möchten Flüchtlinge 
besser versorgen, aber 




• Opposition: criticising 
law as exclusionary, 
residence obligation as 
contrary to freedom of 
movement and barrier 
for integration rather 
than facilitating it 
 
Draft is accepted with the 
votes of the coalition parties 
against the ones of the 
opposition parties 
 
Context: Own drafts of the 
coalition 
 
Not taken into account: critics 
of churches, NGOs, welfare 
organisations 
  
08.07.16   2nd Reading of the draft 
integration law in the 
Bundesrat, Session 947 
 
No additional opinions (in 
regard to first reading) 
 
31.07.16  Decision on the Integration 
law 
  
06.08.16    Integration law 
enters into 
force, amended 
by regulation on 
integration 
  
Breaking Down Borders? Cultural and Linguistic Diversity in the 
European Border Breakers Awards 2004-2018 
Angela Medendorp 
1. Introduction 
Ever since the Maastricht Treaty, culture has taken up a prominent spot on the European agenda. According 
to the Treaty, it is the EU’s aim to contribute to the flowering of Member State culture as well as to bring 
common cultural heritage to the fore.1 To further these goals, the EU has set aside 1.46 billion euros in its 
current budget (until 2020) for its Creative Europe programme (part of the Directorate-General for 
Education, Youth, Sport and Culture of the European Commission). Creative Europe funds and runs 
numerous cultural projects within the EU; the prize for European popular music, the aptly-named European 
Border Breakers Awards (EBBAs), is one such project. 
The EBBAs appear to be a fitting example of a way that the European space is reordered through policy. 
Started in 2004, the EBBA awards ceremony was first held in Lisbon, before moving to the city of 
Groningen, the Netherlands in 2009. It is now typically held at the start of the annual music festival 
Eurosonic/Noorderslag, where artists as well as music fans from all over Europe gather for what many call 
the start of the year for pop music. The awards (ten each year) are given to beginning artists from ten 
different countries that are Creative Europe participants (this includes several non-EU countries), who have 
had their first successful hit in more than one European country in the past year. The winners are selected 
on the basis of airplay, sales, and live performances on festivals. 
The EBBAs, according to the organisation itself, aim to support European artists and ‘highlight Europe’s 
great cultural and linguistic diversity in popular music,’2 and in doing so, the programme seems to fulfil the 
EU’s two cultural goals of the Maastricht Treaty: highlighting national culture (by electing winners from 
different countries who in turn are assumed to represent their national cultures) as well as European 
common culture (by rewarding international success). However, superficially skimming through the 
previous EBBA winners uncovers a few issues, raising the suspicion that the EBBAs might not be fulfilling 
their goals at all: many of the winners sing exclusively in English (thereby significantly limiting the amount 
of linguistic diversity), some countries appear far more successful than others (thereby significantly limiting 
the amount of cultural diversity), and the selection of winners is dependent on so many variables that it is 
incomprehensible at best. To gain a better understanding of linguistic and cultural diversity in the context 
of the EBBAs, a more elaborate investigation is due. The present paper will thus attempt to answer the 
following question: to what extent do the European Border Breakers Awards showcase cultural and 
linguistic diversity in Europe and what are the possible consequences for (the promotion of) European 
culture? 
Looking into the selection procedure and analysing the winners of the past fifteen years (2004-2018) 
should show exactly how accurate the abovementioned suspicion (i.e. that the EBBAs are not fulfilling their 
goals) is. In doing so, this paper attempts to answer the research question using both quantitative and 
qualitative elements. The quantitative approach will provide an analysis of the EBBA winners by 
determining the number and share of winners per country/national culture and per performance language. 
The qualitative approach will support this analysis by offering an insight into the selection procedure of 
EBBA winners and hypothesizes how this selection procedure may influence linguistic and cultural diversity 
among the EBBA winners. 
It is important to note that this paper thus restricts the analysis of cultural diversity purely to 
geographical, national culture. That is to say: an artist of a certain nationality will be regarded as, in a way, 
expressing the respective country’s national culture. This view makes it impossible to account for 
transnational cultural movements and expressions. While this limits the analysis, there are a couple of 
arguments for employing this national lens: historical sociologist Anthony Smith states that transnational 
culture has gained momentum in an increasingly interconnected world, but at the same time maintains that 
national cultures are still ‘dividing the world resoundingly,’ thereby arguing for the salience of national 
                                                 
1 Article 151 TEU. 
2 “This is EBBA,” European Border Breakers Awards, https://www.europeanborderbreakersawards.eu/en/info/.  
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culture.3 Moreover, the national view is justified in this instance because national, geography-bound diversity 
is precisely the sort of cultural diversity that the European Commission is trying to control for by making 
sure that the ten winners each hail from different countries within the Union.  
Establishing an overview of winners per participating country over a longer period of time will thus be 
an appropriate way to analyse the amount of diversity in national cultures that the EBBAs have produced 
over the last decade and a half. The data in the overview will be further examined using Stirling’s factors for 
assessing diversity in society. 4 Stirling’s factors are chosen specifically because they provide a simple yet 
sophisticated way of approaching a highly complex phenomenon. Stirling’s factors for diversity consist of 
variety (in this case: how many different cultures are represented?), balance (how balanced is the 
representation of different national cultures?), and disparity (i.e. how similar/dissimilar are the different 
national cultures represented?). These same three factors will be discussed in the context of linguistic 
diversity. Together, the analysis of the three factors should make it possible to make some claims about 
cultural diversity in EBBA winners, thus providing an answer to the research question. While this paper will 
not engage with Stirling’s mathematical index, it will instead assess the factors textually. 
At the time of writing there were no studies on the EBBAs available, making this paper the first of its 
kind. For that reasons, findings in this paper should provide an important contribution in developing a more 
sophisticated understanding of the EBBAs. 
 To provide the results of this paper with sufficient context, this paper will commence with a literature 
review, drawing from works written by academics and professionals, focussing on three main points, all of 
which help interpret the results from the data evaluation from different perspectives. First of all, the 
development of the area of European cultural policy, the existence (emergence?) of a European culture, and 
the role that European institutions have played in this over the past few decades. Special attention will be 
given to the more recent concept of cultural diplomacy, something which can be seen at work within the 
EBBAs as well. Second, to contextualise the claim that certain countries are disproportionately dominant 
within the EBBAs, a section will be devoted to the West-East (economic) power divide in Europe and the 
European Union. It is no secret that Western European countries are generally in an economically superior 
position to (Central) Eastern European countries. This economic power potentially gives them certain 
advantages when it comes to the export of culture and the development of the music industry. Looking 
further into this divide will hopefully provide a useful frame for the results of this paper. Third point of 
focus is the linguistic situation in Europe and the position of English as Europe’s dominant language. 
Despite the EU’s efforts to preserve linguistic diversity in Europe, the spread of English seems unstoppable 
at times. What is lost in this development? Is it something that the EU is actively combatting? Formulating 
tentative answers to these questions will provide yet another avenue of interpretation. 
After the presentation and discussion of the results, one last section is left. In an unanticipated move, 
the European Commission put out a call in February 2018 for the restructuring of the EBBAs for the years 
2019-2021. This paper will thus have the exclusive opportunity to analyse this call to see what changes 
Creative Europe intends to make and what effect these changes might have on cultural and linguistic 
diversity in future editions. 
2. European Cultural Policy 
As mentioned above, European cultural policy was formally introduced when the Maastricht Treaty was 
signed in 1992, and it has become more intense and programmatic ever since (especially after the Lisbon 
Treaty of 2007).5 Before then, culture was not considered a priority, with cooperation mainly focused on 
the political and economic spheres. Moreover, the EU simply did not have any competences in the field of 
culture. The European Member States, potentially afraid that their own culture would be overlooked in the 
EU’s attempts to create a unified Europe, were continuously stressing the principle of subsidiarity (and are 
still doing this today, on some occasions).6 This does not mean that policy in other fields did not have any 
cultural impact at all: Olivier Audéoud, who is an expert on EU policy, shows that economic measures such 
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as the free movement of people and products have had a significant impact on cultural output in Europe as 
well.7  
When discussing European cultural policy, it is important to know what culture actually entails. Culture 
is a concept that is widely discussed, and many definitions have been proffered by academics from different 
fields. The EU, very conveniently, has not made a choice, leaving the term undefined. However, academics 
appear to have agreed that culture is multifaceted, and that any definition should therefore contain multiple 
elements. A good example of such a definition is drafted by sociologist Williams, who describes culture as 
(1) ‘the independent and abstract noun which generates a process of intellectual, spiritual and aesthetic 
development,’ (2) ‘the independent noun, whether used generally or specifically, which indicates a particular 
way of life,’ and (3) ‘the independent and abstract noun which describes the works and practices of 
intellectual and especially artistic creativity.’8  
European cultural policy, in turn, has been defined as a consciously deceived instrument to build a 
cultural identity for the European Union,9 and a way to further integration in Europe.10 It has several 
dimensions, including sponsorship and subsidies, exchange programmes like ERASMUS, but also a set of 
other initiatives, such as the EBBAs, the Cinema of Europe, or the European Youth Orchestra, all mainly 
relating to Williams’s third definition. However, there is attention for his second definition as well: take for 
instance the initiatives concerning cultural heritage, such as the European Heritage Label and the 2018 Year 
of Cultural Heritage. Creative Europe’s largest programme, the European Capitals of Culture, combines the 
two, placing artistic performances in particular national or regional cultural settings. 
While it may seem fairly clear to the EU, not everyone agrees that European culture, i.e. a particular way 
of life, or a number of artistic and intellectual works and practices that is decidedly European, exists. They 
posit that there are too many differences between the European countries to form a cultural unity. Others 
argue that while European culture does exist, it is not nearly as all-encompassing as the EU would like to 
present it to be. Sociologist Neil Fligstein is a defender of the latter camp. He argues that certain elements 
of European culture are emerging but that many of these elements seem to be influenced by American 
culture.11 And if that is the case, how European can this culture really be said to be? Historian Benjamin 
Martin takes a critical stance as well. Arguing that the “sharedness” of European culture is mostly based on 
common history (think of the Roman era and the Enlightenment) and that this idea of a common history 
only emerged in the 1920s and 1930s (as a reaction to the Soviet and American superpowers), he states that, 
following historian Hobsbawm,12 common European culture is an invented tradition rather than an actual 
thing in and of itself.13 
The EU has a vested interest in proving these scholars wrong. Not only is it using its cultural programme 
to create a sense of cohesion within the existing European member states, it has also been employing this 
programme to create alliances with other nations. It is this practice of cultural diplomacy that makes it so 
significant that the EBBAs were launched in 2004, the same year that ten new countries were to make their 
entrance into the EU.  Introducing the EBBAs might in this context be a way of introducing old and new 
member states to each other’s cultures. 
Later, the EU has only expanded its efforts: several countries that are part of the Eastern Neighbourhood 
have joined Creative Europe’s cultural programme, with the most recent additions being Armenia and, 
pending the agreement with the European Commission, Kosovo.14 A couple of years ago (2016), the 
European Cultural Diplomacy Platform was launched, which has the aim to ‘enhance the European Union’s 
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engagement with third countries and their citizens.’15 For the EBBAs this has a few concrete consequences: 
the number of countries that are eligible for an award is steadily increasing. As a result, the number of 
eligible artists rises as well. To ensure a selection that is fair and consistent with the programme’s aims, it 
becomes ever more important that the procedure of selecting EBBA winners is comprehensible and 
transparent.  
Before coming back to this, the next section of this paper will explore another important facet: the power 
dynamics between the European nations and their possible consequences for understanding the EBBAs. 
3. EU Economic Power Dynamics 
Power is a concept that might be just as complex, if not more so, than culture. A prominent conceptualisation 
of power today is the model of power as domination.16 This model focuses on the idea of “power over”. 
This might be power over others/things/decisions, et cetera. “Power over” can be explained as follows: 
one party can get another to do things they otherwise would not do. It can also be much subtler: one party, 
by reinforcing and promoting certain practices and values, creates an environment in which the range of 
topics that could be raised by another party are significantly limited.17 Political and social theorist  Steven 
Lukes adds one more variety of power: one party prevents another from recognising their own interests.18 
Looking at the EU and its member states then, raises the following question: who is it that holds the power? 
In theory, the member states of the EU have similar amounts of power within the Union. The most 
sensitive issues (such as accession of new members) are decided by unanimous voting and qualified majority 
voting in other areas has made it such that there always has to be a certain balance between the number of 
Member States supporting a decision and the number of EU citizens represented by these countries. This 
mechanism has prevented countries with a large population from acquiring a disproportional amount of 
power and essentially side-lining the smaller countries within the EU. 
In practice however, there are few people who would argue that Germany and Slovenia are equally 
influential and powerful when it comes to European matters. Within the EU, there is still a certain (political) 
power hierarchy. Political magazine Politico published such a hierarchy,19 looking at internal and diplomatic 
strength of Member States and candidate countries, scoring them all on set criteria. The article concluded 
that Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, and the Netherlands are the top influencers in Brussels. 
This article, though not entirely uncontested, does show something very interesting: the most powerful 
countries have all (apart from the UK) been founding members of the European Economic Community 
(the precursor of the EU), have relatively stable economies, and they are all part of Western Europe.  
Apart from order of accession, there is other data supporting an East-West divide within the EU. Net 
contributors to the EU budget of 2016 were overwhelmingly Western European countries, showing the 
same top five as Politico’s power ranking, interestingly enough. Eastern European countries were often net 
recipients.20 Western European countries are thus actively financing Eastern European countries through 
the EU budget (and this financial disbalance appears to be a main cause for Euroscepticism in Western 
Europe). 
This division between net contributors and net recipients can easily be explained: Western European 
countries generally have a higher GDP per capita, which means that they are able to contribute relatively 
more to the EU budget whilst requiring relatively little financial assistance. And partly as a result of this 
financial imbalance, Western Europe seems to have gained the majority of decision-making power, allowing 
it, for instance, to outvote four Eastern European Member States in the much-contested 2015 migration 
vote on the relocation of 120,000 refugees across the continent.21  It should be noted however, that the 
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European institutions have their own agenda, which (even though it is fed and influenced by the European 
member states) need not always be identical to its main influencers’. In fact, the EU institutions have always 
tried to maintain a neutral image. 
Having assessed that there is a certain level of economic and political power disparity between the EU 
member states, what about cultural power? In a sense, it is related to economic power. A country with a 
strong economy will be able to invest more in its culture, thereby giving it more opportunities to showcase 
and export this culture internationally.  
To artists and performers dealing with the popular music industry, financial resources are vital. In a 
world where reaching an international audience through the internet has become easier than ever, 
investment in marketing can make all the difference. Moreover, a bigger budget means that there is more 
money to support artists, invest in production, etc. This creates the expectation that member states with a 
strong economy (i.e. Western European countries, generally), that have been shown to invest more money 
in the music industry and its related marketing22 would be able to provide better conditions for their artists 
to achieve international success (and, by extension, win an EBBA). This expectation is in line with 
economists Moon, Bartnett and Lim’s statement that countries with strong economies are dominant 
exporters in the international music trade network.23 However, it is one of the EBBAs’ goals to promote 
cultural diversity within Europe, which means that, ideally, winners would be representing as many different 
(national) cultures as possible. This creates a tight balance that the organisers must somehow navigate, and 
the degree to which they accomplish this will be vital to cultural diversity within the EBBAs. 
The next section will look at the last facet that will be vital to this paper: linguistic diversity. By examining 
this concept in a European context, it will be possible to come to a more complex understanding of the 
results of the quantitative analysis.  
4. Linguistic Diversity and English Dominance in Europe 
Compared to other continents, Europe has relatively few languages. If one takes linguistic diversity to mean 
just the number of languages spoken in a territory, this would mean that Europe is less linguistically diverse 
than South America or South East Asia, for example. The above is not the only definition of linguistic 
diversity, though. The linguist Clinton Robinson takes it to be based on ‘the percentage of the population 
speaking any single language [in a given territory]’.24 A territory where the largest language is spoken by a 
small proportion of the population would be regarded as very linguistically diverse. 
Looking at linguistic diversity in this way explains why certain academics view the spread of English as 
a threat to linguistic diversity in Europe, some going even so far as to call it a form of linguistic imperialism.25 
After all, the larger the proportion of the population that speaks English, the less linguistically diverse 
Europe will be.  
A couple of arguments for the promotion of linguistic diversity are laid down by linguist Tove Skutnabb-
Kangas in a report for the Council of Europe.26 First she mentions the heritage and biodiversity arguments. 
Linguistic diversity appears to be inherently linked to biodiversity.27 Where linguistic diversity is high, so is 
biodiversity, generally speaking. Preserving biodiversity might thus be achieved by encouraging linguistic 
diversity.28 Secondly, she presents the economic argument. In a society in which human intelligence is 
quickly replaced by technology, creativity is becoming more and more important. Since multilingualism is 
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often associated with enhanced creative thinking and flexibility,29 this would be a good argument for 
retaining and promoting linguistic diversity. And of course, all of this is not even addressing the social and 
emotional functions that having a native, own, language may have for both individuals and groups.30 
The EU, to a certain extent,31 has subscribed to these notions, initiating policy meant to stimulate its 
citizens to learn languages other than their native language or English. The ‘mother tongue plus two’ 
initiative, which advocates that everyone should strive to learn two languages besides their mother tongue, 
is a good example of this. There are also several initiatives aimed at the promotion and preservation of 
Europe’s smallest languages, usually minority languages. Moreover, with Brexit on the horizon, some more 
negative attitudes towards English can be observed within the Union. One of the most important 
spokespeople of the EU, president of the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker, openly expressed 
his scepticism of English, declaring that English is losing importance during his 2018 State of the Union 
speech. Meanwhile, however, the data appear to contradict him. In secondary schools across the continent 
97% of pupils are receiving English education, with 79% of them starting their education at the primary 
school level.32 With numbers this high, the usage of English as a lingua franca in Europe is likely to only 
increase over time. 
In the music industry, where international success is often the main goal, it is then unsurprising that 
English features prominently. This is corroborated by communication theorists Marc Verboord and 
Amanda Branderello, whose longitudinal study indicated that music featuring the use of English was more 
likely to be traded internationally.33 A report written for the European Music Organisation stipulates that 
the only European artists with a real chance at an international breakthrough are those performing in 
English, yet even they appear to have a lot of difficulties trying to compete with the American artists who 
are dominating airplay everywhere.34 The European Border Breakers Awards would then appear to be the 
perfect way to give struggling European artists a chance. Whether the EBBAs have been effective at doing 
so will be examined in the next section. 
5. The EBBAs Dissected 
This section will provide an up-close look at the selection procedure for the European Border Breakers 
Awards as well as the cultural and linguistic diversity of the winners in previous years (2004-2018). After a 
short presentation of the results, a section analysing the most outcomes and their likely consequences will 
follow. 
5.1. Selection Procedure 
 
The official EBBA website quotes three criteria upon which EBBA winners are selected: airplay, sales, and 
the number of live performances in Europe.35 Whether these factors are weighed equally is not revealed. A 
further investigation shows that especially the European Border Breakers Chart (which preceded the 
EBBAs) is important.36 The European Border Breakers Chart, compiled by Radiomonitor, provides a 
ranking of international hit singles by European artists (these do not necessarily need to be first successes) 
and are based on data gathered from 49 radio stations across Europe (1-3 per eligible country) and any 
available streaming data.  
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The next source for data cited by the organisation is Nielsen Music Control Research. This worldwide 
market leader when it comes to music data collection monitors radio airplay, online streaming and consumer 
behaviour, going even so far as to track in-store sales. The data provided by Nielsen are quite likely to be 
the most extensive and all-encompassing, but since Nielsen is a commercial player, the data are not freely 
accessible. One other source that is acknowledged is the European Broadcasting Union and its allied radio 
stations. These stations (all public, national stations) are in many cases also data suppliers for Radiomonitor 
and the European Border Breakers Chart, so they are likely to provide very similar, if not identical, data.  
The last source mentioned that is important when it comes to live performances in particular is the 
European Talent Exchange Programme. With festivals from all over Europe participating, their task is to 
provide information on which artists performed at which festival. It seems to be the appearance itself rather 
than relative success or venue size that counts here. 
All in all then, the data upon which the winners of the EBBAs are decided seem to be collected and 
communicated by trustworthy sources. While data on airplay seem a little biased to public national radio 
stations, this bias might still be balanced by the airplay and sales data from Nielsen, which include a much 
wider range of radio stations and consumers. The European Border Breakers Charts and data from the 
European Talent Exchange Programme are publicly accessible, aiding transparency. However, one question 
remains. There is absolutely no statement on the record that explains the process that transforms these data 
points into actual EBBA winners. Is there an algorithm in place or are there still human choices being made? 
And, if there is human involvement, who exactly is making these decisions? These are questions that have 
as of yet gone unanswered. 
5.2. Previous Winners: Linguistic Diversity 
Table 1 shows the number of EBBA winners per performance language as well as the relative percentage 
per language. In the past fifteen editions, there have been 148 winners (two editions saw nine winners instead 
of ten). In the case that a winner was performing in more than one language (this occurred twice) both were 
scored to be worth 0.5. 
As can be gathered from the data in Table 1, the EBBA winners represent twelve different languages, 
which indicates some variety, yet given the number of languages spoken on the European continent, there 
is a significant number of languages that is not featured at all. Moreover, nearly 80 per cent of EBBA winners 
perform in English, which shows the severe imbalance within the languages. The twelve languages do 
represent a number of different language families, meaning that the languages are relatively dissimilar. 
However, due to English’s majority share, variety and dissimilarity are pushed to the background. 
Considering this and previous definitions of linguistic diversity, it would be safe to say that the EBBAs have 
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Language Number of winners Percentage (rounded to one decimal) 
English 118 79.7 
French 6 4.1 
German 5 3.4 
Spanish 4 2.7 
Portuguese 3 2 
Instrumental 3 2 
Italian 2 1.4 
Polish 2 1.4 
Gibberish 1 0.7 
Persian 1 0.7 
Icelandic 1 0.7 
Albanian 1 0.7 
Irish 0.5 0.3 
Swedish 0.5 0.3 
Total 148 100.1 
Table 1. EBBA winners 2004-2018 per performance language (List of winners acquired through 
www.europeanborderbreakerawards.eu. Performance language determined by author) 
 
5.3. Previous Winners: Cultural Diversity 
Lastly, the previous winners will be examined from the perspective of cultural diversity. As previously 
mentioned, this cultural diversity will be examined through a national lens. Creating an overview of the 
number of winners per participating country makes it possible to assess the amount of diversity in national 
cultures presented through the EBBAs. Table 2 provides the exact number of winners per country.  Figure 
1 presents the same data in the form of a map to aid visualisation and includes the substantial number of 
countries that have never won an EBBA. 
Keeping Stirling’s factors of variety, balance, and disparity in mind, the map in Figure 1 (as well as the 
data in Table 2) show a number of things. Looking at variety, there are artists from 23 countries that have 
won an EBBA. While this shows that there is clearly some level of variety among the winners, it also 
illustrates that artists from a significant number of countries have not won an EBBA in the past fifteen 
years. Looking at balance, it is undeniable that some countries are much better represented than others. 
Whereas artists from some countries have been able to win sixteen times within fifteen editions (2009 saw 
two Danish, French and British winners for a hitherto unexplained reason), other countries have struggled 
to win just once. Looking at disparity, it becomes obvious that all of the most successful countries are 
located in Western Europe. While there are certainly cultural differences between these countries, they are 
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Country Number of winners 
France 16 Italy 4 
United Kingdom 16 Portugal 4 
Germany 14 Poland 3 
Sweden 13 Estonia 2 
Denmark 12 Romania 2 
Ireland 11 Iceland 2 
Belgium 10 Hungary 1 
Netherlands 9 Greece 1 
Spain 7 Latvia 1 
Austria 6 Albania 1 
Norway 6 Bulgaria 1 
Finland 5 Total 148 
Table 2. Number of EBBA winners per country, 2004-2018 (Data on nationality acquired through 
www.europeanborderbreakerawards.eu) 
Taking this all together then, it would appear that diversity among national cultures is relatively weak: 
while there is some variety (which is in part provided by the fact that the Commission requires that the 
winners are from different countries), there is severe misbalance, with the most successful countries being 
relatively similar. Since it is primarily countries with a strong economy that have performed well in the 
EBBAs, the number of winners per country was tested against the nation’s GDP per capita,38 showing a 
slight positive correlation (r = 0.435). Grouping the countries in Western and Eastern Europe however, 
showed a perfect positive correlation with the groups’ combined GDPs.39 
One issue that should be considered and which slightly impacts the analysis is that not all countries have 
been eligible for all editions of the EBBAs. Some countries became member states of the EU after 2004 
(such as Croatia) and some third-countries joined Creative Europe’s cultural programme later as well. 
Correcting for this would likely make the contrast less extreme. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that the 
most successful countries are overwhelmingly Western/Northern European countries with strong 
economies, and even those (Central) Eastern European countries that have been part of the EU since the 
inception of the EBBAs have been relatively unsuccessful in every edition. 
Additionally, it is important to mention once again that this analysis has only approached cultural 
diversity from a geographical, national point of view, thereby making it impossible to take expressions of 
transnational or regional culture into account. However, given that the Commission has explicitly attempted 
to create (national) cultural diversity within the EBBA awards, it can be concluded that rather than 
highlighting the many different national cultures among the participating countries, the selection criterion 
has largely served to repeatedly highlight the same national cultures, thereby decreasing the amount of 
cultural diversity portrayed over time.  
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Where is Europe? 88 
 
Figure 1: Number of EBBA winners per country, 2004-2018 (Data on nationality acquired through 
www.europeanborderbreakerawards.eu. Map by author) 
 
5.4.  Implications 
Looking at previous winners then, the EBBAs seem to have been significantly lacking when it comes to 
both cultural and linguistic diversity. The most successful countries all have strong economies and are 
located in Western and Northern Europe exclusively, confirming the expectation that financial power would 
amount to a greater number of EBBA winners. Whilst winning more EBBAs might not immediately grant 
these countries even more power within the EU, it does reinforce the image of them as main influencers 
and, at times, the “face” of Europe, thereby emphasising their position once more.  
Because relatively unsuccessful countries at the EBBAs do not gain the opportunity to showcase their 
music and national culture, the EBBAs might actually be indirectly working to increase the (cultural) gap 
between Western and Eastern Europe. Moreover, by disproportionately rewarding displays of Western 
European culture, the EBBAs are reinforcing a hierarchy of culture, which does not match with the Union’s 
values of equality. 
English is such a dominant language in the contest that only eleven other languages have been featured 
in the last fifteen years, meaning that many other languages have gotten no exposure at all. As a result then, 
the idea of English as the European lingua franca and the default mode of communication and performance 
– is only strengthened. While it was not examined in detail here, the prominence of English is also a factor 
that may help explain the difference between Western and Eastern European artists when it comes to 
success at the EBBAs. Since English proficiency tends to be higher in Western Europe, it is possible that 
this enhanced ability to speak and understand English leads to a stronger and more popular output of music 
performed in English.40 Taking this together, it is not surprising that the UK is the biggest winner of all: the 
fact that they won the greatest number of awards so far (it is uncertain whether the UK will continue to 
participate in Creative Europe after Brexit), may be in part due to the fact that UK participants are native 
speakers of English. 
Part of the cause for this English prominence is likely to be sought in the selection procedure. With a 
heavy focus on radio airplay (in a time in which radio seems to have become less important than ever), the 
choices made by a few select radio stations can have a significant impact on the selection of the winners. 
These radio stations, despite being mostly public stations, still have one primary goal: to attract as many 
                                                 
40 Education First, “EF English Proficiency Index,” ef.com, https://www.ef.com/epi/. 
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listeners as possible. These days it appears that English and Western (European) music are the most effective 
tools to do so.41 Even though radio is not the only or decisive factor; after all, part of the selection procedure 
is reliant on streaming data and sales, but  those are heavily influenced by marketing (and, once again, radio 
airplay) Thus, the countries with the largest sum of money at their disposal often dominate here as well, and 
it is very clearly reflected in the results.   
This selection procedure has made the EBBAs an effective way to reward the most successful European 
acts, but that also appears to be the entire extent of its reach. The past fifteen years have proven that a 
selection procedure based on airplay and sales is simply not the best way to promote linguistic or cultural 
diversity within Europe and it severely diminishes the impact of the EBBAs as a tool of European cultural 
policy, since it only reinforces an image that has already been quite prevalent now and in the past. 
It seems like the European Commission has also realised that it may be time to make a few changes to 
the EBBAs. In the beginning of 2018, it put out a call for organisers for the European Music Awards 
between 2019-2021. This plan will be examined in more detail in the following section. 
6. Changing Things Up: EBBA 2.0 
In the abovementioned document, the Commission sets out objectives and requirements for the 
organisation of the ‘EU prize for popular and contemporary music’, as it is officially called.42 This section 
will list and analyse the changes the Commission intends to make to the programme and the consequences 
these changes might have for cultural and linguistic diversity in particular. Firstly, the Commission has the 
intention to adapt the prize to work better with digital platforms. This will be taken into account in the 
selection procedure, but also when promoting the winners across Europe. Secondly, the selection process 
will be altered so as to reflect both qualitative and quantitative data. This means that professional 
recommendations will likely play a bigger role than before, when there was no clear evidence of human 
interaction with the selection procedure. Thirdly, the basic criteria will remain the same: there will be ten 
winners each year (though more or less winners could be acceptable if it were well-argued), and each of 
them should be from different countries. Interestingly enough, the Commission states that it requires 
linguistic balance only ‘in so far as possible’. This shows that linguistic diversity is likely not its highest 
priority when it comes to renewing the awards. Fourthly, the name of the awards will change. The 
Commission requires a name that includes the terms ‘Europe/European’, ‘music’, and ‘awards’.43 While this 
is a combination that yields relatively few results, one thing is certain: 2018 will have been the last year 
featuring the EBBAs by their original name. Finally, the awards will remain linked to the city of Groningen 
and Eurosonic/Noorderslag. While this was unsure in the beginning, renewed support from the city and 
the province (100.000 euros each per year) mean that Groningen will still be the central city for the next 
three years.44 Along with the 500.000 euros annually invested by the Commission, this brings the prospective 
budget for the 2019 edition to 700.000 euros. 
Depending on the organiser’s input then, the renewed EBBAs are quite likely to be the same in essence, 
yet branded differently. In doing so, the Commission may be able to reach a new audience (while loss of the 
EBBA brand may at the same time alienate others). A selection procedure that relies more heavily on experts 
might be beneficial for artists from Eastern European countries and third countries who might not receive 
as much airplay but still produce qualitatively good music. Especially if the expert panel contains 
professionals from different areas in Europe, the renewed selection procedure might lead to a more even 
geographic/cultural spread of winners in future editions. 
The fact that the Commission is not placing much priority on linguistic diversity though, is more 
worrisome, because it directly contradicts much of the EU’s language-related policies. By communicating 
this quite explicitly to prospective organisers, any future edition of the awards is still very likely to feature 
English prominently, making it once again impossible for artists performing in other languages to find a 
place within the competition. 
                                                 
41 For a more elaborate overview of airplay per country in the EU, supporting this claim further, please see Emmanuel Legrand, 
Monitoring the Cross-Border Circulation. 
42 Creative Europe, “Call for Proposals – EAC/S26/2017”, https://ec.europa.eu/programmes/creative-europe/sites/creative-
europe/files/eac-2018-00032-00-00-en-rev-00_final.pdf.  
43 As of 2019 the new name is Music Moves Europe Talent Award: https://musicmoveseuropetalentawards.eu/winners/. 
44 “Stad en Provincie Binden EU Music Prize Langer aan Eurosonic/Noorderslag,” Dagblad van het Noorden, 17 April 2018, 
http://www.dvhn.nl/groningen/Stad-en-provincie-binden-EU-Music-Prize-langer-aan-EurosonicNoorderslag-23099246.html.  
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However, many of the eventual implications still depend on the details. While the Commission has 
communicated a vision and some basic requirements for the awards, it has been very careful to leave the 
details to the prospective organisers. The new organiser will thus have a significant say when it comes to the 
form of the new awards as well as the ways it will be promoted to the public.  
7. Conclusion 
All in all then, the EBBAs of the past fifteen years have been culturally and linguistically diverse to only a 
marginal extent. The winners hail predominantly from the economically stronger Western/Northern 
European countries, reinforcing the East-West divide that is already present when it comes to for instance 
the political and the economic dimensions. Moreover, the fact that nearly 80 per cent of the winners perform 
in English might be a good reflection of the European music industry today, but it also has adverse effects 
on artists performing in other languages, in the sense that it makes it nearly impossible for these artists to 
reach a wider audience through the EBBAs. Lastly, the selection procedure of the winners has been relatively 
obscure. While the selection criteria for winning an award are announced and in certain cases the data are 
publicly available, it still remains a secret who or what makes the final decision. 
The third countries that have joined the Creative Europe programme and the EBBAs have not been 
particularly successful either. By not making them an active part of the programme (up until now the winners 
have mostly been promoted in the winning countries of that year),45 a valuable part of cultural diplomacy is 
lost.  
Taking these results together leads to the conclusion that the EBBAs have not been a particularly helpful 
tool in the promotion of the diversity of European culture. Rather, they have created an image of European 
culture that is predominantly Western and predominantly English: reinforcing what is often already seen as 
the status quo. 
When this investigation into the EBBAs was first started, it was not yet known that the 2018 edition of 
the EBBAs would also be the last. The updated version of the awards as described by the Commission in a 
call for prospective organisers has a couple of positive aspects: firstly, more involvement with digital 
platforms will hopefully attract a new and younger audience and will give different data points for the 
selection procedure, diminishing the importance of radio. Secondly, the addition of professionals who are 
part of the selection procedure might have a positive effect on the cultural diversity of the winners. 
The fact that the Commission announced in its call that it was interested in linguistic diversity ‘in so far 
as possible’ is a decidedly more negative aspect. Future editions of the awards are still likely to feature many 
winners performing in English and because of this the organisers are missing out on the opportunity to 
highlight the many different European languages. 
Of course, this paper has not been able to shed light on all there is to say about the EBBAs. Future 
research might therefore focus on awareness and perception of the EBBAs and the work of Creative Europe 
in the participating countries, a dimension which has unfortunately not been incorporated here. This 
research does raise the suspicion that the EBBAs have had difficulties reaching an audience that is 
geographically spread, perhaps because the EBBAs have always been linked to the city of Groningen 
(Netherlands). In order to shed some more light on this, a more extensive study is in order. 
In any case, the EBBAs (in their current form) have been able to reward some of the most successful 
artists of the past decades, calling attention to European performers, all of whom face the challenge of 
competing with their counterparts in the US. However, by rewarding those performing in English and 
coming from the rich Western and Northern European countries disproportionately, the EBBAs have 
projected an image that lacks both cultural and linguistic diversity, directly opposing some of the goals and 
values of the Union. The proposed changes might make a slight improvement to this image, but there is a 
good chance that the European prize for popular music will still suffer from some fatal flaws. 
  
                                                 
45 “Promotion of the Winners of the European Border Breakers Awards (EBBA) 2018,” 10 May 2017, 
https://ec.europa.eu/programmes/creative-europe/calls/promotion-winners-european-border-breakers-awards-2018_en. 
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EU’s Enforcement of  Solidarity: A Case Study of  the ‘Emergency 
Relocation Scheme’ during the European Migration Crisis 
Juliane Olliger 
1. Introduction  
The European Union (EU) is internationally respected for its unity grounded on shared philosophies and 
ideologies. The question where Europe is, is therefore often answered by referring to its belief system and 
aspiration. Europe is said to be where its core values hold and its goals are pursued.1 But what happens if 
some of those values are at danger? How can the EU persist if its member states drift apart ideologically? 
Solving this dilemma has always been one of the EU’s biggest challenges and until today no consensus exists 
on how to best promote a united thinking and acting of member states.   
One of the EU’s core values, which often causes controversy and is at the centre of the European debate 
on ideology is solidarity.2 As stated in the Treaty of Lisbon in Article 2.3 the EU is supposed to ‘promote 
economic, social and territorial cohesion, and solidarity among Member States’.3 Yet, here solidarity is a 
rather vague construct and not clearly defined. While in the past, solidarity meant a sentiment of unity and 
team spirit, it nowadays means active sharing of responsibility and solidary performance of member states.4  
What this means in reality is often difficult to grasp, especially in moments of crisis. During European 
crisis member state solidarity is weak and national interest seem to predominate. The question of how to 
promote solidarity arises at that point quickly and until today the EU has not found a solution for this. 
In the case of one of the biggest European crisis of the last years – the migration crisis in 2015 – the EU 
nonetheless took clear action to respond to the lack of solidarity between member states. President of the 
European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker stated in September 2016 that the EU needed to stick to its 
values and should ‘answer the migration crisis with solidarity and the heart’.5 Because this vocal plea for 
more solidarity and the sharing of responsibility was not prosperous, the EU adapted another approach to 
ensure a fair and equal allocation of refugees across all its member states. Enforcement of solidarity became 
the new strategy. Amidst criticism and strong resistance from especially eastern European countries, the EU 
began to adapt different political and legal mechanisms, forcing its member states to act in solidarity and 
share responsibility over the incoming refugees.  
In the case of the European relocation-system this enforcement of solidarity meant the fair relocation of 
refugees from Greece and Italy to other EU member states, which were capable of processing their asylum 
requests.6 As this case has exemplary character it is the focus of this research, and solidarity is therefore 
defined and measured as the number of accepted relocations. 
The political mechanisms to enforce this accepting of relocations or so called solidarity was the creation of 
an ‘emergency relocation scheme’ in September 2015.7 This provisional measure was supposed to take off 
pressure of Greece and Italy by ensuring the relocation of 160 000 of refugees residing on their soil to other 
EU member states. A relocation quota was created, which calculated the number of refugees every member 
state would have to accept over a period of two years. Even if those obligations were not included in the 
                                                 
1 Mosaiikki Ry, “European Parliament in Plain Language – Values,” Mosaiikki Ry – Information campaign of the European 
Parliament, 2018, https://europarlamentti.info/en/values-and-objectives/values/. 
2 European Union, “Goals and Values of the EU,” European Union, 2018,  
https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/eu-in-brief_en#goals-and-values-of-the-eu. 
3 Official Journal of the European Union, “Treaty of Lisbon (2007/C 306/01) – Article 2,” Official Journal of the European Union 50 
(2007), 1. 
4 Alexandra Pimor, “Solidarity Was a Founding Principle of the European Unity – It Must Remain So,” The Conversation, 24 March 
2017, 
 http://theconversation.com/solidarity-was-a-founding-principle-of european-unity-it-must-remain-so-74580. 
5 Aleksandra Eriksson, “Learn to Love Migrant Quotas, Juncker Tells Eastern EU,” Euobserver, 28 September 2016, 
https://euobserver.com/migration/135257. 
6 Official Journal of the European Union, “Council Decision (EU) 2015/1601,” Official Journal of the European Union 248 (2015), 80. 
7 Ibid., 1. 
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EU’s original migration policy – the Dublin III Regulations8 – they became legally binding after a majority 
vote on Council Regulations (EU) 2015/1601 9 and (EU) 2015/1523.10 EU countries were therefore 
obligated to follow the ‘emergency relocation scheme’, which is why this research understands it as the first 
mechanism to enforce solidarity. 
Because this political solidarity-enforcement-mechanism was not as prosperous as hoped and member states 
resisted to obey it, legal mechanisms to enforce the relocation quota were introduced. In September and 
December 2017 the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) proved the validity of the ‘emergency 
relocation scheme’ by rejecting the claim of the joint case C-643/15 and C-647/1511 and adopting a new 
law case against resisting member states.12 More specifically, the CJEU rejected Slovakia and Hungary’s 
claim that the ‘emergency relocation scheme’ should be annulled due to its lack of a legal basis, procedural 
errors and inappropriate objectives. The CJEU referred hereby to articles 12.2, 68 and 78.2 & 3 of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights on the EU,13 which 
allow provisional emergency mechanisms in times of extreme crisis. In the newly adapted law case the 
European Council sued the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland directly, for not following their obligations 
stemming from the ‘emergency relocation scheme’.14 Even though the ruling in this case is expected only 
in summer 2020, it still exemplifies the European Council’s hard stance in this debate and makes the 
mentioned court cases legal solidarity-enforcement-mechanisms.  
However, the effectiveness of enforcing solidary acceptance of refugee relocations in different EU 
member states remains questioned. Especially legal enforcing of solidarity sounds contradictory, and scholars 
disagree if punishment can enhance compliance.15 Still, as sustaining the European core value of solidarity is 
crucial in international politics, this research focuses on exactly this and tries to deepen the knowledge on 
mechanisms of solidarity enforcement. To this end, political and legal solidarity-enforcement-mechanisms will 
be analysed for their effectiveness. Consequently, this paper asks: did the EU’s political and legal 
enforcement of solidarity increase its member states’ acceptance of refugee relocations? 
Different hypotheses to this question are possible. The socio-psychological theory of ‘Forced 
Compliance’16 assumes that forcing an individual to do a disliked task will lead to the individual’s change of 
beliefs to prevent cognitive dissonance. Hence, threat and legal pressure could be effective to promote 
policy compliance and relocation solidarity. Etzioni’s ‘Compliance Theory’17 disagrees with this and suggests 
that compliance is closely linked to different forms of involvement, which have different consequences. His 
theory leads to the hypothesis that threat – such as legal pressure – cannot force moral involvement and 
would therefore be inefficient in promoting relocation solidarity. Whether one of these theories holds in the 
case of the ‘emergency relocation scheme’, or if another theoretical explanation must be considered, will be 
discussed at the end of this research.  
                                                 
8 Official Journal of the European Union, “Dublin III Regulations (Regulation No. 604/2013),” 
Official Journal of the European Union 180 (2013), 31. 
9 Official Journal of the European Union, “Council Decision (EU) 2015/1601”, 1. 
10 Official Journal of the European Union, “Council Decision (EU) 2015/1523,” Official Journal of the European Union 239 (2015), 146. 
11 Court of Justice of the European Union, “Judgement in Joint Cases C-643/15 and C-647/15 Slovakia and 
Hungary v Council,” Court of Justice of the European Union, Press Release no. 91/17, 2017. 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=193230&doclang=EN. 
12 European Commission, “Relocation: Commission Refers the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to the Court 
of Justice,” European Commission, Press Release, 7 December 2017.  
13 European Council on Refugees and Exiles, “CJEU - Joined Cases C-643/15 and C-647/15 Slovak Republic and Hungary v 
Council of the European Union, 6 September 2017,” EDAL-European Database of Asylum, 2017. 
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14 European Commission, “Relocation: Commission Refers the Czech Republic.” 
15 Fred C. Lunenburg, “Compliance Theory and Organizational Effectiveness,” International Journal of Scholarly 
Academic Intellectual Diversity 14, no. 1 (2012), 1-4.; Fabien Girandola, “Double Forced Compliance and Cognitive 
Dissonance Theory,” The Journal of Social Psychology 137 (2010), 594-605. 
16 Girandola, “Double Forced Compliance.” 
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2. Background 
2.1. Legal Basis for European Solidarity  
European solidarity is a rather complex construct, due to the diversity of EU member states, the scope of 
European issues and continuously changing political, economic and social circumstances. Solidarity as a 
European core value is already mentioned in the Treaty of Lisbon - the EU’s constitutional basis - in article 
2.3. Here the treaty states that the EU ‘shall promote economic, social and territorial cohesion, and solidarity 
among Member States’.18 This clause consequently calls for a support system of EU member states and 
specifies different situations, in which this support should hold. Article 3a.3 of the Treaty of Lisbon further 
states that  
‘[p]ursuant to the principle of sincere cooperation, the Union and the Member States shall, in 
full mutual respect, assist each other in carrying out tasks which flow from the Treaties. The 
Member States shall take any appropriate measure, general or particular, to ensure fulfilment 
of the obligations arising out of the Treaties or resulting from the acts of the institutions of 
the Union.’19  
This clause expands the call for solidarity in different fields to the actual obligation of solidary action such as 
cooperation and assistance. The concept of European solidarity is clearly explained and described as a 
commitment to action and not a voluntary option. 
In the context of migration and the refugee crisis, solidarity of European member states is defined in an 
even more straight-forward way. Even though in this context the obligation for solidarity is widely discussed, 
the EU took a clear position on this matter. In the section ‘Policies and Border Checks, asylum and 
immigration’ of the Treaty of Lisbon the need for solidarity and shared support between EU member states 
is clearly described as an obligation. As direct as in no other section of the treaty, article 63b states that   
‘[t]he policies of the Union set out in this Chapter and their implementation shall be governed 
by the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility, including its financial 
implications, between the Member States. Whenever necessary, the Union acts adopted 
pursuant to this Chapter shall contain appropriate measures to give effect to this principle.’20  
2.2. Theories on Solidarity  
Official definitions of solidarity are, however, rather vague. The Cambridge Dictionary defines solidarity as an 
‘agreement between and support for the members of a group’, while the Law Dictionary defines solidarity as 
‘a term given to the situation where a group of people will band together for the performance of a contract’. 
Reoccurring in all definitions is the idea that solidarity is based on some kind of shared belief system and 
expresses itself in reciprocal support and performance of a group. 
Attempting to explain political solidarity in the context of globalization, Habermas proposes the idea of 
cosmopolitan solidarity.21 For him this solidarity is an attempt to fill “solidaric” and “integrative gaps”, created 
by globalization and internationalization of different groups. According to Habermas, this solidarity requires 
a moral and legal understanding of the situation. Ferguson adds to this the need for ethical solidarity as a way 
to fully close the gaps of globalization and make cosmopolitan solidarity work.22 Interesting within this 
context is Gesthuizen, Savelkoul and Scheeper’s research on in-group solidarity and its characteristics.23 
Besides finding that education had a positive effect on solidarity, they found that ethnic diversity did not 
weaken, nor strengthen the solidarity within a group, as was assumed beforehand. This could be especially 
important when looking at solidarity in a multicultural society, such as the EU, which is often criticized for 
being too complex and diverse for true solidarity.  
                                                 
18 Official Journal of the European Union, “Treaty of Lisbon (2007/C 306/01) – Article 2”, 1.  
19 Official Journal of the European Union, “Treaty of Lisbon (2007/C 306/01) – Article 3a,” Official Journal of the 
European Union 50 (2007), 1. 
20 Official Journal of the European Union, “Treaty of Lisbon (2007/C 306/01) – Article 63b.” Official Journal of the 
European Union 50 (2007), 1. 
21 Jason Todd Ferguson, “Cosmopolitan Solidarity: Social-Political Integration in the Era of Globalization,” (PhD Dissertation, 
Purdue University, 2004). 
22 Ibid. 
23 Maurice Gesthuizen, Michael Savelkoul and Peer Scheepers, “Ethnic Diversity and Dimensions of In-Group Solidarity,” in 
Social Conflict within and between Groups, ed. Carsten K.W. de Dreu (New York: Psychology Press, 2014), 75. 
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2.3. Theories on the Promotion of Solidarity  
Creating solidarity between different parties is nonetheless a difficult task, which concerned mankind for 
decades. Confucius already argued that a ‘harmonious society’24 is led by virtue and the emperors longing 
for perfection but could not be forced by punishment. The idea of forcing a group into a feeling of 
belonging, solidarity and sharing of responsibility would therefore only work naturally. Durkheim’s theory 
on the creation of solidarity is somehow similar to this, but differentiates between two different forms of 
solidarity.25 Durkheim describes mechanical solidarity as a form of solidarity based on similarities and 
ideologies, which was common in past times such as the time of industrialisation. For him this form of 
solidarity is functioning and will lead to successful group achievements. Durkheim’s organic solidarity is on 
the other hand described as a modern form of solidarity, based on interdependence of group members. 
According to Durkheim this solidarity works only partly and can create conflict. Hence, not only the 
existence of solidarity, but also the form of solidarity between different EU member states seems to be 
important when looking at the bigger picture of solidarity enforcement.  
Diverse theories on compliance give further input to this discussion. As suggested by ‘Forced Compliance 
Theory,’26 compliance is closely linked to beliefs and values. In the case of forced compliance and fulfilment 
of a disliked task – such as the acceptance of refugee relocations – this fulfilment will automatically lead to 
a change of beliefs and values. ‘Cognitive Dissonance Theory’27 – a related construct – explains this with 
the human preference to keep beliefs about an action and the action itself consistent. Hence, if the action 
is unavoidable the beliefs about the action will change in favour of it, to justify its performance. This theory 
therefore implies that legal forcing to accept refugee relocations, will create positive beliefs about those 
relocations to avoid disagreements between beliefs and actions. Etzioni’s understanding of compliance and 
its characteristics is vastly different to this.28 Etzioni suggests that different types of compliance exist – 
which each lead to different forms of involvement. Coercive or forced compliance would hereby lead to 
‘alienative involvement’ and reactions of hostility, utilitarian compliance to ‘calculated involvement’ with regard 
to cost and benefits and normative compliance to a deep ‘moral involvement’. For Etzioni different forms of 
compliance can be combined, but forcing and the use of coercive compliance would hinder the development 
of moral involvement. Hence, in his opinion the approach to enforce solidarity through legal mechanisms 
would be ineffective and would not strengthen solidarity but rather create hostility.  
Enforcing solidary compliance of national states to international regulations is an especially tricky and 
multidimensional task. European member state solidarity during the migration crisis is, for example, 
assumed to be closely connected to media and national propaganda. Countries, in which governing parties 
sympathize publicly with populist movements, such as Hungary or Poland, seem to be less interested in 
sharing responsibility for refugees and solidarity with other EU member states.29 While Duven explains this 
with his theory of a solidarity created by propaganda,30 John Berry from Queen’s University, suggests that 
public policy making plays a major role in creating solidarity in such a context.31 Policymaking and societies’ 
goodwill would foster integration and shape the political landscape of a country, which according to Berry 
serves the establishment of a social solidarity best.  
The variety of theories on solidarity itself and ways of promoting it explains why this research is of such 
crucial importance. Until today no consensus exists on how to enforce an important European value, such 
as solidarity. This research helps to understand mechanisms that might solve this conundrum.  
                                                 
24 Gordon Sammut and Alex Gillespie, “Editorial: Cultural Encounters and Social Solidarity,” Papers on Social Representations 20 
(2011), 1.1. 
25 Emile Durkheim, “Social Solidarity,” Social Theory Re-wired (Routledge), 2016, http://routledgesoc.com/category/profile-
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26 Girandola, “Double Forced Compliance,” 2. 
27 Ibid. 
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29 Steven Erlanger, “In Eastern Europe, Populism Lives, Widening a Split in the E.U,” The New York Times, 28 
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Olliger 97 
3. Method  
3.1. Type of Analysis  
This research focuses on the EU’s approach to enforce solidarity during the refugee crisis, in the case of the 
‘emergency relocation scheme’. More precisely, it asks whether the EU’s political and legal enforcement of 
solidarity increased its member states’ acceptance of refugee relocations. The acceptance of relocations will 
be hereby understood as member state solidarity. The mentioned definitions of solidarity in the Treaty of 
Lisbon32 serve as a basis here for. Analysis of collected statistics on relocations and results from an extensive 
literature review are used to conclude and answer the research question.  
3.2. Operationalisation of Variables 
In the case of the ‘emergency relocation scheme’ the EU’s mechanisms of enforcing solidarity were of 
political and legal nature. Political enforcement of solidarity was the creation of the ‘emergency relocation 
scheme’ through EU Council Decisions (EU) 2015/152333 and (EU) 2015/2691.34 Those decisions were 
meant to benefit Greece and Italy and stipulated a relocation of 160 000 asylum seekers. The decisions were 
officially adapted after a majority vote in September 2015 and were set to be binding, even for the four 
countries – the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia – that voted against the decision.35 The 
relocation scheme was set to be in practice for two years until September 2017.  
The legal mechanisms of enforcing solidarity were two lawsuits of the European Council against diverse 
EU member states. The EU member states which were directly involved in those lawsuits – the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia – form the focus of this analysis. The reason Romania is not part 
of the further analysis, besides voting against the emergency relocation scheme, is that it was not directly 
affected by the legal mechanism of enforcing solidarity. Including it in this analysis would  bias the results. 
Hence, only the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia are analysed independently to give a clearer 
picture of their behaviour before and after the solidary enforcement. The first lawsuit was the joint case of 
Slovakia and Hungary against the European Council (C-634/15).36 During this case Slovakia and Hungary 
sued the European Council for wrongly enforcing the ‘emergency relocation scheme’. The CJEU rejected 
this claim in September 2017 and therewith strengthened the legal validity of the EU’s relocation policy. 
The second court case is the ongoing case of the European Council against the Czech Republic, Poland and 
Hungary.37 In this law suit the European Council sued member states that did not follow their obligations 
of the relocation quota. Even though the CJEU has not ruled yet, this lawsuit increases the legal pressure 
on all member states opposing the ‘relocation policies’ and is therefore an important instrument to obtain 
member state solidarity. In summary, political and legal solidarity enforcements are the independent variables of 
this study, whose variations are expected to influence the measured variable.  
The measured variable is, as mentioned, member state solidarity or so-called acceptance of refugee relocations. The 
consequences of political and legal solidarity enforcement are being analysed as exact as possible. Taking 
the difficulty of measuring their long-term effects into account, their time frame of measurement is clearly 
defined during the research to compare the two constructs directly.  The number of accepted relocations 
during the time of the political-solidarity-enforcement – from September 2015 to September 2017 – 
constitutes politically enforced solidarity. The number of accepted relocations during the legal-solidarity-
enforcement – from September 2017 to April 2018 – constitutes legally enforced solidarity.  
3.3. Method of Analysis 
To compare and measure the dependent variable of solidarity, data on refugee relocations was collected. To 
this end, official press-releases of the European Commission were consulted.  The gathered data was sorted 
and arranged in different tables, stating the number of relocations per country (Appendix A, Table 1) the 
proportions of required and accepted relocations (Appendix A, Table 2) and the monthly number of 
relocations of four specifically chosen countries (Appendix A, Table 3). When analysing the general situation 
                                                 
32 Official Journal of the European Union, “Treaty of Lisbon (2007/C306/01),” 1. 
33 Official Journal of the European Union, “Council Decision (EU) 2015/1523,” 2. 
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35 European Council on Refugees and Exiles, “CJEU - Joined Cases C-643/15 and C-647/15 Slovak Republic and Hungary v. 
Council of the European Union,” 6 September 2017, 2. 
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of accepted relocations in relation to required relocations, acceptance-rates per country, month and on average were 
compared. The rates were divided in rates during political-solidarity-enforcement and legal-solidarity-
enforcement. A bar-graph of the general trend and the acceptance rates was created (Figure 1).   
The four countries which were directly affected by the legal solidary enforcement – the CJEU lawsuits 
– were analysed with especial caution. The Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia were seen as 
examples of resisting member states and were analysed and explained independently. While analysing them, 
their acceptance rates per country, month and on average were compared with regard to political and legal 
solidarity enforcement. Additionally, pie-charts of their acceptance proportions were created (Figure 2) and 
data on their monthly acceptance of refugee relocations was taken into account.  
4. Results  
4.1. General Situation of Relocations  
In general, results show that during the period of political-solidarity-enforcement (September 2015 – September 
2017) more refugee relocations were accepted than during the period of legal solidarity enforcement (September 
2017 – April 2018) (Appendix A, Table 1). 
During the political-solidarity-enforcement countries accepted on average 59.24 % of the required 
relocations, while during the legal-solidarity-enforcement on average only 10.03 % of required relocations 
were accepted (Appendix A, Table 2). The monthly acceptance-rates showed similar results. During the 
political-solidarity-enforcement a monthly average acceptance-rate of 2.47 % of the required relocations was 
found (Appendix A, Table 2). During the legal-solidarity-enforcement a monthly acceptance-rate of only 1.43 
% was found (Appendix A, Table 2). Thus, the relocations during the legal-solidarity-enforcement were only 57.89 
% of the relocations during the political-solidarity-enforcement, and led to an average of 1.04 % less accepted 













Figure 1: Number of required and accepted relocations per country   
Discrepancies between the acceptance-rates of relocations in different countries were found to be 
enormous. Some countries outnumbered their requirements of relocations, while others barely fulfilled 
them. Finland (153.97 %), Latvia (184.7 %), Luxembourg (231.65 %), Malta (236.62 %) and Sweden (127.16 
%) received more relocations than they were required to and had an average acceptance-rate of over 100 % 
in April 2018 (Appendix A, Table 2). At the same time Austria (2.2 %), Bulgaria (5.87 %), the Czech Republic 
(0.75 %), Hungary (0 %), Poland (0 %) and Slovakia (2 %) received less than 10 % of their required 
relocations (Appendix A, Table 2). Figure 1 illustrates these large discrepancies. The bar-graph shows the 
countries differences between the required and accepted relocations in September 2017 and April 2018. 
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4.2. Relocation Situation in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia 
The analyses of the countries, which were directly involved in the legal procedures showed similar patterns 
of relocation acceptances. All countries accepted only little to no relocations during the period of political-
solidarity-enforcement (September 2015 – September 2017) and did not increase their relocations during the 
period of legal-solidarity-enforcement (September 2017 to April 2018) (Appendix A, Table 1). 
Slovakia accepted 3 refugee relocations between August and September of 2016, 6 more relocations 
between November and December of 2016 and 7 more relocations between March and April of 2017 
(Appendix A, Table 3). This total of 16 accepted relocations makes a relocation acceptance-rate of 2 % during 
the political-solidarity-enforcement and 0 % during the legal-solidarity-enforcement (Appendix A, Table 1 & 2). The 
Czech Republic accepted 12 refugee relocations between March and April of 2017 (Appendix A, Table 3). 
This is a relocation acceptance-rate of 0.75 % during the political-solidarity-enforcement and 0 % during the legal-
solidarity-enforcement (Appendix A, Table 1, 2). Hungary accepted no refugee relocations at all (Appendix A, Table 
3). Hence, its relocation acceptance-rate is 0 % for the time of political and legal solidarity-enforcement (Appendix 
A, Table 2). Similarly, Poland accepted no refugee relocations (Appendix A, Table 3). Its relocation 









Figure 2: Proportions of the accepted missing relocations compared to the required in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and       
Slovakia 
Figure 2 visualises those proportions. The pie-charts show what percentage of the required relocations was 
accepted until September 2017 and from September 2017 to August 2018, and what percentage is still 
missing. It can be seen that neither the political-solidarity-enforcement until September 2017, nor the legal-solidarity-
enforcement until April 2018 had a significant impact and all four countries are still missing an enormous 
amount of accepted relocations. 
5. Discussion 
The research question – did the EU’s political and legal enforcement of solidarity increase its member states 
acceptance of refugee relocations? – can be answered by the two major findings of this study. First the 
research showed that political-solidarity-enforcement led to an increase of refugee relocations in countries, 
which were predisposed for this. Second it showed that legal-solidarity-enforcement within those member 
states that resisted was ineffective. 
Undecided and supportive countries were receptive to political mechanisms of enforcing acceptance of 
relocations and kept this solidary behaviour even after the termination of binding Council Regulations (EU) 
2015/1601 and (EU) 2015/1523. Whether ensuing legal solidarity enforcements had an influence on this 
cannot be answered. Critical countries were however not receptive to both political and legal solidarity-
enforcement, as shown with the example of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. Even if 
those countries were the direct target of the legal enforcement mechanisms, they did not give up their 
resistance and did not accept any significant refugee relocations until today. 
While those findings failed to confirm the ‘Forced Compliance Theory’, which hypothesized a 
functioning of solidarity-enforcement – political and legal – they could provide evidence for the hypothesis 
based on Etzioni’s ‘Theory of Compliance’. Etzioni’s theory posits that different forms of compliance are 
 Czech Republic        Hungary                        Poland                            Slovakia 
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related to different forms of involvement. For him, enforcement using threats of punishment – such as legal 
enforcement – leads to coercive compliance, which is closely linked to hostility. Only if the punishment is 
consistent and worse than the costs of obeying the disliked policy, this form of enforcement works. As the 
EU’s punishment of the member states disobeying the ‘emergency relocation scheme’ is still unclear, this 
could explain why critical member states resist and respond with hostility instead of solidarity. Etzioni’s normative 
compliance, a form of compliance based on strong moral involvement and with long-lasting commitment 
could further explain the solidarity of undecided and supporting countries. As forcing coercive compliance 
hinders the development of this moral and long-lasting form of involvement, the ineffectiveness of legal-
solidarity-enforcements within resistant countries could be explained further. Panke adds to this idea that 
the effectiveness of the Court of Justice of the European Union is not only dependent on compliance 
instruments but also on the characteristics of the discussed issue, the scope of the problem, and the fit of 
domestic ideas.38 Hence, the conditions surrounding the situation of solidarity enforcement and refugee 
relocations are strongly influential as well.  
According to Durkheim the existing form of solidarity is hereby of big importance. 39 He explains the 
different effects enforcement had on undecided, supportive or critical countries, with differences between 
prosperous mechanic and fluctuating organic solidarity. For him those different forms of solidarity have different 
consequences and are based on different assumptions. To understand this, it has to be recalled that the EU 
is not a fixed construct and is based on different constructs – on ideologies such as responsibility for 
refugees40 – or on interdependence of member states in issues such as freedom of movement or security.41 
As different member states favour different aspects of those basic assumptions, their prioritizing of 
importance can vary. This means that especially in times of a crisis, member states focus on different aspects 
and have different motives to engage in European issues. Member states which are supporting the 
‘emergency relocation scheme’ are hereby likely to do so based on their shared values and feeling of being 
responsible. According to Durkheim this means that their solidarity is mechanic, which explains why enforcing 
their solidarity is more effective.  Etzioni’s moral involvement comes really close to this construct of mechanic 
solidarity and thereby gives rather support for the idea of a strong solidarity based on beliefs, similarities and 
morals. Member states that oppose the ‘emergency relocation scheme’ are however lacking this similar 
ideology and are connected to the EU through their international interdependence and its consequences. 
An example is the interdependence of EU member states during the mobilization of refugees from south 
to north Europe. Hungary, for instance, claimed that Germany’s ‘welcoming culture’ created a massive 
migrant movement through Hungarian territory, which influenced Hungary’s every-day-life dramatically.42 
According to Durkheim, this feeling of solidarity is more organic and prone to create conflicts. 43 This could 
explain why solidarity enforcement techniques were not successful for those member states that viewed the 
refugee relocation from an interdependent but not moral perspective. 
The mentioned idea of Berry can also be brought in line with the research findings and concepts of 
coercive compliance and mechanic solidarity. Berry's theory that policy-making and sufficient goodwill of the society 
are able to promote solidarity gives evidence for the found effectiveness of political-solidarity-enforcement.44 
Coercive compliance and the results of the ineffectiveness of legal-solidarity-enforcement could additionally be 
explained by the rather old, but still popular philosophy of Confucius. As mentioned, this philosophy states 
that the use of pressure and punishment is ineffective in forcing people and achieving long term results. 45 
Besides the question of the effectiveness of solidarity enforcement, the question of its consequences is 
important. Enforcing solidarity in member states that are indecisive or even supportive of the promoted 
ideologies can work, but enforcing solidarity in resistant member states can be dangerous. Looking at the 
current political situation within the EU, it can be asked if the European migration policy and the attempt 
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to enforce it might have had more negative consequences than positive ones. Hungarian Prime Minister 
Viktor Orbán has already declared that his country will continue to resist following the EU’s ‘emergency 
relocation scheme’ and fight the CJEU’s ruling.46 Media further talks of a rise of nationalism in Hungary 
and Poland47 and national interests seem to overweight the calls for European solidarity and union during 
the migration crisis. Even if those phenomena are certainly not only caused by the EU’s political or legal 
solidarity-enforcement, they might influence the conflict and push resistance and the feeling of unfairness 
even further. Duven’s idea that propaganda binds members together can therefore also be understood from 
a different perspective.48 Propaganda does not necessarily need to promote solidarity but can also promote 
the opposite of solidarity. If propaganda, as in the case of Hungary and Poland, is refusing the sharing of 
responsibility and emphasises the need of independence this weakens the idea of solidarity, especially when 
propaganda can make use of allegedly unjust court rulings.  
Lastly, the large discrepancies among relocation acceptance rates of single member states should not be 
forgotten when concluding about the effectiveness of political or legal solidarity-enforcement. Even though 
it was expected that countries supporting the EU migration policy such as Belgium, Germany, Greece, 
France, Italy, Luxembourg and Sweden would follow their relocation obligations more diligently than 
opposing countries, the observed extreme differences were not expected.49 The phenomenon of acceptance 
rates of over 100 % and under 10 % across EU member states started a debate about the functioning and 
fairness of the ‘emergency relocation scheme’. In light of those drastic differences some of the statements 
of the European Commission should be reviewed and seen with caution. Statements such as the 
announcement of EU Migration Commissioner Avramopoulos should leave one – especially after looking 
at this research’s findings – thoughtful: ‘With the EU relocation scheme successfully coming to an end, we 
have made enormous progress on relocation over the past two years. This shows that responsibility can be 
successfully shared within the EU.’50 
6. Strengths and Limitations 
6.1. Strengths 
A major strength of this study is its big data-set and its analysis of almost all EU member states, involved in 
the EU ‘emergency relocation scheme’. Data of refugee relocations of 23 countries over a period of 2,5 
years was collected and compared, which allows a good understanding of the general situation. 
Another advantage of this study is its use of two different forms of solidarity enforcement. Even if they 
are influencing each other, as a successful political-solidarity-enforcement makes legal-solidarity-enforcement less 
necessary, this gives a clear picture of the different effects and consequences of both mechanisms separately. 
6.2. Limitations 
The most important limitation of this research is its inability to generalise. As this study focused on a case 
study of one specific ‘emergency scheme’ during one specific crisis, this is not fully generalisable to other 
situations. The background of a crisis, countries differing interests and the changing international politics 
are always influential and make other situations not comparable. Additionally, it is a drawback that this 
research focused only on the quantitative perspective of solidarity – namely its numbers or relocations. 
Evaluating the effectiveness of every policy is however only possible if also qualitative aspects are accounted 
for. Future research could therefore focus on treatment of refugees or the organisation of the relocation 
process and thereby add important value to this study’s findings.  
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7. Conclusion  
This research adds crucial understanding to the EU’s approach to promote – or enforce – a key value, such 
as member state solidarity, in times of crisis. The major findings are that political forcing of undecided or 
supporting member states was effective in increasing the acceptance of relocations, but legal forcing of the 
remaining resisting member states was ineffective. Hence, for undecided and supporting countries political-
solidarity-enforcement worked, while for resisting countries neither political, nor legal solidarity-enforcement had an 
effect.  
Even if those findings are not generalisable to other European values or crisis, they still have important 
implications. First, they exemplify how complex the concept of European solidarity is and that enforcing it 
is not as straightforward as hoped for. Different types of solidarity – mechanic and organic - seem to exist and 
member states have different motivations to prioritise one over the other.51 Enforcement of member state-
solidarity therefore only functions to a certain extent and does not change the resistance of critical countries. 
Second, they show how torn apart EU member states are when it comes to refugee policies. Different states 
have different approaches to solve the migration crisis and the EU’s attempt to promote a unified attitude 
is not easy. Lastly the findings show how important shared values, such as solidarity, are with regard to the 
functioning of the European Union. As Etzioni’s ‘Compliance Theory’ suggests, are shared values and 
morals more effective in creating compliance than pressure and cost-benefit calculations. Political and legal 
pressure alone seem inefficient. This finding is especially important when coming back to the question 
‘Where is Europe?’. If Europe is where its values hold – what happens if values are not shared anymore and 
enforcing them fails? Questions like that need to be asked and answered to ensure Europe’s unity even in 
times of crisis.   
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9. Annex: Data of the number of refugee relocations  
Table 1: Number of refugee relocations per country52 
 
Country Required  





All accepted Relocations 
in April 2018 
Austria 1953 15 43 
Belgium 2448 936 1171 
Bulgaria 852 50  60 
Croatia 568 78 82 
Cyprus 147 130 143 
Czech Republic 1591 12 12 
Estonia 199 141 147 
Finland 1286 1951 1980 
France 12962 4278 5029 
Germany 17036 7852 10825 
Hungary 1294 0 0 
Latvia 281 321 328 
Lithuania 416 382 384 
Luxembourg 237 382 549 
Malta 71 148 168 
Netherlands 3900 2357 2775 
Poland 5082 0 0 
Portugal 1642 1415 1548 
Romania 2475 727 728 
Slovakia 802 16 16 
Slovenia 337 217 253 
Spain 8023 1257 1359 
Sweden 2397 1903 3048 
 
  
                                                 
52 European Commission, “State of Play – Relocation En,” European Commission, 30 April 2018, https://ec.europa.eu/home-
affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/press-material/docs/state_of_play_-




Journal of the European Union, “Council Decision (EU) 2015/1601,” Official Journal of the European Union 
248 (2015), 80-94. 
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Table 2: Proportions of the accepted relocations in relation to the required relocations, per country 
 
Country  Percentage of accepted 
relocations from September 2015 
to September 2017 
 %                        %  per month 
Percentage of newly accepted 
relocations from September 2017 
to April 2018 
 %                            %  per month 
Austria 0.77 0.03 1.43 0.20 
Belgium 38.24 1.59 9.59 1.37 
Bulgaria 5.87 0.24 1.17 0.17 
Croatia 13.73 0.57 0.7 0.1 
Cyprus 88.44 3.69 8.84 1.26 
Czech Republic 0.75 0.03 0 0 
Estonia 70.85 2.95 3.02 0.43 
Finland 151.71 6.32 2.26 0.32 
France 33.00 1.38 5.8 0.82 
Germany 46.09 1.92 17.45 2.49 
Hungary 0 0 0 0 
Latvia 114.23 4.76 2.5 0.36 
Lithuania 91.83 3.83 0.48 0.07 
Luxembourg 161.18 6.72 70.47 10.07 
Malta 208.45 8.69 28.17 4.02 
Netherlands 60.44 2.52 10,71 1.53 
Poland 0 0 0 0 
Portugal 86.18 3.59 8.1 1.16 
Romania 29.37 1.22 0.4 0.06 
Slovakia 2.00 0.08 0 0 
Slovenia 64.39 2.68 10.68 1.53 
Spain 15.67 0.65 1.27 0.18 
Sweden 79.39 3.31 47.77 6.82 





Table 3: Number of accepted relocations in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia per months53 
 
Month/Year Czech Republic Hungary Poland Slovakia  
09/2015 0 0 0 0 
10/2015 0 0 0 0 
11/2015 0 0 0 0 
12/2015 0 0 0 0 
01/2016 0 0 0 0 
02/2016 0 0 0 0 
03/2016 0 0 0 0 
04/2016 0 0 0 0 
05/2016 0 0 0 0 
06/2016 0 0 0 0 
07/2016 0 0 0 0 
08/2016 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
09/2016 0 0 0 3 
10/2016 0 0 0 3 
11/2016 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
12/2016 0 0 0 9 
01/2017 0 0 0 9 
02/2017 0 0 0 9 
03/2017 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
04/2017 12 0 0 16 
05/2017 12 0 0 16 
06/2017 12 0 0 16 
07/2017 12 0 0 16 
08/2017 12 0 0 16 
09/2017 12 0 0 16 
10/2017 12 0 0 16 
11/2017 12 0 0 16 
12/2017 12 0 0 16 
01/2018 12 0 0 16 
02/2018 12 0 0 16 
03/2018 12 0 0 16 
04/2018 12 0 0 16 
*n.a.=  data not available 
                                                 
53 European Commission, “Relocation and Resettlement – Factsheets En,” Migration and Home Affairs, 
https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/background-information_en. 
  
The ‘Risk of  Inhuman and Degrading Treatment’ as a Reason to 
Limit the Principle of  Mutual Recognition on which the European 
Arrest Warrant is Built 
Giorgia Spolverato 
1. Introduction 
Europe is a place of safeguard for (European) citizens’ rights, especially their human rights, but today, many 
threats are undermining European solemn commitment to respect and protect these rights. In the current 
context of fear of terrorism and crime, the states of the European Union (EU) are willing to cooperate in 
order to better face such threats to public security.1  
The creation of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) at the end of the 1990s 2 aimed at 
replacing national practices in the field of justice with a more European approach; that is to say, based on 
cooperation among EU member states. The integration process so far witnessed the extension and the 
strengthening of pan-European principles and values, which represent Europe and bring it everywhere. 
They may have the dimension of a practice, a rule, a belief, a dream, a concept and so on, but Europe is 
there, encapsulated in every dimension of reality.  
If Europe is everywhere, one could certainly affirm that it is also in the cross-border cooperation against 
crime among the member states of the block. Europe is in the protection of prisoners’ right; even though 
every state has its own rules and laws on detention and detainees’ administration, European standards 
managed to break into the system.  
Following this premise, one could also sustain that through the institutionalisation of European 
international organisations, such as the European Union and the Council of Europe, European values are 
not only concepts, they are not only on paper anymore. Instead, they have acquired a concrete and spatial 
dimension, for instance in places of detention. And yet, all that glitters is not gold. Integration among EU 
member states led to the weakening of the protection of human rights, particularly as these have been 
overlooked in favour of the respect of some other fundamental principles of the EU, as in the case of the 
principle of mutual recognition. 
The aim of this paper is to explain the existing incompatibility between the principle of mutual 
recognition and the protection from the risk of inhuman and degrading treatment, both promoted by the 
European Union, when applying the European Arrest Warrant and how such incompatibility has been 
addressed.  
Mutual recognition is one of the ways in which integration and cooperation among member states is 
strengthened but sometimes it clashes with the EU’s commitment to the protection of its citizens’ human 
rights. A balance between the desire to maintain a powerful supranational entity, in which borders are not 
an obstacle in the fight against crime, and a real protection of human rights has to be found in the EU 
system in order to guarantee a long life of such a community based -inter alia- on the correct functioning of 
the cross-border cooperation and human rights’ protection. In other words, to be able to continue claiming 
safeguarding European citizens’ rights, the Union should reorder its practices and institutions.  
In the Tampere European Council conclusions of October 1999, EU member states were asked to 
replace the formal extradition procedure of the time,3 because it was considered too complex and subject 
to delays, with a simpler mechanism of persons’ transfer in respect of the principles set out in article 6 of 
                                                 
1 Jan Zielonka, “The Remaking of the EU’s Borders and the Images of European Architecture,” Journal of European Integration 39, 
no. 5 (2017), 643; Joanna Apap and Sergio Carrera, “Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters-European Arrest Warrant–A Good 
Testing Ground for Mutual Recognition in an Enlarged EU?," CEPS Policy Briefs, no. 46 (2004), 2. 
2 Art. 67(3) TFEU. The AFSJ was introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam (1999).  
3 The former extradition mechanism in the European Union was based on the European Convention on Extradition 1957 and 
Additional Protocol to the European Convention on Extradition 1975. 
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the TEU.4 In order to do so, the European Council promoted the role of the principle of mutual recognition 
as “the cornerstone of judicial co-operation in both civil and criminal matters.”5  
In the field of judicial cooperation, the principle of mutual recognition is based on the principle of mutual 
trust among EU member states and entails that “a decision taken by an authority in one member state may 
be accepted as it stands in another state.”6 The precept has been set forth in the Treaties, particularly in 
article 67 (3), (4) and article 82 (1) TFEU. In 1998, the UK presidency underlined the relevance of the 
principle of mutual recognition – one of the objectives of the AFSJ – in the cross-border fight against 
crime.7 
To answer the concerns of the Council related to cross-border cooperation among member states, in 
2001, the European Commission proposed the European Arrest Warrant (EAW) as a new tool for the 
regulation of the surrender procedure of convicts within EU territory.8 The EAW was approved by EU 
member states in less than three months and was finally adopted in 2002,9 following the anxiety generated 
by the attack on the Twin Towers and the necessity of ensuring the “free movement of judicial decision[s]” 
in pre-sentenced and final decision situations.10 The EAW entered into force officially on 1 January 2004.  
The EAW-Framework Decision (FD), due to its nature, did not need ratification by each member state 
but is legally binding for the 28 of them, with each member state having to adopt national measures to 
implement it.11 
2. Methodology 
As a result of the European Union Court of Justice’s (CJEU) judgment in the joined cases Aranyosi and 
Căldăraru,12 a scenario, in which the EAW-FD is amended in favour of the protection of human rights of 
felons, opened. Indeed, even though the CJEU remarked the importance of the principle of mutual 
recognition on which the EAW is built, it allowed EU member states – only under specific conditions – to 
refuse the surrender of a prisoner to another EU country where his/her fundamental rights might be 
jeopardised.  
In order to identify the conflict between mutual recognition and human rights’ protection arising from 
the implementation of the European Arrest Warrant, the meaning of the principle of mutual recognition 
and the origins of the EAW as a “new” tool for the cooperation among EU member states in criminal 
matters will be reconstructed. This will be followed by the analysis of the CJEU’s final judgment in the 
joined cases Aranyosi and Căldăraru and by a brief overview of previous positions adopted by the CJEU and 
by some of its Advocates General on the issue.   
To draw the theoretical framework and to give a legislative perspective to this paper, I perused primary 
sources from the European Union’s institutions, such as directives, reports, recommendations and 
                                                 
4 Tampere European Council, Presidency Conclusions, 15 and 16 October 1999, para. 35, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/tam_en.htm#c. 
5 Ibid., para. 33. The importance of the principle of mutual recognition and the harmonization of national laws in the Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice are also underlined by article 82 (1) TFEU.  
6 European Commission, “Commission Communication to the Council and the European Parliament - Mutual Recognition of 
Final Decisions in Criminal Matters COM/2000/0495 Final,” https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52000DC0495. 
7 Cardiff European Summit, Presidency Conclusions, 15 and 16 June 1998, SN 150/98, para. 39, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/car1_en.htm. 
8 European Commission, “Commission Proposal for a Council FD on the EAW and the surrender procedures between MSs,” 
COM/2001/522, http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2001/EN/1-2001-522-EN-F1-1.Pdf. 
9 Susie Alegre and Marisa Leaf, “Mutual Recognition in European Judicial Cooperation: A Step Too Far Too Soon? Case Study-
the European Arrest Warrant,” European Law Journal 10, no. 2 (2004), 202; JHA Council meeting on 6 and 7 December, “Council 
Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant and Surrender Procedures between Member States,” COPEN 79 CATS 
50, Brussels, 10 December 2001. 
10 In this respect see: Apap and Carrera, “Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters,” 3; Alegre and Leaf, “Mutual Recognition in 
European Judicial Cooperation,” 202; Massimo Fichera, “The European Arrest Warrant and the Sovereign State: A Marriage of 
Convenience?,” European Law Journal 15, no. 1 (2009), 72. On the urgency of cross-border measures to fight against terrorism: 
European Council, “Conclusions adopted by the Council (Justice and Home Affairs),” Brussels: European Union, SN 3926/6/01, 
REV 6, para. 2; “Conclusions and Plan for Action of the Extraordinary European Council Meeting,” SN 140/01, Council 
Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European Arrest Warrant and the Surrender Procedures between 
Member States, 2002 O.J. L190/1, preamble, recital 5, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32002F0584:en:HTML. 
11 Ibid., art. 34(1) and (2).  
12 Joined Cases C-404/15 and C-659/15 PPU, Pál Aranyosi and Robert Căldăraru, EU:C:2016:198. 
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resolutions from the European Commission, the European Parliament and the European Council. Case law 
of the CJEU has been taken into account as well, in order to clarify the different positions that the court 
took over time with regard to the clash between the principle of mutual recognition and the protection of 
human rights of detained persons.  
In addition, primary sources from another European international organisation, the Council of Europe 
(CoE), have been deeply examined because of the commitment to the protection of human rights of its 
bodies. Indeed, two of these – the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the European 
Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) – 
constantly advocate for the compliance with certain minimum standards in detention facilities across 
Europe. The ECtHR is the designated institution for the defence and supervision of the correct application 
of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR). The CPT, in turn, is the operative control body 
which visits some places of detention of CoE member states and produces ad hoc individual reports in 
addition to annual general reports. The documents of the CPT have been of great relevance to the current 
paper because they summarise and offer overviews on common problems identified across European states 
in relation to detention centres and compliance with European rules and standards. As for other sources 
from the CoE, the European Committee on Crime Problems’ “White Paper on Prison Overcrowding” has 
also largely contributed to drawing a general picture of detention conditions in states of the European block.  
The contribution of secondary sources to my paper was highly relevant as well: I found many essays and 
commentaries written by European law and human rights experts, who examine in depth the EAW-
Framework Decision and identify criticisms and uncertainties deriving from the measure itself. In addition, 
scholarly opinions gave me proper knowledge of the different doctrines existing around the topic of prisoner 
fundamental rights’ and allowed me to establish a position on this issue. Scholars’ contrasting visions about 
the introduction of a new ground of refusal of the EAW offered me the chance to compare benefits and 
drawbacks of the eventual choice of introducing a new ground of refusal of the EAW based on the detainee 
human rights’ protection.  
To provide a quantitative nuance to my paper, I have also benefitted from a questionnaire submitted by 
the EU Commission to EU member states, which shows trends related to the issue and the implementation 
of the EAW in 2015.13  
3. Data 
In spite of the fact that the EAW has been implemented for more than ten years, there are not too many 
statistics and data on its functioning; therefore, the creation of a database for collecting and analysing such 
data is highly suggested.14 
The European Commission is the responsible body for the gathering and the publication of quantitative 
information related to the use of the EAW by the EU member states; from the “Replies to questionnaire 
on quantitative information on the practical operation of the European arrest warrant” of 2015 emerges 
that in 2005 the total number of EAW issued was 6.894 and this grew markedly to 16.144 in 2015. In 2015, 
Poland accounted for the highest quantity of issued arrest warrants (2.390) followed by Denmark (2.237).15 
Conversely, in the same year, the lowest number of EAW was issued by Malta. Data refers to the year 2015 
because the Commission received the answer to the questionnaire by all of the 28 EU member states for 
the first time that year and because it is the last official report on the EAW available online. 
3.1. Grounds for Refusal of a European Arrest Warrant 
The EAW is the first and the most important measure in the field of European criminal law based on the 
principle of mutual recognition and it supposes a “high level of confidence between member states.”16 The 
tool has been defined by article 1(1) of the EAW-FD as a “judicial decision issued by a member state with 
a view to the arrest and surrender by another member state of a requested person, for the purposes of 
                                                 
13 See: Commission Staff Working Document, “Replies to Questionnaire on Quantitative Information on the Practical Operation 
of the European Arrest Warrant - Year 2015,” https://e-justice.europa.eu/content_european_arrest_warrant-90-en.do.  
14 Anne Weyembergh et al., “Critical Assessment of the Existing European Arrest Warrant Framework Decision Research Paper,” 
(Brussels: European Union, 2013), I-51. 
15 Commission Staff Working Document, “Replies to Questionnaire,” supra note 15. 
16 Fichera, “The European Arrest Warrant,” 71 and Evgenia Ralli, “The Principle of Mutual Recognition Based on Mutual Trust 
and the Respect for Fundamental Rights: The Case of the Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant,” European Law 
Institute (2017), 3.  
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conducting a criminal prosecution or executing a custodial sentence or detention order.”17 The issuing state 
can ask for the surrender of a convict for acts punishable according to its own domestic legislation for which 
it provides a maximum of at least one year in prison, or when the person has already been sentenced to a 
prison term of at least four months. The FD also provides a non-exhaustive list of crimes – such as 
terrorism, illicit trade in human organs and tissue, rape, forgery of means of payment, etc. – for which the 
request of the EAW should be pursued without the double criminality verification.18 
Even though judicial cooperation among EU member states is limited in case of “serious and persistent 
breach by a member state of the principles set out in Article 6(1) of the Treaty on European Union”,19 the 
EAW system has been largely criticised as being unable to protect fundamental rights efficiently.20 One of 
the main controversial issues that arise from the implementation of the new extradition tool is the conflict 
between the principle of mutual recognition, on which the EAW and the entire AFSJ is based, and the 
protection of individuals’ fundamental rights. Such a problem emerges because the FD lists the mandatory 
(article 3) and optional (article 4) grounds for which the executing state could refuse the implementation of 
a warrant, but it does not explicitly include the violation of fundamental rights as a ground for refusal. 
Although article 5 EAW-FD includes some conditions under which the execution of the warrant may be 
refused, none of these makes explicit reference to the protection of human rights as a reason to refuse the 
surrender. 
The FD negotiations resulted in the rather vague statement contained in article 1(3), which can be seen 
as a compromise between the principle of mutual recognition vis-à-vis human rights protection.21 The 
provision declares that the “Framework Decision shall not have the effect of modifying the obligation to 
respect fundamental rights and fundamental legal principles as enshrined in Article 6 of the Treaty on 
European Union.”22 To specify even more, article 6 TEU prescribes the obligation of the European Union 
to recognise and respect the “rights, freedoms and principles” contained in the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights (CFR).23 The same provision guarantees to the CFR the same legal value as the Treaties, that means 
that the entrance into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 and, above all, the insertion of this specific 
provision is intended to enhance the protection of fundamental rights in EU law.24 Following this path of 
a progressive higher relevance of human rights’ protection within the EU legal system, another step forward 
has been made by the EU legislator, especially for the safeguarding of the rights of defendants and victims.25 
It included, in the second part of article 6 TEU, the possibility for the Union to accede to the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Such a provision is supported 
by the so-called “clause of coherence”,26 whereby the scope of the rights contained in the CFR, which 
correspond to the ones guaranteed by the ECHR, “shall be the same as those laid down by the said 
Convention.”27 
                                                 
17 European Council, “Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European Arrest Warrant and the Surrender 
Procedures Between Member States,” (2002/584/JHA), article 1(1). 
18 2002/584/JHA, preamble, rec. 6, 10; art. 1(1), (2); art. 2(1), (2) and (3). For the argument that abandoning the double 
criminality verification could result in a situation in which the executing State must arrest and surrender an individual for conduct 
which is not an offence under its domestic law, please refer to Anne Pieter van der Mei, “The European Arrest Warrant System: 
Recent Developments in the Case Law of the Court of Justice,” Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 24, no. 6 (2017), 
896. For other offences, the verification that the act for which an individual is requested by the issuing state is “punishable” 
according to its own jurisdiction is a non-negotiable condition under which the EAW is permitted. 
19 2002/584/JHA, preamble, rec. 10.  
20 Van der Mei, “The European Arrest Warrant System,” 903. 
21 Elena E. Popa, “The Clash between Fundamental Rights, Mutual Recognition & Public Security. Recent Developments in the 
CJEU's Case Law in the Field of AFSJ,” BA Thesis. (The Hague: Haagse Hoogeschool, 2017), 27; Nina Marlene Schallmoser, 
“The European Arrest Warrant and Fundamental Rights: Risks of Violation of Fundamental Rights through the EU Framework 
Decision in Light of the ECHR,” European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 22, no. 2 (2014), 160. 
22 2002/584/JHA, art. 1 (3).  
23 European Union, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Adopted by the European Parliament, the Council of Ministers and 
the European Commission on 7 December 2000 and Entered into Force with the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/pdf/text_en.pdf. 
24 Theodore Konstadinides and Noreen O’Meara, “Rebalancing Judicial Protection in Criminal Matters after Lisbon and 
Stockholm,” in EU Security and Justice Law: After Lisbon and Stockholm, ed. D. A. Arcarazo and C. C. Murphy (Hart Publishing, 
2014), 17. 
25 Ibid., 2. 
26 Schallmoser, “The European Arrest Warrant and Fundamental Rights,” 139. 
27 CFR, art. 52 (3); Explanations relating to the charter of fundamental rights (2007/C 303/02) art. 52 (3).  
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4. Finding a Balance between Human Rights’ Protection and the EAW – the Joined Cases 
Aranyosi and Căldăraru 
In the midst of this context characterised by, on the one side, an always stronger necessity for safeguarding 
human rights and, on the other side, the need for quick and reliable cooperation among EU member states 
in the fight against crime, where can the EAW be placed? Are these two desires compatible?  
To answer this question, it is necessary to understand the opinion of the CJEU as the European 
institution dedicated to the interpretation of EU legislation and its compatibility with EU treaties.28 During 
the first cases in which the Court had to judge on the EAW-FD, it stated that a breach of individuals’ 
fundamental rights cannot be accepted as a justification for not implementing a European Arrest Warrant; 
thus, the EU member states are obliged to act according to the Framework Decision in order to fulfil the 
principle of mutual recognition. Therefore, only the appeal of the executing state on the grounds provided 
by articles 3 and 4 of the FD allows the non-execution of the warrant at stake.29  
The position of the CJEU has been contradicted by the European Parliament that expressed its concerns 
regarding the lack of an explicit ground for refusal of an arrest warrant when the human rights of the 
surrendered person are involved.30 
Only lately, the CJEU admitted the existence of “exceptional circumstances” in which the principle is 
not absolute and thus can be limited.31 According to what the Court stated in Opinion 2/13 on the Accession 
of the European Union to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, the principle of mutual recognition and the protection of human rights are two cornerstones of 
the European Union, so they must be balanced against each other according to the circumstances. 
Therefore, the Court recognises that mutual recognition must be restricted when it is not granted that 
European Union member states are complying with EU law and with fundamental rights recognised by EU 
law.  
The joined cases Aranyosi and Căldăraru (2016) compose the first case in which the CJEU had to cope 
directly with fundamental right violations during the implementation of the EAW.32 Mr. Aranyosi, a 
Hungarian national, was requested by Hungary for two counts of burglary.33 Because his location was 
unknown, the District Court of Miskolc issued an alert for Mr. Aranyosi in the Schengen Information 
System (SIS).34 He was arrested and put in pre-trial detention on 14 January 2015 in Bremen (Germany).35 
The Public Prosecutor of Bremen, worried about the detention conditions in Hungarian prisons which do 
not satisfy the minimum European standards,36 asked the Hungarian District Court (Miskolci járásbíróság) 
in which facility Mr. Aranyosi would be detained in case he was surrendered.37 Since that was still unknown, 
there was no proof that he would not have been subjected to torture or inhuman and degrading treatment; 
for this very reason, Aranyosi’s lawyer opposed the surrender request, stating that, since the Court of 
Miskolc had not specified the correctional facility, it would be impossible to verify that its conditions were 
respecting minimum European standards.38 The concerns of the lawyer did not come gratuitously; indeed, 
                                                 
28 The preliminary ruling is a procedure, regulated by article 267 of the TFEU, which enables National Courts to submit questions 
to the CJEU on the interpretation or validity of EU law, specific to a case in their vicinity. The main goal of the procedure is to 
promote a more uniform application of EU law in all member states. 
29 Case C-388/08 PPU, Leymann and Pustovarov, EU: C:2008:669, para. 51. 
30 European Parliament, “Parliament Report with Recommendations to the Commission on the review of the European Arrest 
Warrant 2013/2109(INL),” 28 January 2014, F(i), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
//EP//TEXT+REPORT+A7-2014-0039+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN.  
31 European Court of Justics, “Opinion 2/13 of the Court on the Accession of the European Union to the European Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,” EU:C:2014:2454, para 191. 
32 Koen Bovend’Eerdt, “The Joined Cases Aranyosi and Căldăraru: A New Limit to the Mutual Trust Presumption in the Area of 
Freedom, Security, and Justice?,” Utrecht Journal of International and European Law 32, no. 83 (2016), 113; Marta Muñoz de Morales 
Romero, “‘Dime Cómo Son Tus Cárceles y Ya Veré Yo Si Coopero’. Los Casos Căldăraru y Aranyosi Como Nueva Forma de 
Entender El Principio de Reconocimiento Mutuo,” InDret, no. 1 (2017) and Szilárd Gáspár-Szilágyi, “Joined Cases Aranyosi and 
Căldăraru: Converging Human Rights Standards, Mutual Trust and a New Ground for Postponing a European Arrest Warrant,” 
European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 24, no. 2–3 (2016), 199.  
33 Aranyosi and Căldăraru, paras. 30-38. 
34 In accordance with art. 9 of the EAW-FD.  
35 Aranyosi and Căldăraru, para. 32. 
36 For an overview of European standards: European Parliament, “Prison Conditions in the Member States: Selected European 
Standards and Best Practices,” Brussels, 2017.  
37 Aranyosi and Căldăraru, para. 34. 
38 Ibid., para. 39. 
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a wide number of ECtHR cases and reports from the CPT,39 following on-site periodic visits and ad hoc 
visits between 2009 and 2015,40 suggested that there were high possibilities for Mr. Aranyosi to be exposed, 
if surrendered to Hungary, to detention conditions in obvious violation of article 3 ECHR, article 4 CFR 
and the general principles included in article 6 TEU. 
On the other side, Mr. Căldăraru, a Romanian national, was sentenced to a custodial sentence of 1 year 
and 8 months on 16 April 2015 for driving without a license. The alert issued in the SIS by the Romanian 
Court of First Instance in Fagaras (Judecătoria Făgăraş) had made his arrest possible by the Bremen 
authorities on 8 November 2015.  Also in this case, the facility in which the individual would have been 
detained had not been designated on time by the Judecătoria Făgăraş and, just as in the Aranyosi case, the 
Hanseatische Oberlandesgericht Bremen (Higher Regional Court of Bremen) was concerned about the 
detention conditions in Romanian prisons. Indeed, they were declared in violation of article 3 ECHR, article 
4 CFR, and general principles enshrined in Article 6 TEU because of their small, dirty and overcrowded 
cells, lack of heating and of warm water for showering.41 In addition, the Hanseatisches Oberlandesgericht 
in Bremen referred to the CPT’s conclusion – based on visits to Romanian detention centres between 5-17 
June 2014 – that correctional facilities in Romania were overcrowded.42 
In absence of a ground for refusal in cases in which the surrendered person might be subjected to  human 
rights’ infringements and since detention conditions that do not meet minimum standard requirements are 
considered as inflicting inhuman and degrading treatment to detainees,43 the Higher General Court of 
Bremen doubted the execution of the EAWs issued by Hungary and Romania and decided to refer both 
cases to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling concerning the Framework Decision.44 The German Court 
formulated its question in order to understand if article 1(3) of the EAW-FD should have been interpreted 
as meaning that the executing judicial authority must refuse the surrender of the requested person against 
an issuing state of which the detention conditions are proved to be in violation of article 4 of the CFR. 
In its ruling activity the Court considered relevant factors such as: (i) the “exceptional circumstances” in 
which the principles of mutual trust and recognition can be limited; (ii) article 1(3) of the EAW Framework 
Decision which subordinates the extradition tool to the respect of fundamental rights contained in the CFR 
and, above all, (iii) the absolute and non-derogable nature of the prohibition of inhuman and degrading 
treatment as stated in article 3 ECHR and article 4 of the CFR. The CJEU affirmed that “the consequence 
of the execution of such a warrant must not be that that individual suffers inhuman or degrading 
treatment.”45 
On 5 April 2016, on the occasion of the joined cases Aranyosi and Căldăraru, the CJEU stated that:  
‘where there is objective, reliable, specific and properly updated evidence with respect to 
detention conditions in the issuing member state that demonstrates that there are deficiencies, 
which may be systemic or generalised, or which may affect certain groups of people, or which 
may affect certain places of detention, […] [t]he executing judicial authority must postpone its 
decision on the surrender of the individual concerned until it obtains the supplementary 
information that allows it to discount the existence of such a risk. If the existence of that risk 
                                                 
39 After having received approximately 450 similar cases for inhuman detention conditions in Hungarian facilities, the ECtHR 
ruled about prison conditions in the pilot case Varga and Others v. Hungary, Judgment of 10 March 2015, Application N° 14097/ 
12, 45135/12, 73712/12, 34001/13, 44055/13 and 64586/13. 
40 The European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) is a 
specialised independent monitoring body of places of detention, it is part of the Council of Europe.  For the CPT reports on the 
detention conditions in Hungarian correctional facilities, see https://www.coe.int/en/web/cpt/hungary. 
41 Ibid., paras. 47-60. The CJEU refers to the ECtHR’s judgments of 10 June 2014: Voicu v Romania, (No 22015/10); Bujorean v 
Romania, (No 13054/12); Constantin Aurelian Burlacu v Romania, (No 51318/12); and Mihai Laurenţiu Marin v Romania, (No 
79857/12). 
42 Aranyosi and Căldăraru, para. 61. The CJEU refers to the following report: European Committee for the Prevention of Torture, 
“Rapport au Gouvernement de la Roumanie Relatif à la Visite Effectuée en Roumanie par le Comité Européen pour la 
Prévention de la Torture et des Peines ou Traitements Inhumains ou Dégradants (CPT) du 5 au 17 Juin 2014,” 24 September 
2015, CPT/Inf (2015), https://www.coe.int/bg/web/cpt/romania.  
43 In the pilot case Varga and Others v. Hungary, the ECtHR established that there is a violation of Article 3 when a detainee 
disposes of less than three square metres of personal space and that it is aggravated by lack of ventilation and lighting, lack of 
outdoor exercise and poor sanitary and hygiene conditions; the point is also considered by Popa, “The Clash between 
Fundamental Rights, Mutual Recognition & Public Security,” 12-13 and Lina Panella, “Mandato Di Arresto Europeo e Protezione 
Dei Diritti Umani: Problemi Irrisolti e ‘Incoraggianti’ Sviluppi Giurisprudenziali,” Freedom, Security & Justice: European Legal Studies, 
no. 3 (2017), 25-26. 
44 Aranyosi and Căldăraru, para. 63.  
45 Ibid., paras. 82-88. 
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cannot be discounted within a reasonable time, the executing judicial authority must decide 
whether the surrender procedure should be brought to an end.’46 
Trying to find a balance between the principle of mutual recognition and the protection of fundamental 
rights of the requested person,47 the position of the CJEU can be considered a breakthrough from the past.48 
Indeed, it moved from its previous approach, in which it protected the effectiveness of mutual recognition 
among member states, to favour a more balanced perspective towards stronger human rights’ protection.49 
Nevertheless, the Court has not gone too far with its judgment. Indeed, according to its reasoning, stating 
a higher position of fundamental rights over mutual trust would have undermined the principle itself and 
would have run against the text of the EAW Framework Decision. For this reason, instead of a new ground 
for refusal, it preferred to introduce a “less drastic” ground of mandatory postponement of the execution 
of an arrest warrant in case of potential breach of fundamental rights in the issuing state.50 
5. The Debate on the Future of the EAW-FD 
Due to the fact that the CJEU did not seize the opportunity of the joined cases to interpret article 1(3) FD 
as if installing a de facto ground for refusal in the case of possible inhuman and degrading treatment, rather 
providing a not too well-defined ground for postponement,51 one of the main current concerns is whether 
an explicit ground for refusal based on human rights’ protection should or should not be inserted  into the 
EAW-FD. The necessity to amend the FD stems from the fact that the same issue of risk of inhuman and 
degrading treatment will surely stir up again in the future since unsatisfactory prison conditions do not affect 
only Hungary and Romania. In fact, other countries such as Italy, Greece and Belgium have been scolded 
by the CJEU and other international organisations for not respecting minimum European standards on 
prison conditions.52 
The positions of the institutions in this debate are contrasting: since the initial proposal, the European 
Commission has retained that the EAW is subject to the rights contained in the ECHR and in the CFR,53 
even though the FD does not contain an explicit ground for refusal regarding the protection of human 
rights. It has also added that the compliance with fundamental rights, as required by article 1(3) of the FD, 
results in a de facto ground for refusal, at least as far as infringement of fundamental rights caused by 
inadequate detention conditions is concerned.54 In addition, in 2017, the Commission published a 
“Handbook on how to issue and execute a European arrest warrant”,55 in which it stated that, despite the 
lack of a specific provision to refuse the execution of a warrant in case of a breach of individuals’ 
fundamental rights in the issuing member states, a combined reading of article 1(3) together with recitals 12 
and 13 of the EAW-FD constitute an obligation to respect fundamental rights in the EAW’s context. 
To the contrary, the European Parliament, due to its concerns about “unacceptable conditions in a 
number of detention facilities across the Union and the impact that this has on the fundamental rights of 
the individuals concerned”, requested the Commission to submit legislative proposals providing for “a 
                                                 
46 Ibid., para. 104. 
47 Panella, “Mandato Di Arresto Europeo e Protezione Dei Diritti Umani,” 26. The author defines the CJEU’s ruling as a 
compromise between the respect for mutual recognition and human rights’ protection. 
48 Van der Mei, “The European Arrest Warrant System,” 899. 
49 Ralli, “The Principle of Mutual Recognition,” 5. 
50 Gáspár-Szilágyi, “Joined Cases Aranyosi and Căldăraru,” 211. 
51 Some mechanisms have been criticized to cause uncertainty in the field, such as the case of the two-step test introduced by the 
CJEU in the case Aranyosi and Căldăraru and of the vague definition of the “judicial authority” which conducts such test, as well 
as of the contradiction of the possibility of postponement of a warrant in case of risk of breach of human rights but impossibility 
to refuse it for the same reasons. Moreover, it is not clear if the new ground of postponement of the EAW only refers to art. 4 of 
the EU Charter or also to other fundamental rights. See Van der Mei, “The European Arrest Warrant System,” 886 and 
Bovend’Eerdt, “The Joined Cases Aranyosi and Căldăraru,” 118. 
52 De Morales Romero, “‘Dime Cómo Son Tus Cárceles.”; CPT annual reports (https://www.coe.int/en/web/cpt/annual-
reports) and public statements (https://www.coe.int/en/web/cpt/public-statements); Council of Europe, European Committee 
on Crime Problems, “White Paper on Prison Overcrowding,” Strasbourg, 2016. 
53 European Commission, “Commission Proposal for a Council FD on the EAW”, supra note 9, art. 26.  
54 European Commission, “Report to the European Parliament and the Council on the Implementation Since 2007 of the Council 
Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European Arrest Warrant and the Surrender Procedures between Member States, 
SEC/2011/430 final, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A52011DC0175. 
55 European Commission, Handbook on how to Issue and Execute a European Arrest Warrant, COM/2017/6389 final, 46. This position 
also recalls the judgment of the ECHR in Soering v UK Series A, Application no 161 (1989), which established an evaluation on a 
case-by-case basis when the obligation to extradite and fundamental rights’ protection have to be weighed.  
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mandatory refusal ground where there are substantial grounds to believe that the execution of the measure 
would be incompatible with the executing member state's obligation in accordance with Article 6 of the 
TEU and the Charter.”56 In 2011 already, the European Parliament argued that detention conditions which 
do not meet the standards required by the Council of Europe’s European Prison Rules,57 could be a reason 
for denying the transfer of prisoners.58 
As for the position of the CJEU with regard to the possibility of introducing a new ground for refusal 
based on fundamental rights’ protection, it is important to remember its previous approaches when it had 
to deal with the protection of such rights in the context of the EAW. For a long time, the Court had given 
priority to the effectiveness of the principle of mutual recognition over safeguarding human rights; indeed, 
as already mentioned, in the case of Leymann and Pustovarov (2008),59 the CJEU clearly stated that EU 
member states are obliged to act upon a European Arrest Warrant in order to fulfil the principle of mutual 
recognition and can only refuse to execute a warrant for reasons included in articles 3 and 4 of the EAW-
FD (mandatory and optional grounds). In Radu (2013) the Court widened its view recognising that the 
execution of a warrant may be subjected to the conditions laid down in article 5 of the FD.60 In Melloni 
(2013) the Court stated that the responding state could not rely on its higher level of protection of 
fundamental rights in order to refuse the request, because it would “undermine the principles of mutual 
trust and recognition […] and, therefore, compromise the efficacy of the FD.”61 
In spite of that, there have been some counter-tendencies in the ruling activity of the Court, indeed in 
Radu, Advocate General (AG) Sharpston, putting forward a comparison between the circumstances 
regulated by the EAW and the ones related to asylum seekers, disciplined by the Dublin Regulation,62 stated 
that:  
‘the competent judicial authority of the State executing a European arrest warrant can refuse 
the request for surrender […] where it is shown that the human rights of the person whose 
surrender is requested have been infringed, or will be infringed, as part of or following the 
surrender process.’63  
Advocate General Sharpston based her view on some interpretations of the FD given by other AGs of the 
Court.64 More specifically, her position aligns with the Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalón’s in 
the I.B. case, in which he considered that the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms is the premise 
which legitimates the existence and development of the AFSJ; indeed, it is stated in recitals 10, 12, 13 and 14, 
and in Article 1(3).65 Among other opinions considered by AG Sharpston to formulate her position,66 the 
opinion of Advocate General Mengozzi in the João Pedro Lopes Da Silva Jorge case plays an important role.67 
He suggested a “human-rights oriented” interpretation of the principle of mutual recognition when it has 
to be applied to the cooperation among EU member states in criminal matters.68 
Eventually, following the introduction by the CJEU of a ground for postponing the execution of a 
warrant in case of “real risk of inhuman or degrading treatment”,69 it can be said that a step towards a broad 
protection of detainees’ human rights had been made, even though it cannot be considered completely 
satisfying because it does not include a proper ground for refusal for human rights’ protection. Concerning 
                                                 
56 Euroepan Parliament, “Parliament Report with recommendations to the Commission,” F (ix), supra note 33. 
57 Council of Europe: Committee of Ministers, “Recommendation (2006)2 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on 
the European Prison Rules,” 11 January 2006. 
58 European Parliament, “Parliament Resolution on Detention Conditions in the EU 2011/2897(RSP), B7-0687/2011,” para. 6, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+MOTION+B7-2011-
0687+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN. 
59 Leymann and Pustovarov, para. 51. 
60 C-396/11, Ciprian Vasile Radu, EU: C:2013:39, paras. 36-42. 
61 C-399/11, Stefano Melloni v. Ministerio Fiscal, EU: C:2013:107, paras. 61-64. 
62 European Union law adopted in 2003, which establishes the criteria and mechanisms for determining the member state 
responsible for examining an asylum application lodged in one of the member states by a third-country national. 
63 Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston, Ciprian Vasile Radu, Case C-396/11, 2012, para. 97.  
64 Ibid., para. 71.  
65 Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalón, I.B. v Conseil des ministers, Case C‑ 306/09, 2010, para. 43.    
66 See Opinion of Advocate General Bot, Wolzenburg, Case C-123/08, 2009, paras. 148, 151 and Mantello, Case C-261/09, 2010, 
paras. 87-88. 
67 Opinion of Advocate General Mengozzi, João Pedro Lopes da Silva Jorge, Case C-42/11,2012, para. 28. 
68 Panella, “Mandato Di Arresto Europeo e Protezione Dei Diritti Umani,” 24. 
69 Aranyosi and Căldăraru. 
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the ruling in the joined cases Aranyosi and Căldăraru, the opinion of AG Bot is relevant: he denies the 
interpretation of article 1(3) of the EAW-FD as a ground for non-execution of an arrest warrant.70 The AG 
also stated that, giving to article 1(3) the meaning of a non-execution ground signifies not only overcoming 
the European legislator’s will,71 but also going against previous CJEU’s hearings.72  
Referring to CJEU’s Opinion 2/13, he argued that the very phrasing of the provision expresses the 
principle of mutual trust and not a non-execution ground of the warrant.73  Indeed, his main concern regards 
the fact that allowing the executing authority to check if the issuing authority complies with the fundamental 
rights’ protection as required within the EU would undermine mutual confidence among member states.74 
Moreover, if prison overcrowding is the reason why an always higher number of executing member states 
will not accept to surrender a requested person in an issuing state, the EAW would be paralysed. At the 
same time, he affirmed that reducing prison overcrowding in one member state only to increase it in another 
is a not solution.75 
Contrary to what AG Sharpston suggested in Radu, AG Bot also supported his opposition to the 
introduction of a new ground for refusal based on human rights protection averring that the same 
mechanism the Court established for the Common European Asylum System on occasion of the N.S. and 
others case cannot be applied in the EAW system because, in the text of the measure, no reference is made 
to the person “surrendered.”76  
It can be argued that Bot’s conclusions go against the hierarchy of EU law, provided by article 6 TEU, 
according to which the EU CFR – and therefore the prevalence of the respect of fundamental rights over 
the implementation of secondary EU legislation – has the same legal value as the Treaties. Bot’s position in 
the case has also been considered a “defeat” to the aim of ensuring the respect of fundamental rights in the 
AFSJ.77 
Simultaneously, there are many opinions in favour of the introduction of a new ground for refusal for 
the execution of the EAW in case of risk of inhuman and degrading treatment. These viewpoints are 
founded on the assumption that even though the FD contains certain provisions referring to the 
commitment of the EAW to the respect of human rights, those are not binding enough. The main critique 
addressed at article 1(3), which requires that the compliance with fundamental rights and principles stated 
in article 6 TEU not be modified by the FD, claims that it only provides obligation to the respect of human 
rights for the national legal authority of the EU member states, without considering such commitment from 
the EU as a whole.78 For this reason, according to J. Apap – Policy Analyst with the External Policies Unit 
of the Members' Research Service at the European Parliamentary Research Service – and S. Carrera – Senior 
Research Fellow and Head of Justice and Home Affairs Programme at the Centre for European Policy 
Studies (CEPS) – the protection of the surrendered person is not entirely guaranteed by the mentioning of 
article 6 TEU in the FD.79 Therefore, a new ground for refusal should be included in the text of the FD. 
Even though a combined reading of article 1(3), recital 10, 12, 13 of the EAW-FD and article 51 of the 
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights establishes a clear hierarchy of EU legislation and results in 
strengthening the commitment to the respect of human rights from member states,80 the necessity to 
introduce an explicit ground for the non-execution of a European warrant in protection of fundamental 
                                                 
70 Opinion of Advocate General Bot, Pal Aranyosi and Robert Căldăraru, Joined cases C-404/15 and C-659/15 PPU, 2016, para. 69. 
71 Who haven’t provided an explicit non-execution ground as the ones listed in art. 3 and art. 4 of the EAW-FD. 
72 Opinion of Advocate General Bot, Aranyosi and Căldăraru, paras 80-81, 92-93. 
73 Ibid., paras. 75-78. 
74 Ibid., para 109.  
75 Ibid., para 126.  
76 Opinion of Advocate General Bot, Aranyosi and Căldăraru, paras 90-91; Joined Cases C-411/10 and C-493/10, N.S. and others, 
EU:C:2011:865, para. 106. In N.S. the CJEU established that the extradition procedure must be prohibited when systemic 
deficiencies in the asylum procedure and in the reception conditions of asylum seekers in the issuing state would result in a real 
risk of inhuman and degrading treatment of the individuals concern.  
77 Gáspár-Szilágyi, “Joined Cases Aranyosi and Căldăraru,” 205. 
78 Schallmoser, “The European Arrest Warrant and Fundamental Rights,” 16; Cian C. Murphy, The European Evidence Warrant: 
Mutual Recognition and Mutual (Dis)Trust?, in Crime Within the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: a European Public Order, eds. Christina 
Eckes and Theodora Konstadinides (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 20, where “the warrants ultimately rely on 
national law enforcement authorities to act in a manner that respects human rights and the operation of the legislation is not 
subject to any system of oversight in EU law.” 
79 Apap and Carrera, “Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters-European Arrest Warrant,” 13. 
80 Weyembergh et al., “Critical Assessment of the Existing European Arrest Warrant,” I-10; Panella, “Mandato Di Arresto 
Europeo e Protezione Dei Diritti Umani,” 10; De Morales Romero, “‘Dime Cómo Son Tus Cárceles y Ya Veré Yo Si Coopero’.” 
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rights is still felt.81 One of the main reasons for that is fundamental rights’ protection, which comes from a 
broad and systemic interpretation of the FD. The latter does not fully guarantee the safeguarding of the 
requested individuals.82  
Furthermore, the fact that the FD includes some grounds of refusal means that mutual recognition is 
not prescribed in an absolute way; indeed, articles 3 and 4 of the directive do list some reasons that allow 
the non-execution of an EAW.  
6. Conclusion  
Human rights’ protection and mutual recognition are two principles recognised by the EU. Both of them 
are fragile and paramount to the functioning of the Union. The automaticity of the EAW, provided to 
ensure mutual recognition among member states, has presented challenges related to the ability of a state to 
refuse the execution of a warrant when it is incompatible with the protection of individuals’ human rights.83 
In fact, the high level of mutual trust among the states in the criminal field is based on the presumption that 
certain standards on human dignity and human rights’ protection are equally respected across the European 
Union.84 The cross-border fight against crime seems even more impelling in recent times due to the change 
in the type of public security threats, but this urgency cannot be the reason to downgrade and neglect human 
rights’ protection within the EU legal system.  
Since the Treaty of Westphalia (1648), national borders are intended to protect a certain territory and to 
guarantee security. Borders establish where the sovereignty of a state starts and where it ends. At the same 
time, the European Union is a supranational entity which tries to invert this tendency. With the advent of 
the EU, shared sovereignty and transnational governance have become new key notions.85 Indeed, the main 
objective of the AFSJ is to render the EU territory a common space without internal borders, in which 
security, citizen rights and free movement are granted over everything else, but this will not be possible if 
there is no trust among EU member states. To enhance judicial cooperation, states are required to lower 
their defences so the borders which divide them would be less marked. At the same time, “blind” and 
trustful cooperation is only possible in a context where human rights enjoy the same recognition in every 
country. Consequently, the nation-state conception of sovereignty would not be overcome until certain EU 
standards and principles are effectively respected by its member states. Therefore, the promotion of a better 
understanding of fundamental rights in Europe and the development of a positive attitude towards 
European physical and legislative dimension by member states – who should consider it as a guarantee 
instead of a limit – would only be a benefit to European cross-border cooperation against crime.  
  
                                                 
81 See for instance, Weyembergh et al., “Critical Assessment of the Existing European Arrest Warrant,” I-13; De Morales 
Romero, “‘Dime Cómo Son Tus Cárceles y Ya Veré Yo Si Coopero’.” 
82 Apap and Carrera, “Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters-European Arrest Warrant,” 7. 
83 Valsamis Mitsilegas, “The Limits of Mutual Trust in Europe’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: From Automatic Inter-
State Cooperation to the Slow Emergence of the Individual,” Yearbook of European Law 31, no. 1 (2012), 325. 
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